Ledger · the file as text
Actors
Every organisation, state and person in the file, with the basis for listing it.
- SAF, allied or supplier
- Reported link
- Commercial or context only
Procurement and supply networks
46The strongest evidence in the dossier: a sanctioned chain from the Defense Industries System through front companies and brokers to foreign suppliers.
Defense Industries System (DIS)
state military enterprise · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
OFAC: 'Sudan's largest defense enterprise... manufactures a range of small arms, conventional weapons, ammunition, and military vehicles for the SAF'; 2026: 'supports and maintains the SAF's arsenal of arms, ammunition, vehicles, and materi
CAEUUKUSGrade A: Official recordTarget Multiactivities Company Ltd (TMAC)
company · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
OFAC: 'TMAC has imported explosives and related material into Sudan from Egyptian and Indian companies, including... SBL Energy Limited. These explosives are subsequently used in bombs deployed by the SAF.' OFAC classifies it as 'Chemicals
USGrade A: Official recordstate-owned company · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
OFAC: 'Since the start of the conflict in April 2023, Ports Engineering has imported uniforms and footwear worn by Sudanese intelligence personnel from an Emirati company, and ammunition belts and boxes of weapons from a Turkish company.'
USGrade A: Official recordcompany · Sudan (joint venture of Giad group and Egypt-based Elsewedy Electric SAE, established 2002) · Reported or alleged link, not established
Consignee of RMIL brass-cup shipments in 2023; assessed by C4ADS as an intermediary between MASAD/DIS and the Indian supplier.
Grade A: Official recordperson (Director General, DIS) · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Director-General of DIS; appointed chairman of Zadna by Burhan in Oct 2021 (EU). EU: has travelled extensively with Burhan since the war began.
CAEUUSGrade A: Official recordcompany · India · Documented supplier or backer
OFAC: TMAC 'has imported explosives and related material into Sudan from Egyptian and Indian companies, including India-based explosives manufacturer, SBL Energy Limited (SBL). These explosives are subsequently used in bombs deployed by the
USGrade A: Official recordperson (broker; charged, not convicted) · United States / Iran · Reported or alleged link, not established
US prosecutors allege she brokered, on behalf of the Iranian government, sales of Iranian-made drones, bombs, bomb fuses and ammunition to Sudan's Ministry of Defence.
legalGrade A: Official recordperson (DIS official) · Sudan / Ukraine · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
DIS official and COO of Portex who 'coordinated the acquisition of Iranian-made UAVs from an Azerbaijani defense company for shipment to Sudan'.
UKUSGrade A: Official recordcargo airline · Russia · Reported or alleged link, not established
US-sanctioned Russian cargo airline identified by the Washington Post as flying Baykar weapons to Port Sudan via Bamako in 2024; its Il-76TDs are tracked by OSINT accounts flying Istanbul-Port Sudan in 2026.
Grade A: Official recordForeign listed industrial group · Egypt · Commercial or professional counterparty
The Ministry of Finance inventory (labels mistranslated as 'Swedish') shows 'Elsewedy Electric International' with 45% of the cable company beside Giad Metal Industries Complex 55% (earlier filing: Giad 85%, United Export 15%); 'Elsewedy El
legalGrade A: Official record'Poly (POLY)' Chinese company (as written; presumably Poly Technologies / China Poly Group)
foreign state-owned defence company · Reported or alleged link, not established
On 6 Sept 2024 in Beijing, in Burhan's presence, DIS director-general Mirghani Idris signed an agreement with 'Poly (POLY)' for 'strategic cooperation in vital and defence fields'. The official text says the contracts will 'contribute to su
Grade A: Official recordAtlas International Business LLC
company · Oman · Reported or alleged link, not established
ALLEGED (US v. Mafi): 'MAFI and Co-Conspirator-1 own and operate an Omani company, Atlas International Business LLC ("Atlas International," also known as "Atlas Global Holding" and "Atlas Tech LLC")'. Mafi 'facilitated a contract valued at
Grade A: Official recordcompany · Hong Kong · Documented supplier or backer
OFAC (16 Jan 2025): Abdalla is COO of Portex, 'a company that has transacted with entities involved in the sale of military equipment'; he 'coordinated the acquisition of Iranian-made UAVs from an Azerbaijani defense company for shipment to
UKUSGrade A: Official recordperson (DIS officer; managing director, TMAC) · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
OFAC release sb0544: senior DIS officer, managing director of TMAC
USGrade A: Official recordperson (chief executive, SBL Energy) · India · Documented supplier or backer
Chief executive officer of SBL Energy Limited.
legalUSGrade A: Official recordforeign state-owned defence company · Reported or alleged link, not established
On 5 Sept 2024 in Beijing, Burhan presided over the signing of a cooperation agreement between Sudan's Defense Industries System (DIS, US/EU-sanctioned) and CPMIEC, described as a company specialised in 'vital defence industries'. DIS direc
Grade A: Official recordSalah Abdallah Mohamed Salah ('Salah Gosh')
individual (official / former official) · Sudan · Reported or alleged link, not established
Former Director of Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Service. Named as a defendant; prosecutors attribute to him 'roles in direction and coordination' (2026) and say investigations 'confirmed' his involvement in 'managing illicit t
legalCAEUUSGrade A: Official recordTAE Avia (Transaviaexport Airlines)
state-controlled cargo airline · Belarus · Reported or alleged link, not established
OFAC designated JSC Transaviaexport Airlines (now OAO TAE Avia; Belarus registration number 100027245; established 28 December 1992; Minsk) on 2 December 2021 under E.O. 14038, calling it 'a GoB-controlled cargo carrier in Belarus that has
Grade A: Official recordRubystar Airways (UE RubiStar)
cargo airline · Belarus · Reported or alleged link, not established
OFAC designated UE RubiStar (a.k.a. Rubystar Airways; Belarus tax ID 600436180; registered office Smolevichi, Minsk region; organisation type 'freight air transport') on 9 August 2024 under the Belarus order E.O. 14038 and the Russia order
legalGrade A: Official recordcargo and passenger charter airline · Egypt · Reported or alleged link, not established
The company's own website describes it as 'an Egyptian carrier, founded in 2022' operating under the Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority. Its certificates page lists 'AOC Sky Vision No. 94 — valid to 17 Dec 2025' (the page had not been update
legalGrade A: Official recorddefence manufacturer · Türkiye · Documented supplier or backer
Washington Post (7 Mar 2025, leaked documents/messages): contract dated 16 Nov 2023 worth USD 120 million between Baykar and DIS, signed for DIS by Director General Mirghani Idris Suleiman, covering 600 warheads, six TB2 drones and three gr
Grade B: Corroboratedcompany · Türkiye · Reported or alleged link, not established
Turkish munitions-component manufacturer whose 'empty metal boxes' and 'springs' (assessed by C4ADS as ammunition boxes and link belts) were received by SAF-linked Ports Engineering Company in early 2024, via UAE-based Bond Technologies FZE
legalGrade B: Corroboratedairline · Iran · Documented supplier or backer
IRGC-linked cargo airline whose Boeing 747-200F EP-FAB flew repeated Iran-Port Sudan rotations coinciding with the appearance of Mohajer-6 and Ababil-3 drones in SAF service.
Grade B: CorroboratedChemtrade International Corporation
company · India · Commercial or professional counterparty
Exported compressed chlorine gas cylinders to Ports Engineering Company; one cylinder (serial GC-1983-1715, from a batch of 17 shipped from Nhava Sheva on 14 Jul 2024) was filmed after being used as a chemical weapon near al-Jaili refinery
legalGrade B: CorroboratedNew Way Cargo / Astraway FZC (Il-76 EX-76011, later ST-JAN)
airline · Kyrgyzstan / United Arab Emirates · Context only
Il-76 previously used on the UAE-Chad airlift for the RSF was transferred to the Sudanese register in Jan 2024 and flew airdrops for the SAF to El Fasher with a Russian crew until shot down on 21 Oct 2024.
Grade B: Corroboratedcargo charter airline · Egypt · Reported or alleged link, not established
Trade press and an industry database report that the Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority issued Air Master's air operator certificate on 27 February 2024, that it is a charter cargo carrier based at Cairo International Airport (IATA code MR,
legalGrade B: Corroboratedcompany · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Largest importer of HS-93 goods into Sudan in Amnesty's data; procured S-8 rocket components from Ashoka Manufacturing; flagged by UN Panel (2016) as a likely government front.
Grade C: Single sourceSAF Armament Committee (as named by UAE prosecutors)
military procurement body · Sudan · Reported or alleged link, not established
UAE authorities announced (30 Apr 2025) that they foiled an attempt to pass about 5 million rounds of 7.62x54 ammunition to the Sudanese army via a private aircraft; they allege former intelligence chief Salah Gosh ran the trafficking, that
Grade C: Single sourcecompany · India · Reported or alleged link, not established
Largest exporter of HS-93 goods to Sudan in Amnesty's trade data; supplied 'munition metal components', many of them parts for S-8 80mm air-to-ground rockets, to Marble Engineering; also sole supplier to TMAC 2016-2018.
Grade C: Single sourcecompany · United Arab Emirates · Reported or alleged link, not established
UAE-based intermediary that bought Karmetal boxes and 'springs' and shipped them to Ports Engineering Company in Sudan.
Grade C: Single sourceRashtriya Metal Industries Ltd (RMIL)
company · India (Mumbai) · Reported or alleged link, not established
Exported 7.62mm brass cups (cartridge-case precursors) to Giad Elsewedy Cables, a company C4ADS assesses to be an intermediary for the sanctioned Defense Industries System (MASAD), after the war began and after US sanctions on DIS/SMT.
Grade C: Single sourceCol. Othman Mohammed Al Zubair Mohammed (SAF financial officer, as named by UAE prosecution)
individual (official / former official) · Sudan · Reported or alleged link, not established
Described by UAE prosecutors as 'head of financial operations in the Sudanese military' (2025) and 'financial officer of the Port Sudan Authority' (2026) who coordinated the deals and transfers. Listed among the 13 individual defendants.
legalGrade C: Single sourcecompany · Russia · Reported or alleged link, not established
Exported civilian-variant rifles to SAF-linked Sudanese dealers (notably Wail Shams Trading) and to Al-Shagara Industrial Complex; weapons seen with both SAF and RSF.
Grade C: Single sourceindividual (official / former official) · Sudan · Reported or alleged link, not established
Senior SAF general (member of the Sovereignty Council; described in agency copy as army chief of staff). Listed among the 13 individual defendants and 'charged in absentia'; prosecutors call him deputy chair of the armament committee.
legalGrade C: Single sourceNational Aerospace Science and Technology Park (NASTP)
company · Pakistan · Reported or alleged link, not established
Co-developer with Baykar of the YIHA-III loitering munition identified in SAF strikes.
Grade C: Single sourcecompany · Turkey · Reported or alleged link, not established
Small-arms supplier to the SAF, including Burhan's security detail (SAR 15T rifles); exported 500+ M4-pattern rifles to Sudan in Jul/Dec 2022 and Apr 2023.
Grade C: Single sourceTula Cartridge Works (TulAmmo)
company · Russia · Reported or alleged link, not established
TulAmmo-branded 7.62x39 ammunition boxes were identified in videos with SAF soldiers in October 2024 (Sudan War Monitor, cited by C4ADS). How the ammunition reached Sudan is not established.
Grade C: Single sourcecompany · Sudan · Reported or alleged link, not established
Fifth-largest Sudanese weapons importer in Amnesty's data; main customer of Kalashnikov Concern; headquartered at the Military Officers' Club until at least 2020 per trade data.
Grade C: Single sourceApollara Electronics Trading Company
company (defendant in UAE prosecution) · UAE · Reported or alleged link, not established
One of six companies charged; role not specified. Prosecutors say payments 'were passed through licensed companies and bank accounts inside the country under cover of sham commercial transactions'.
Grade C: Single sourceOther Turkish small-arms exporters (Derya Arms, BRG Defense / Burgu Metal, Daglioglu Silah)
company · Turkey · Reported or alleged link, not established
Exported hunting shotguns/rifles to Sudan in recent years per trade data; BRG 55 rifles were documented with the RSF (not the SAF) in Darfur.
Grade C: Single sourcecompany (defendant in UAE prosecution) · UAE · Reported or alleged link, not established
One of six companies charged; role not specified in the reports read. Prosecutors say payments 'were passed through licensed companies and bank accounts inside the country under cover of sham commercial transactions'.
Grade C: Single sourcecompany (defendant in UAE prosecution) · UAE · Reported or alleged link, not established
One of six companies charged; role not specified. The name resembles Sudan's state-owned Sudamin Company Limited (UK-sanctioned 16 Jul 2026), but no source read links the two; treat as unverified. Prosecutors say payments 'were passed throu
Grade C: Single sourcecompany · Turkey · Reported or alleged link, not established
Supplied 40 R56 rifles to the Sudanese Ministry of National Defense (18 Mar 2022, labelled sporting/hunting rifles); seen with Burhan's security detail in Port Sudan, 28 Aug 2023.
Grade C: Single sourceWardat Al Masarra Trading Company
company (defendant in UAE prosecution) · UAE · Reported or alleged link, not established
One of six companies charged; role not specified. Prosecutors say payments 'were passed through licensed companies and bank accounts inside the country under cover of sham commercial transactions'.
Grade C: Single sourcecompany (defendant in UAE prosecution) · UAE · Reported or alleged link, not established
One of six companies charged; role not specified. Prosecutors say payments 'were passed through licensed companies and bank accounts inside the country under cover of sham commercial transactions'.
Grade C: Single sourcecompany · Pakistan · Reported or alleged link, not established
Manufacturer of Mohafiz armoured vehicles reported delivered to the SAF (approx. 100) in Aug 2026.
Grade D: Unverified lead
26 more actors below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
20 more actors at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
1 more actor at grade D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.
Foreign state support
23Iran, Türkiye and Egypt are the best documented. Several other states were checked and no support was found.
state · Iran · Documented supplier or backer
Supplier of armed drones and other weapons to the SAF via IRGC-linked cargo flights to Port Sudan after diplomatic relations were restored in October 2023; US government says the IRGC trained and supported the SAF-aligned Al-Baraa Bin Malik
Grade A: Official recordstate · Egypt · Documented supplier or backer
New in second pass: (1) Egypt itself reported to UN Comtrade exports to Sudan in 2023 of military weapons, parts and ammunition, plus explosives, detonators and chlorine in 2022-2025; (2) the NYT/Washington Post dossier (Sept 2026) says the
Grade A: Official recordstate · Eritrea · Documented supplier or backer
In Asmara on 26 Nov 2024 Burhan thanked Eritrea's government for 'positions supportive of Sudan'. Separately the Sudanese Navy announced on 26 July 2024 that it had received Eritrean naval vessels at Port Sudan; the Eritrean force commander
Grade A: Official recordstate · Türkiye · Documented supplier or backer
New in second pass: Turkey-reported customs data on arms-chapter and unmanned-aircraft exports to Sudan; reports of Turkish (and Iranian) technical teams at the SAF airbase near Port Sudan; unverified reports of Turkish cargo flights to Eas
Grade A: Official recordState · Azerbaijan · Reported or alleged link, not established
Sudan's Ministry of Defence reported that on 29 Sep 2026 the defence minister met Azerbaijan's defence minister in Baku during the sixth ADEX defence fair, accompanied by the deputy director-general of the Defense Industries System. They 'd
Grade A: Official recordstate · Belarus · Reported or alleged link, not established
Pre-war and 2023 supplier per SIPRI (first pass). Second pass found only civil/economic contact: the 5th Joint Belarusian-Sudanese Commission for Cooperation met in Minsk on 7 May 2026.
Grade A: Official recordstate · Russia · Documented supplier or backer
On 1 Dec 2024 Burhan handed Russia's ambassador a letter thanking Putin for his 'unlimited support for Sudan', citing Russia's recent Security Council veto as a 'noble position'.
Grade A: Official recordUnited Arab Emirates (gold market and banking channel)
state / market · UAE · Context only
Despite Port Sudan's accusations that the UAE arms the RSF, the UAE bought ~97% of official gold exports from SAF-held areas in 2024 (US$1.52bn, 48.5% of all Sudanese exports) and 56% in 2025. Exporters preferred Dubai for finance availabil
Grade A: Official recordstate · Saudi Arabia · Reported or alleged link, not established
SUNA, 16 Sept 2026: Sovereignty Council member and Chief of Staff (al-Atta) received the Saudi ambassador at the armed forces General Command – a military, not foreign-ministry, venue. Agenda not stated.
Grade A: Official record224th Flight Unit State Airlines
state-owned military cargo airline · Russia · Reported or alleged link, not established
OFAC designated Joint Stock Company The 224th Flight Unit State Airlines (Russian registration number 1097746281160, tax ID 7718763393; target type 'State-Owned Enterprise'; Moscow) on 19 May 2023 under E.O. 14024, as 'Linked To: Private Mi
Grade A: Official recordstate · Algeria · Reported or alleged link, not established
Al-Quds Al-Arabi relays a Bulgarian Military website claim that Algeria might give surplus MiG-29s to the Sudanese air force. Explicitly unconfirmed.
Grade A: Official recordNational Committee to investigate the US chemical-weapons allegations (Sudan)
government committee · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Formed by decision of the Transitional Sovereignty Council after the US announcement of May 2025 (Sudan's own statements to the OPCW give the decision as no. 139/2025; the foreign ministry announced the committee in press release 50/25 of 2
Grade A: Official recordstate · Qatar · Reported or alleged link, not established
Listed by several analytical sources as a political backer of the SAF and named in Sudanese press as a possible financier of the Pakistani arms package. No weapons transfer documented.
Grade A: Official recordstate · South Sudan · Context only
South Sudan exports crude through pipelines to the SAF-controlled Port Sudan terminal and pays per-barrel fees under inter-state agreements. A recurring hard-currency revenue stream for the SAF-led government, arising from a treaty obligati
Grade A: Official recordstate · China · Reported or alleged link, not established
Country of origin of recently manufactured mortars, small arms, drone jammers and commercial drones seen with SAF (and RSF). No source accessed documents a wartime state-to-SAF transfer of major Chinese systems.
Grade A: Official recordState · Indonesia · Context only
Sudan's Ministry of Defence reported that Indonesia's defence minister received Sudan's defence minister in Jakarta on 9-10 Sep 2026, 'the first visit of its kind'. Talks covered 'developing frameworks of military cooperation, widening trai
Grade A: Official recordLibya (Government of National Unity)
state · Libya · Reported or alleged link, not established
Military-to-military contact: on 5 April 2026 the GNU chief of staff received the SAF Military Intelligence director, Lt Gen Mohamed Ali Sabir, in Tripoli; the two sides agreed intelligence exchange, expanded training programmes and exchang
Grade B: Corroboratedstate / market · Oman · Commercial or professional counterparty
Bloomberg (Sept 2025): Port Sudan reached a preliminary agreement with Oman for bullion purchases after the UAE halted trade. Ordinary commerce.
Grade B: CorroboratedNational Service Projects Organization (NSPO), Egypt
Foreign state body (Ministry of Defence economic arm) · Egypt · Commercial or professional counterparty
The 25% Egyptian block whose holder was disputed is the armed forces' NSPO. On 4 June 2021 Egypt's Ministry of Supply reported a meeting of the company's board with a Sudanese delegation; three outlets carrying the statement quote Maj. Gen.
legalGrade B: Corroboratedstate · Pakistan · Reported or alleged link, not established
Negotiated a $1.5bn arms package for the SAF (reported Jan 2026), placed on hold in April 2026 after Saudi objection; Mohafiz armoured vehicles reportedly delivered Aug 2026; Pakistani-origin Shahpar drones and Turkish-Pakistani YIHA-III lo
Grade B: CorroboratedForeign state body (armed forces) · Qatar · Context only
The Ministry of Finance inventory relayed by C4ADS lists a Qatari armed-forces body (Arabic label: لجنة لتصنيع القوات المسلحة القطرية) holding 30% of Sur International Investment (reg. 17410, sector 'Defense'), beside Saria Industrial Group
Grade B: CorroboratedKyrgyzstan (aircraft registry)
state · Kyrgyzstan · Context only
Registry of origin of two Il-76 heavy transports transferred to Sudan (2024, 2025) per SIPRI; one (ex EX-76011) was shot down over North Darfur on 21 Oct 2024 while supplying SAF forces in El Fasher.
Grade B: Corroboratedstate · Somalia · Reported or alleged link, not established
Reported agreement (Jan 2025) to host SAF troops for training at Camp TURKSOM, in a plan said to involve Turkey, Egypt and Eritrea.
Grade D: Unverified lead
7 more actors below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
1 more actor at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.
1 more actor at grade D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.
State-owned and co-opted commercial entities
61Military-owned companies and the gold sector, together with their foreign commercial partners.
Sudan Master Technology / Giad Industrial Group
military-controlled holding company · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
OFAC 2023: SMT 'an arms company, is a shareholder in multiple Defense Industries System companies and a major shareholder in three companies involved producing weapons and vehicles for the SAF'. EU: GIAD conglomerate 'involved in the produc
CAEUUKUSGrade A: Official recordstate-owned mining-supply company · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
UK: 'a major state-owned gold mining company in Sudan with links to other SAF-owned mining companies, has provided the SAF with revenue from conflict gold'. UK press release adds past links to sanctioned (RSF) company Al Junaid.
UKGrade A: Official recordZadna International Company for Investment Ltd
military-owned holding company · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
OFAC: 'one of the most important components of the SAF's commercial empire... Formerly a subsidiary of... DIS... moved under the control of the SAF's Special Fund for the Social Security of the Armed Forces (SFSSAF) with the express purpose
CAEUUKUSGrade A: Official recordSpecial Fund for the Social Security of the Armed Forces (SFSSAF)
military fund · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Holding vehicle through which SAF controls Zadna and Omdurman National Bank (EU; C4ADS).
Grade A: Official recordSudanese Mineral Resources Company (SMRC)
state company · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Collects royalties and oversees gold sector for the Port Sudan (SAF-led) authorities; Chatham House treats gold revenue as central to SAF war financing. No sanctions designation.
Grade A: Official recordAdvanced Engineering Works Co. (AEW)
contracting / infrastructure / real-estate company (private limited, est. 1992, Khartoum) · Sudan · Commercial or professional counterparty
Its own website lists 'القوات المسلحة السودانية' (Sudanese Armed Forces) and 'منظومة الصناعات الدفاعية' (Defense Industries System) among clients, alongside ministries, Khartoum State, Sudatel Group, Bashayer Energy and UNAMID. News item Ju
Grade A: Official recordMining services company · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Inventory: Red Rock 99%, Giad for Cars 1% (historically 50% Advanced Technology Group and 50% one individual). It owns 87% of Brouj Industry Services and Consultancy Construction. The EU statement of reasons for Red Rock Mining Company (Jul
legalGrade A: Official recordEmiral Resources / Kush for Exploration and Production / Alliance for Mining
foreign-owned mining group · Sudan / UAE · Commercial or professional counterparty
Chatham House: Emiral owns Kush, which established Alliance for Mining in 2014; after the outbreak of war Alliance 'emerged as one of the leading companies selling its gold production to the SAF-led Port Sudan authorities'. STPT lists Kush/
Grade A: Official recordlisted mining company · Morocco · Commercial or professional counterparty
Ordinary licensed mining in SAF-held River Nile state; one of the franchise companies that resumed production (STPT; Minister of Minerals: a 'Moroccan' company among three that resumed). Pays royalties/state share under its concession; its
Grade A: Official recordmining company · Sudan · Documented supplier or backer
UK: 'as a gold mining company operating in territory controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and part-owned by the state-owned Sudamin Company Limited, it has provided the SAF with revenue from gold'.
UKGrade A: Official recordmining company · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
EU: 'provides funding to the armed groups behind the Sudanese conflict, most prominently to the SAF'; holds a concession near al-Damazin.
EUUKGrade A: Official recordstate-owned mining company · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
UK: 'has provided the SAF with revenue from conflict gold and other minerals'.
UKGrade A: Official recordstate-owned company · China · Reported or alleged link, not established
On 5 Sept 2024 Burhan received Norinco's general manager in Beijing with DIS chief Mirghani Idris present; the official readout says Norinco affirmed 'continued cooperation in joint defence and strategic projects'.
Grade A: Official recordMilitary aviation maintenance and training companies · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Safat Holding Complex: Military Industry Corporation (MIC) 50%, Brouj Industry and Construction Services 50%; it owns a third of Giad Industrial Group (with Saria Industrial Complex and Blue Optics). Safat Aircraft Repair Complex (reg. 1949
Grade A: Official recordAHCOF (Chinese agricultural trader; agreement with DIS's Export Development Group)
Company · China · Commercial or professional counterparty
DIS's page reported that 'the Export Development Group, one of the business groups of the Defense Industries System', and 'the Chinese company AHCOF' signed 'agreements to develop the agricultural sector' in Burhan's presence; AHCOF's repre
Grade A: Official recordDongfeng Motors / Dongfeng Automobile / 'Zhenghou Annaide'
foreign vehicle manufacturers / Sudanese military-linked industrial group · Commercial or professional counterparty
On 4 Sept 2024 Burhan witnessed in Beijing an agreement between Giad Engineering Group (DIS-linked; Giad/SMT is sanctioned) and three Chinese groups making electric cars, trucks and machinery. Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim and DIS chief M
Grade A: Official recordHong Kong Matrix Golden Fortune Mining Limited
private company (acquisition vehicle) · Hong Kong SAR · Commercial or professional counterparty
New wartime foreign investor in a project in which the Sudanese government holds a reported 20%. Ordinary commercial acquisition; no military link documented. Whether Port Sudan authorities approved the change of control is not stated in th
Grade A: Official recordForeign state-owned public works company (Ministry of Defence) · Syria · Context only
The Ministry of Finance inventory relayed by C4ADS lists 'Syrian Military Housing Corporation' (مؤسسة الإسكان العسكرية السورية) with 50% of Sudanese Syrian Housing and Development (reg. 17715, sector 'Defense'); the other 50% is held by Sud
Grade A: Official recordmobile operator, subsidiary of MTN Group (South Africa) · Sudan / South Africa · Commercial or professional counterparty
Ordinary commerce. 'MTN Fintech (Momo)' appears on the Central Bank of Sudan list of licensed internal-transfer companies.
Grade A: Official recordChinese mining company; reported to belong to the NORINCO group (state-owned defence conglomerate) · China; Hong Kong subsidiaries · Commercial or professional counterparty
Majority owner-designate of Sudan's Gabgaba-Block 15 gold project in SAF-held territory. STPT reported SMRC courting 'Narinco' to return, expecting 6-7 t/yr. A July 2026 article (Mideast Journal, single source, anonymous sourcing) alleges '
Grade A: Official recordPerseus Mining Limited (Meyas Sand Gold Project, Block 14)
listed gold miner (ASX/TSX: PRU) · Australia · Context only
None documented. Development was frozen from April 2023; Perseus cited the 'protracted armed conflict in Sudan'. Other holders of the project: Sudanese government 20% and Meyas Nub Multiactivities 10% (press).
Grade A: Official recordRida Engineering (Rida/Radah Engineering and Construction)
Engineering and construction company · Sudan · Context only
The UK notice of 16 July 2026 gives Omdurman Mining's parents as '82% owned by Rida Engineering and 18% owned by the state-owned Sudamin Mining Company'. The Ministry of Finance inventory has the same split under the label 'Radah Engineerin
legalGrade A: Official recordlimited liability company (Dubai mainland) · UAE (Dubai) · Context only
None documented. Listed because its parent was designated by OFAC on 26 June 2026 for supplying Target Multiactivities Co; OFAC's release does not name the Dubai units and no source links them to Sudan shipments.
Grade A: Official recordSBL International Trading FZCO
free-zone company · UAE (Dubai Airport Freezone) · Context only
None documented (see S B L Overseas Trading).
Grade A: Official recordWanbao Sahari Mining (Chinese concession holder, Red Sea State)
Company · China / Sudan · Commercial or professional counterparty
SMRC's page reported a meeting on 26 Aug 2026 with the management of 'the Chinese mining company Wanbao Sahari' on 'resuming and continuing technical and exploration work in the company's concession blocks in Red Sea State' up to a feasibil
Grade A: Official recordChinese energy/mining firms (CCCC group named)
foreign companies · Commercial or professional counterparty
On 4 Sept 2024 Burhan witnessed agreements on solar power, mining (iron ore, precious metals) and transmission lines with Chinese companies; the Sudanese signatory was the CEO of the 'Energy and Mining Group' and the DIS director-general at
Grade A: Official recordKaradeniz Holding (Karpowership) - power ship at Port Sudan
Company · Türkiye · Commercial or professional counterparty
The Turkish ambassador visited 'the power station ship of Karadeniz Holding moored in the Red Sea, which contributes greatly to supplying Port Sudan with electricity' and 'produces 80 megawatts' (25 Sep 2024). He added that Turkish companie
Grade A: Official recordCharitable Organization / Authority for the Support of the Armed Forces (CASAF)
SAF-directed charitable investment arm · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
C4ADS: 'Multiple SAF-directed charities, including the Special Fund for the Social Security of the Armed Forces (SFSSAF), the Charitable Authority for the Support of the Armed Forces (CASAF), and other, smaller funds, operate overlapping co
Grade B: CorroboratedEgyptian-Sudanese Company for Development and Multiple Investments (ESC)
joint-stock company - Egyptian state/military and Sudanese military-industrial joint venture · Egypt (launched in Cairo) · Reported or alleged link, not established
A standing commercial channel in which Sudan's sanctioned military-industrial conglomerate (DIS: US 1 Jun 2023, EU 22 Jan 2024, UK) is a 40% partner of Egyptian state and reportedly military-owned companies; trade settled in local currencie
legalGrade B: CorroboratedMartyr Organization (Munazzamat al-Shahid)
State-affiliated foundation · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
The inventory lists the Martyr Organization and its state branches as government organisations: 4.69% of Omdurman National Bank; 89.92% of Khartoum for Dairy Products (reg. 2104), beside a 10.08% holder labelled 'Swedish Monetary Fund for D
Grade B: Corroboratedcompany · Sudan · Context only
Pre-war foreign military shareholder in a Sudanese defence-ministry company. No wartime activity documented.
Grade B: CorroboratedAswar Multi Activities Co. Ltd
military-intelligence-controlled company · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Holding company under the DIS umbrella operated by SAF military intelligence. Under a five-year contract with Wagner-linked M Invest it received a US$200,000 'goodwill fee', US$100,000 per month and US$500 per Russian staff member, in retur
Grade B: CorroboratedHolding Company for Food Industries (Egypt)
Foreign state-owned holding company (Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade) · Egypt · Commercial or professional counterparty
Its chairman, Maj. Gen. Ahmed Hassanein, said on 4 June 2021 that the holding company owns 25% of the Egyptian-Sudanese Company for Development and Multiple Investments, that 'cooperation with the Sudanese Etegahat company goes back to 2014
Grade B: CorroboratedGold-mining joint venture · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Inventory: reg. 43357, registered 14 August 2013, sector 'Energy - sub', capital 100,000; shareholders (historical rows only) SMT Engineering 70% and Sudamin 30%. Chatham House describes the same split for Block 3A: 'the Mining Ministry awa
legalGrade B: CorroboratedMeroe Gold / M Invest / Al-Solag Mining
foreign-owned mining company (Wagner/Africa Corps network) · Russia / Sudan (Al-Abidiya, River Nile) · Reported or alleged link, not established
Wagner-linked subsidiary that received the state's 30% share of Block 3A in 2018 and paid SAF military-intelligence company Aswar for services. STPT (Oct 2024) lists 'Russian-owned Meroe Gold' among franchise companies that restarted produc
Grade B: Corroboratedrefinery · Saudi Arabia · Commercial or professional counterparty
First named foreign refinery found. In January 2026 its chairman Suleiman bin Saleh al-Othaim told Sudan's minerals minister and the head of the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company that it was ready to 'begin purchasing operations immediatel
Grade B: CorroboratedShalateen Mineral Resources Company
State-owned mining company · Egypt · Reported or alleged link, not established
Egyptian state company created in 2012 to organise gold prospecting in the Eastern Desert (former petroleum minister Osama Kamal to Asharq Al-Awsat, 2 Jul 2026). It granted eight new licences in early 2026, bringing to 61 the companies work
legalGrade B: CorroboratedMilitary Industrial Complex Holding (MIC Holding)
holding company · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
DIS holding vehicle.
Grade B: CorroboratedSouth Valley Development Company (Egypt)
Foreign state-owned company (Holding Company for Construction and Development) · Egypt · Commercial or professional counterparty
The chairman of Egypt's Holding Company for Construction and Development told Al Mal that South Valley Development would take about 10% of the new company, 'equivalent to EGP 50 million'. The ministry statement of 4 June 2021 repeats the 10
Grade B: CorroboratedSudan-Qatar gold refinery project / AWJ Investment and Development
investment vehicle · Qatar / Sudan · Commercial or professional counterparty
Port Sudan authorities sought to reduce dependence on the UAE by agreeing with Qatar (reported 1 May 2024) to build a refinery in Doha for Sudanese gold. On 10 March 2025 Qatar Chamber and a Sudanese delegation launched AWJ Investment and D
Grade B: CorroboratedZain Sudan (Sudanese Mobile Telephone (Zain) Co. Ltd)
mobile operator, subsidiary of Zain Group (Kuwait) · Sudan / Kuwait · Commercial or professional counterparty
Ordinary commerce: licensed operator paying taxes/fees to the Port Sudan authorities. No documented support to the military in sources read.
Grade B: Corroboratedstate geological company · Russia · Commercial or professional counterparty
May 2025, Moscow: Sudan's Minerals undersecretary (Dr Hind Siddig) and the company discussed 'the status of implementation in the concession area awarded to the Russian side', resuming war-halted work and the geological map; Russian interes
Grade B: CorroboratedAD Ports Group and Invictus Investment (Abu Amama port)
foreign SOE / private investor consortium · UAE · Context only
None after cancellation. A US$6bn preliminary agreement (Dec 2022) for a Red Sea port, free zone and farm project, with a US$300m central-bank deposit, was cancelled by Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim in Nov 2024 over alleged UAE support fo
Grade B: CorroboratedPrinting company, engineering company and education foundation · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Karari for Printing, Publishing and Distribution (reg. 2820, 'Defense'): Military Industry Corporation 50%, Military Economic Authority 50%; holds 0.42% of Omdurman National Bank. Karari Engineering Company (reg. 44257, registered 2 May 201
Grade B: Corroboratedstate refinery · Sudan (Khartoum) · Context only
State refinery; captured by the RSF in the first two months of the war with an estimated 1.3 t of unrefined gold (~US$150m). Named in CBOS Circular 17/2025 (Nov 2025) among bodies in the restored export framework.
Grade B: Corroboratedpublic listed telecom group (Khartoum Stock Exchange; Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange) · Sudan · Commercial or professional counterparty
Not documented as support. Governance link: the chairman named in the statements matches Gen. Ibrahim Jaber (Jabir), reported as assistant commander-in-chief of the SAF and member of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, who is also reporte
Grade C: Single sourceMilitary industrial complex (textiles, leather, consumer goods) · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Appears in the inventory only as a shareholder (no shareholder rows of its own): a third of Giad Industrial Group; 99.9% of Al-Sadaqa for Textiles (reg. 2993); 45.45% of White Nile for Leather Industries (reg. 6055, 'Defense'; Ministry of D
Grade C: Single sourceSudanese Syrian Housing and Development
Joint venture company (military housing) · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Reg. 17715, sector 'Defense' in the Ministry of Finance inventory. Shareholders: Military Housing Fund 50% and Syrian Military Housing Corporation 50% (current rows); Military Housing Corporation 50%, Sudanese Military Housing Fund 25%, Al-
Grade C: Single sourceEtegahat / Multiple Directions Company
DIS subsidiary · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Vehicle through which DIS holds its stake in the Egyptian-Sudanese Company.
Grade C: Single sourceYarmouk Industrial Complex / Yarmouk Industrial Services
Military industrial complex and its services company · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Yarmouk Industrial Services: 'Military Industry Corporation Yarmouk Industrial Complex' 99% and SMT Engineering 1% (historically MIC 99%). It holds 5% of Jolly Holding (reg. 31684, registered 28 Nov 2007, 'Defense', MIC 95%) and 40% of Naha
Grade C: Single sourceShining Transport and Investment (Al-Sati')
Transport and investment company · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Reg. 20487, registered 6 July 2003, sector 'Defense', active, capital 100,000,000 (currency and date not stated). Current shareholders: National Economic Authority 99.9% and Sheikan Insurance 0.1%; historically Military Truck Management 95%
Grade C: Single sourceWafra for Chemicals and Medical Technical Services / Wafra Pharma
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals companies · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Wafra for Chemicals and Medical Technical Services (reg. 2635, sector 'Defense'): currently Federal Martyr Organization 99.8% and Global Ideal 0.2%; historically Military Commercial Corporation 96%, Military Service Corporation 2%, Military
Grade C: Single sourceMilitary Commercial Corporation
SAF economic body · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Classed as a foundation in the inventory. Historical holdings: 70% of Red Sea Navigation and Services (reg. 2841, registered 21 June 1984, 'Defense', active), 66.59% of Sheikan Insurance and Reinsurance, 96% of Wafra for Chemicals and Medic
Grade C: Single sourceSudanese Free Zones and Markets Company
Free-zone operator · Sudan · Context only
Reg. 8323, sector 'Investment'. Only historical shareholder rows exist: 'The Islamic Bank of Dubai' 74.28%, one natural person 24.7%, Ministry of Finance 0.74%, Omdurman National Bank 0.25%, and near-zero holdings for Sheikan Insurance, Ban
Grade C: Single sourceDelgo Mining (Sudan government - Tahe Mining JV)
joint venture · Sudan (Northern State) / Turkiye · Commercial or professional counterparty
Chatham House: after the war began 'the governor of Northern state underscored the need to continue the work of the company under any condition to financially support the war'; security forces violently suppressed residents protesting conta
Grade C: Single sourceforeign state-owned company · Qatar · Commercial or professional counterparty
Announced in May 2026 it would resume an US$800m copper project (with gold exploration; seven exploration blocks across Khartoum, Northern and River Nile states) after meeting Sudan's Minister of Minerals and SMRC. Ordinary investment with
Grade C: Single sourcestate company / official · Sudan (Egypt named as cotton partner) · Reported or alleged link, not established
Ayin reports the army 'set foot' in the Sudanese Cotton Company by appointing the former intelligence service director (Oct 2025), as part of a contest for economic influence between SAF and Joint Force movements.
Grade C: Single sourceprivate Saudi contracting/energy group · Saudi Arabia · Commercial or professional counterparty
10 Sep 2026: MoU with Sudan's energy ministry to rehabilitate the war-damaged Khartoum (Al-Jaili) refinery and build a new refinery at Port Sudan. Reconstruction commerce; not binding yet.
Grade C: Single sourceServices and construction companies of the Military Industry Corporation / Giad · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Brouj Industry Services and Consultancy Construction (reg. 23778, registered 20 Dec 2004, active, capital 5,000,000): currently Advanced Mining Works 87% and Military Industry Corporation 13% (historically MIC 98%). 'Brouj' (reg. 10091, 'De
Grade C: Single sourceChina National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)
foreign state-owned company · China · Context only
None documented in wartime. CNPC declared force majeure (June 2025) and on 19 Nov 2025 asked to terminate the Block 6 (Balila, West Kordofan) production-sharing and pipeline agreements by 31 Dec 2025, citing destroyed facilities and 'zero r
Grade C: Single sourcesecurity-service-owned gold trading company · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Named by Chatham House as the NISS (now General Intelligence Service) gold-trading company, alongside SAF's Sudan Master Technology/Red Rock and the RSF's Al-Junaid.
Grade C: Single source
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16 more actors at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
Financial enablers and gatekeepers
34Gold revenue, state banks and registered lobbyists are documented. No public evidence of crypto use, named formation agents or hawala operators.
bank (military-owned) · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
C4ADS: 'gives the Sudanese military access to international finance and facilitates its ability to transfer funds without oversight'.
Grade A: Official recordcentral bank · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Banks listed by CBOS as its correspondents (AED, EUR, GBP, SAR, TRY, USD). Provides the Port Sudan authorities' access to international payments. Correspondent banking with a central bank is ordinary, lawful commerce; listing implies no wro
Grade A: Official recordAl Zawaya Group for Development and Investment (chaired by Abdelbasit Hamza)
business group (Bashir-era Islamist financier network) · Sudan; subsidiaries in Turkiye, Spain, Cyprus, Austria, Egypt · Context only
INDIRECT / CONTESTED. Sanctioned for financing Hamas, not for supporting the SAF. Relevance: the Empowerment Removal Committee seized the group's assets in April 2020 (79 properties, est. US$1.2bn, incl. hotel, mall and MTN Sudan shares); a
Grade A: Official recordlobbying firm · United States · Commercial or professional counterparty
Registered for the Embassy of the Republic of Sudan (official contact: Counselor Abasher A. Khidir Mohamed) for 'advocacy services relative to U.S.-Republic of Sudan bilateral relations', trade and investment.
Grade A: Official recordBank of Khartoum (and Bankak platform)
commercial bank (majority foreign-owned) · Sudan / UAE (Abu Dhabi branch) · Commercial or professional counterparty
Largest commercial bank; its Bankak app carries transfers for millions of displaced people and public institutions. Chatham House: disruption 'would have severe consequences for the SAF and the public sector'. Its Abu Dhabi branch receives
Grade A: Official recordDevelopment Bank of the Republic of Belarus
state development bank · Belarus · Commercial or professional counterparty
Belarus and Sudan signed a general intergovernmental agreement on export credits in Minsk on 7 May 2026 (negotiation authorised by Council of Ministers Resolution No. 169; approved by Resolution No. 443). After the joint commission's prepar
Grade A: Official recordEl Nilein Bank (Abu Dhabi branch)
state-owned commercial bank with foreign branch · Sudan / UAE (Abu Dhabi) · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Chatham House: 'The Port Sudan authorities depend mainly on the Abu Dhabi branch of the state-owned El-Nilein Bank to manage international transactions, a critical asset considering Sudan’s post-coup international isolation.' STPT: gold exp
Grade A: Official recordperson (Finance Minister; JEM leader) · Sudan · Allied force or mobilisation network
Finance minister of the SAF-led government and JEM chairman. Stated that war financing is the first spending priority (STPT); confirmed in April 2024 that gold from government-held areas still went to Dubai; announced cancellation of the Ab
USGrade A: Official recordDickens & Madson (Canada) Inc.
lobbying firm · Canada (registered under US FARA no. 6200) · Context only
June 2019 agreement with the Transitional Military Council to lobby the US and others, seek funding and arrange meetings for the council leadership. Signed for the council by its then deputy leader, Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (now RSF comma
Grade A: Official recordElectronic Banking Services (EBS) - SWIFT service bureau
payments infrastructure company (central bank holds a stake) · Sudan · Commercial or professional counterparty
Context: infrastructure through which banks in SAF-held areas reconnect to cross-border payments. Accredited as Sudan's first SWIFT service bureau (announced June 2026); the central bank took a 'strategic stake' on 15 January 2026; 26 banks
Grade A: Official recordgold refiner and bullion dealer · United Arab Emirates (Dubai / Sharjah) · Context only
Global Witness (July 2020) reported that between 2012 and 2019 Kaloti repeatedly acquired large quantities of gold from Sudan's central bank, which bought from Jebel Amer in Darfur, and that Swiss refiner Valcambi took about 20 tonnes from
legalGrade A: Official recordNelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
law / lobbying firm · United States · Context only
Engaged after the Oct 2021 coup by the Republic of Sudan through the Commission for Social Safety, Solidarity and Poverty Reduction to advise on relations with the US Government, NGOs and press.
Grade A: Official recordlobbying firm · United States · Commercial or professional counterparty
Registered for the Embassy of the Republic of Sudan: federal executive and legislative lobbying and public-affairs consulting on 'humanitarian and foreign relations policy concerns'.
Grade A: Official recordlobbying firm · United States · Commercial or professional counterparty
Registered for the Embassy of Sudan (official contact: Ambassador Mohamed Abdalla Idris): 'strategic counsel, tactical planning and government relations assistance' before the US government, Congress and think-tanks.
Grade A: Official recordlobbying firm (subcontractor) · United States · Commercial or professional counterparty
Subcontractor to Ballard Partners for the Embassy of the Republic of Sudan: advocacy before the US Government and monitoring legislation.
Grade A: Official recordlaw firm · United States · Commercial or professional counterparty
Legal services to the Republic of the Sudan 'in connection with pending litigation in the United States'; filing made 'as a cautionary measure'. Engagement began under the Bashir government and ran through the transition, coup and first yea
Grade A: Official recordEmpowerment Removal Committee (ERC) - seizure record and 2026 revival in exile
anti-corruption body (2019-2021; reconstituted outside Sudan March 2026) · Sudan (now operating from abroad) · Context only
Source of the only official record of NCP/Islamic Movement business assets. The C4ADS compilation of its decisions lists 123 seized entities, including the Danfodio group (holding, trading, contracting, petroleum services, advanced industri
Grade A: Official recordDubai Islamic Bank (shareholder in Bank of Khartoum)
foreign commercial bank · UAE · Commercial or professional counterparty
Significant shareholder in Bank of Khartoum (Chatham House). Listed for structural context only; no allegation of support to the SAF.
Grade B: CorroboratedSheikan Insurance and Reinsurance (Shiekan)
Insurance company · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
The inventory holds three or four records for what is probably one insurer (Sheikhan for Insurance and Reinsurance; Sheikhan for Insurance; Sheikhan National Insurance and Reinsurance; Sheikan Insurance Company). Historical shareholders: Mi
Grade C: Single sourcecommercial bank · Oman · Commercial or professional counterparty
Signed a 'strategic MoU' with Omdurman National Bank on 1 Oct 2025 on Islamic-finance cooperation. The release does not specify correspondent or remittance services. Lawful commercial agreement with a non-sanctioned bank.
Grade C: Single sourceBank of Russia (Central Bank of the Russian Federation)
foreign central bank · Russia · Commercial or professional counterparty
STPT: in Aug 2024 a Bank of Russia delegation met the CBOS governor in Port Sudan on correspondent ties, bank branches, local-currency settlement and financing of gold investment. STPT's assessment (not a documented fact) is that Russia wou
Grade C: Single sourceNorthern State Chamber of Commerce
business association · Reported or alleged link, not established
SUNA, 11 Aug 2023: the Northern State Chamber of Commerce 'announces its support for all programmes backing the armed forces'.
Grade C: Single sourceGezira State intercity bus operators' chamber
business association · Reported or alleged link, not established
SUNA, 15 June 2023: the travel-bus chamber in Gezira State donated SDG 10 million to the armed forces.
Grade C: Single sourceKarima - Merowe commercial bus line steering committee
Business association · Sudan · Reported or alleged link, not established
The armed forces' page reported that the 19th Infantry Division 'received a support and solidarity convoy for the armed forces from the steering committee of the commercial buses of the Karima - Merowe line', in the presence of the locality
Grade C: Single sourcebusiness association · Reported or alleged link, not established
SUNA reported on 12 May 2023 that the Kassala Chamber of Commerce dispatched 'the first of its convoys to support the armed forces'.
Grade C: Single sourceKhartoum State Employers' Union
business association · Context only
PRE-WAR CONTEXT: on 24 Feb 2021 the Sovereignty Council secretary-general received SDG 2 billion for the armed forces from the Khartoum State employers' union (during the al-Fashaga border confrontation). Shows an established channel of bus
Grade C: Single sourceMinistry of Foreign Affairs staff
state institution (employees' collection) · Reported or alleged link, not established
On 23 Dec 2024 Burhan received from Foreign Minister Ali Yousif a 'personal donation' from ambassadors, diplomats and staff at headquarters and missions abroad 'in support of the armed forces in the Battle of Dignity'. No amount is given.
Grade C: Single sourceRed Sea State Workers' Union / Sudan Workers' Trade Union Federation
trade union federation (state-aligned) · Reported or alleged link, not established
On 11 Sept 2025 Lt Gen Ibrahim Jabir received 150 million Sudanese pounds from the Red Sea State workers' union 'to support the war effort of the armed forces and their supporting forces'; the federation's president pledged continued suppor
Grade C: Single sourceSama Sudan network (pro-army pages run from Turkey and Syria)
information-operations network · Turkey / Syria · Reported or alleged link, not established
Beam Reports found five Facebook pages with 787,000+ followers, mostly administered from Turkey and Syria, spreading misleading content in support of the army and against civilian forces, the RSF and the UAE; an affiliated website publishes
Grade C: Single sourcestate governments · Reported or alleged link, not established
Kassala's governor told the Council of Ministers that the spending priority is support for the war effort (SUNA, 23 Apr 2024); Gedaref's finance ministry said the same of its 2024 budget (reported 29 Mar 2024). Indicates state-level budget
Grade C: Single sourceZakat Chamber (Diwan al-Zakat), Gezira State
state religious-tax body · Reported or alleged link, not established
SUNA, 14 June 2023: the Gezira State Zakat Chamber sent a 'support and backing convoy to the armed forces' – i.e. statutory alms funds directed to the army.
Grade C: Single sourceZakat Chamber (Diwan al-Zakat), River Nile State
State body · Sudan · Reported or alleged link, not established
The armed forces' page reported on 7 May 2024 that 'the Zakat Chamber, in coordination with the armed forces in River Nile State, inaugurates support for medical services and the war effort' in the presence of the 3rd Infantry Division comm
Grade C: Single sourcebusiness association · Reported or alleged link, not established
Pro-army channel post (7 Aug 2024) showing the launch of 'war effort support presented by the Merowe Chamber of Commerce to the mujahideen', alongside continuing training.
Grade D: Unverified leadZakat Chamber, North Kordofan (El Obeid)
state religious-tax body · Reported or alleged link, not established
Pro-army channel post (16 June 2024): North Kordofan's Zakat Chamber supported the regular forces with SDG 50,000,000 'for the war effort in the state' at Eid al-Adha.
Grade D: Unverified lead
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2 more actors at grade D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
Command, allied forces and mobilisation
24Sanctioned command figures, allied armed groups, and the domestic funding of mobilisation.
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) - institutional conduct
state armed force · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
SAF itself. The US TIP Reports 2024 and 2025 place Sudan on Tier 3 and find 'a government policy or pattern of employing or recruiting child soldiers'. TIP 2025: 'The SAF and the RSF recruited and used child soldiers, including children who
Grade A: Official recordJoint Force of Armed Struggle Movements
armed group coalition · Sudan · Allied force or mobilisation network
Allied with SAF since Nov 2023; leaders hold state office (Gebreil Ibrahim, JEM - Finance Minister; Minni Minnawi, SLM-MM - Darfur governor). OFAC on JEM: 'has contributed thousands of its followers to fight the RSF, leading to the destruct
Grade A: Official recordIslamist militia aligned with SAF · Sudan · Allied force or mobilisation network
Fights under SAF orders. OFAC: BBMB 'traces its origins to Sudan's Popular Defense Forces', 'has contributed upwards of 20,000 fighters in the conflict against the RSF, using training and weapons provided by the IRGC', and its fighters 'hav
USGrade A: Official recordPopular Resistance / National Committee for Mobilization
state-sponsored mobilisation force · Sudan · Allied force or mobilisation network
Created by SAF. FFM A/HRC/57/23 para 25: 'The leadership of the Sudanese Armed Forces established a committee to coordinate the recruiting, arming and financing of new militias.' CRP.6 para 84: 'In May 2024, SAF General Command issued The R
Grade A: Official recordSudanese Muslim Brotherhood / Sudanese Islamic Movement
political-religious organisation · Sudan · Allied force or mobilisation network
US State Department designated Sudan's Muslim Brotherhood (covering the Islamic Movement and its armed wing, the Baraa bin Malik brigade) as a terrorist organisation, announced 9 Mar 2026; says many of its fighters received training and oth
USGrade A: Official recordSAF-aligned militia · Sudan · Allied force or mobilisation network
Fights alongside SAF since leader Abu Aqla Keikal defected back from the RSF in Oct 2024 (previously SAF-aligned 2022-Aug 2023, then RSF, as RSF 'governor' of Gezira from Dec 2023). ABUSES: HRW found SSF 'intentionally targeted civilians' a
legalGrade A: Official recordGeneral Intelligence Service (GIS) and Central Reserve Forces
state security services · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
State services aligned with SAF. FFM CRP.6 para 80: by 'a legal amendment from May 2024', GIS 'regained legal powers of interrogation, search, detention and asset seizure, along with immunities shielding its personnel from criminal or civil
Grade A: Official recordSAF Military Intelligence (MI)
state intelligence service · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Part of SAF. (1) Broker of paid militia alliances - FFM CRP.6 para 90: 'The SAF, often working through its Military Intelligence service, has also pursued alliances with other armed groups and militia leaders on the basis of shared politica
Grade A: Official recordperson (SAF commander-in-chief) · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
OFAC release jy2789: commander of the SAF
CAUSGrade A: Official recordHumanitarian Aid Commission (HAC)
state agency · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
State body under the SAF-led government. OBSTRUCTION (official findings): OFAC, sanctioning Burhan: 'The SAF is also responsible for the routine and intentional denial of humanitarian access, using food deprivation as a war tactic.' UN SG C
Grade A: Official recordperson (commander, Sudan Shield Forces) · Sudan · Allied force or mobilisation network
EU sanctioned Keikal on 18 Jul 2025 (attacks on Kanabi communities in Gezira); UK sanctioned him in Feb 2026 over atrocities suspected in early 2025 in Gezira.
EUUKGrade A: Official recordperson (commander, Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade) · Sudan · Allied force or mobilisation network
EU sanctioned him on 29 Jan 2026, citing field executions of civilians in Khartoum and Gezira (2024-25). He was detained in Egypt for about a week in Aug 2025 and released after senior SAF-side officials intervened.
EUGrade A: Official recordperson (community leader, EU-listed) · Sudan · Allied force or mobilisation network
EU statement of reasons: Emir of the Nafeidiya clan of the Kawahla tribe (Sarhan area, west Gezira); 'among the community leaders who assisted the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and allied militias, in particular the Sudan Shield Forces, in re
EUGrade A: Official recordperson (Islamic Movement leader) · Sudan · Allied force or mobilisation network
Stalwart of the National Congress Party; Secretary-General of the Sudanese Islamist Movement; Former Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs
CAEUUSGrade A: Official recordGathering of the Sudanese Justice and Equality Forces (GSJEF) - Abdallah Banda
armed group based in Libya · Libya / Sudan (North Darfur) · Allied force or mobilisation network
UN Panel S/2024/65 para 12: GSJEF, 'a Darfurian armed group based in Libya and led by Abdallah Banda, publicly announced in November [2023] its decision to join the SAF against the RSF' - 'Banda, who is wanted by the International Criminal
Grade A: Official recordstate institution · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
SUNA headlines record the Interior Ministry launching successive phases of 'support for the war effort' with medical aid (3rd phase 29 Apr 2024; 10th phase 8 Jul 2024; 'more than 16 tonnes of medicines' 5 Aug 2024). The acting interior mini
Grade A: Official recordperson (Director of Military Intelligence) · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Director of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF); Lieutenant General
EUGrade A: Official recordformer rebel movement aligned with SAF · Sudan (Blue Nile) · Allied force or mobilisation network
Leader Malik Agar is deputy chairman of the SAF-led Sovereignty Council; ACSS lists the faction as a Blue Nile armed group supporting SAF. UN SG CAAC report (2024): sexual violence against 1 child attributed to 'the Sudan People's Liberatio
Grade A: Official recordMohamed El Awad El Amin El Tahir
person (Air Force commander) · Sudan · Part of the SAF or state-controlled
Commander of the Sudanese Air Force since 1 September 2022; Former Dean of the Sudanese Air Force College; Former Commander of the Khartoum Air Base; Lieutenant General; Lieutenant General, Commander of the Sudanese Air Force since 1 Septem
CAEUGrade A: Official recordEastern Orta (Eastern Battalion)
SAF-aligned militia · Sudan · Allied force or mobilisation network
Led by Al-Amin Daoud (Juba Peace Agreement signatory). Deployed to Kassala 29 Oct 2024; assistant commander Humad Shiblalla told Sudan Tribune the move 'followed consultations with the Sudanese Armed Forces and that the militia's forces wer
Grade B: CorroboratedEastern Sudan armed groups trained in Eritrea
militias · Sudan / Eritrea · Allied force or mobilisation network
Foreign sponsor: STATE OF ERITREA. Dabanga (Jan 2024): six training camps in Gash-Barka for eastern Sudanese groups. STPT (Aug 2025), quoting an interviewee: Eritrea 'provides training, weapons, vehicles, and logistical support to these mov
Grade B: CorroboratedJustice and Equality Movement (JEM)
armed movement (Joint Force) / state funds · Sudan · Allied force or mobilisation network
Ayin reports JEM, led by the Finance Minister, has held the state social-security investment apparatus, insurance and pension funds (and stakes in Family, Savings and Workers banks; c. $7bn per the article) since Feb 2021, and that the Audi
Grade C: Single sourceAzhari al-Mubarak (head of the Popular Resistance in Northern State)
businessman / head of state-sanctioned mobilisation body · Sudan (Northern State) · Allied force or mobilisation network
STPT report (Jan 2025) says he donated US$5 million in support of the war effort. He publicly heads the Popular Resistance (mobilisation) and a gold/trading group. A partisan site (Ain al-Haqiqa) headlines him as 'war financier' and 'manage
legalGrade C: Single sourceEastern Sudan Liberation Forces
armed movement · Sudan (east) – based/trained in Eritrea · Reported or alleged link, not established
Atar reports the movement held its first conference under full Eritrean sponsorship in May 2024 and has about 2,000 fighters; AJ Centre lists it as Eritrea-backed and army-aligned, though Atar says it later declared equidistance between SAF
Grade C: Single source
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3 more actors at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
Organised crime and trafficking
1Recruitment of children, aid obstruction and smuggling on SAF-controlled routes are documented. No link to transnational criminal organisations was found.
Awlad Gumri ('Strategic Reconnaissance Battalion')
criminal network turned SAF auxiliary · Sudan (Northern State; Sudan-Egypt-Libya tri-border) · Allied force or mobilisation network
A family-based smuggling group that SAF armed and incorporated after April 2023 as a reconnaissance battalion attached to the Dongola operational sector to monitor desert routes (STPT; Sudan Tribune; Darfur24). Sudan Tribune: the group 'fac
Grade B: Corroborated
1 more actor below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.
Foreign personnel and contractors
3Foreign technicians, aircrew and reported special forces. No private military contract is documented.
Ukraine (Main Directorate of Intelligence, HUR)
state · Ukraine · Documented supplier or backer
Deployed special forces (HUR 'Tymur' unit) alongside the SAF against Wagner-backed RSF from Aug 2023.
Grade B: CorroboratedRussian contract aircrew (Il-76)
foreign contract personnel · Russia · Documented supplier or backer
Russian crew flew SAF airdrop missions to El Fasher; two Russians killed in 21 Oct 2024 shootdown.
Grade B: CorroboratedTurkish and Iranian technical teams at the SAF airbase near Port Sudan (reported)
unit · Turkey; Iran · Reported or alleged link, not established
Sudan Conflict Monitor (Ayin / Human Rights Hub / STPT) reports that an RSF drone attack in May 2025 on an SAF airbase near Port Sudan was 'reportedly targeting facilities used by Turkish and Iranian technical teams'.
Grade C: Single source
3 more actors below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
1 more actor at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.