Complicit Dossier

Procurement and supply networks · state-owned company · Sudan

Ports Engineering Company Ltd

شركة الموانئ الهندسية المحدودة

  • Part of the SAF or state-controlled
  • Grade A: Official recordStrongest record: official record
  • Sanctioned byUS
  • 7 documented ties · 1 step from the SAF

Also recorded as: PORTS ENGINEERING COMPANY LTD; شركة الموانئ الهندسية المحدودة; Engineering Port Company; Ports Engineering Construction

OFAC: 'Since the start of the conflict in April 2023, Ports Engineering has imported uniforms and footwear worn by Sudanese intelligence personnel from an Emirati company, and ammunition belts and boxes of weapons from a Turkish company.'

Their response

  • Did not respond to FRANCE 24; website went offline during the investigation.

Records

6

Each record carries its own grade. A grade describes the source for that record, not the actor.

Grade A: Official record

Ports Engineering Company Ltd

OFAC: 'Since the start of the conflict in April 2023, Ports Engineering has imported uniforms and footwear worn by Sudanese intelligence personnel from an Emirati company, and ammunition belts and boxes of weapons from a Turkish company.'

Sanctions
US OFAC, SUDAN-EO14098, 2026-06-26
  1. 1US Treasury: Treasury Sanctions Networks Fueling Sudan's Civil War and Worsening Humanitarian Crisis · home.treasury.gov · 26 Jun 2026
  2. 2OFAC SDN list (XML), publication dated 10/02/2026, record 19488; local copy raw/sdn.xml parsed with scripts/sdn_sudan.py · treasury.gov · 2 Oct 2026

NamesUAETürkiye

Grade A: Official record

Public partnership with Giad in Port Sudan (March 2024)

2024-03-04

DIS's page reported that the vehicle service centre opened in Port Sudan on 4 Mar 2024 'came through a partnership between Giad Engineering Group and Ports Engineering Company'. The Ports Engineering director addressed the ceremony and spoke of the company's 'contributions to development in Red Sea State'.

Why this grade
Grade A is for the fact that the page announced this. The page was identified as official by its name and content; no verification badge was detected.
Sanctions
US (as recorded in the dossier).
›Research notes

Source alignment: official SAF-side channel. Grade applies to the fact that the announcement was made, not to its content. The post names the company director (an engineer); an earlier editorial decision removed that name as press-only. It now appears in an official DIS post; editorial decision needed.

  1. 1Defense Industries System Facebook page (MASAD.SD): Giad Engineering Group and Ports Engineering launch the Giad vehicle service centre in Red Sea State · facebook.com · 4 Mar 2024

NamesGiad (SMT)

Grade B: Corroborated

Ports Engineering Company Ltd

Apr 2023 - 2026

State-owned (incl. Giad) construction company, reported by FRANCE 24 to be managed by an SAF colonel. FRANCE 24 and C4ADS document its chlorine-cylinder imports; the US sanctions text separately cites uniforms, footwear, ammunition belts and boxes of weapons and does not mention chlorine.

Response
Did not respond to FRANCE 24; website went offline during the investigation.
Sanctions
OFAC SDN, 26 Jun 2026.
  1. 1US Treasury: Treasury Sanctions Networks Fueling Sudan's Civil War and Worsening Humanitarian Crisis · home.treasury.gov · 26 Jun 2026
  2. 2FRANCE 24 Observers (via Yahoo News): How did chlorine imported to Sudan for water purification end up being used as a poison gas? · uk.news.yahoo.com · 29 Nov 2025

NamesGiad (SMT)

Grade B: Corroborated

Chlorine importer of record: 125 cylinders, 123 unaccounted for

July - November 2024

According to Chemtrade's statement to FRANCE 24, Ports Engineering Company was the consignee of all three Indian chlorine shipments of 2024 (see Chemtrade entry), making it, in FRANCE 24's words, 'one of the only regular importers of chlorine to Sudan'; the other importers in the C4ADS data are Medecins Sans Frontieres (powder or tablets from Kenya) and one private Sudanese company supplied from the UAE. One cylinder of the July 2024 batch of 17 (serial GC-1983-1715; moved from Port Sudan on 17 August 2024) was filmed at Garri on 5 September 2024. FRANCE 24 could not establish whether the company knew its cylinders were used in the attacks, nor where the other 123 went. The end-use explanation given to the exporter does not hold up: UNICEF says Tawila uses chlorine powder, not gas, and the 'Nile River Water Board' could not be identified.

Response
Ports Engineering did not answer FRANCE 24; its website went offline during the investigation. No statement after the June 2026 designation was found.
Sanctions
OFAC, 26 June 2026 (E.O. 14098), as owned or controlled by Sudan Master Technology. OFAC's stated reasons mention uniforms, footwear, ammunition belts and weapons boxes; they do not mention chlorine.
›Research notes

What is documented: the import, the consignee (on the exporter's word), the serial number match and the military ownership and management of the company. What is assessed: that the company, rather than a later holder, diverted the gas. Sources marked summary_only were read through an automated page summary; quotations from them should be checked against the page before publication.

  1. 1FRANCE 24 Observers / C4ADS table, 'Ports Engineering Company is one of the only regular importers of chlorine to Sudan' (dataset.csv) · datawrapper.dwcdn.net · 4 Dec 2025
  2. 2FRANCE 24 Observers (Yahoo syndication), 'How did chlorine imported to Sudan for water purification end up being used as a poison gas?' · uk.news.yahoo.com · 29 Nov 2025read via summary
  3. 3US Treasury, 'Treasury Sanctions Networks Fueling Sudan's Civil War and Worsening Humanitarian Crisis' · home.treasury.gov · 26 Jun 2026

NamesChemtradeUAE

Grade C: Single source

Ports Engineering Construction

Named in the June 2026 OFAC action as a company owned by Sudanese government institutions that is part of the DIS procurement network.

Why this grade
Press report of an official act. The primary record is cited in another record for this actor.
Source
Al Bayan (UAE daily, Dubai government-owned; UAE is accused of backing the RSF) reporting a US Treasury (OFAC) action
  1. 1Al Bayan · albayan.ae · 26 Jun 2026

3 more records below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

1 more record at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.

Checked against the document

3

Statements compared with the wording of the primary document.

Relationships

14

← means the other party acts on this one; → means this one acts on the other.

Ownership and control · 3

1 more relationship below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.

Arms and supply · 11

7 more relationships below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

1 more relationship at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.

Sanctions listings

1

  • United States (OFAC)26 Jun 2026OFAC SDN UID 57487

    ›Stated reason

    Ports Engineering Company LTD (Ports Engineering) is a Sudan-based public construction company owned by Sudanese state-owned enterprises, including Giad. Since the start of the conflict in April 2023, Ports Engineering has imported uniforms and footwear worn by Sudanese intelligence personnel from an Emirati company, and ammunition belts and boxes of weapons from a Turkish company. | OFAC designated Ports Engineering pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being a foreign person who is owned or controlled by, or has acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sudan Master Technology, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098. home.treasury.gov

Dated events

12

  1. Giad and Ports Engineering open a joint vehicle service centre in Port Sudan. facebook.com

    Grade A: Official record

  2. First of three Chemtrade chlorine consignments to Sudan in trade records (17 cylinders; loaded at Nhava Sheva 14 July per FRANCE 24) datawrapper.dwcdn.net

    Grade B: Corroborated

  3. 17 chlorine cylinders shipped by Chemtrade from Nhava Sheva (India) for Ports Engineering Company, Port Sudan. uk.news.yahoo.com

    Grade B: Corroborated

  4. 17 chlorine cylinders shipped by Chemtrade loaded at Nhava Sheva for Port Sudan; collected by Ports Engineering on 17 Aug 2024 (vessel not named). uk.news.yahoo.com

    Grade B: Corroborated

  5. Chlorine barrel dropped on Garri base near al-Jaili refinery; second attack 13 Sep. Barrel serial traced to Chemtrade shipment. uk.news.yahoo.com

    Grade B: Corroborated

  6. Second Chemtrade chlorine consignment to Sudan (48,600 kg in Indian customs data for September) datawrapper.dwcdn.net

    Grade B: Corroborated

  7. Third and last Chemtrade chlorine consignment to Sudan (48,600 kg in Indian customs data for November) datawrapper.dwcdn.net

    Grade B: Corroborated

  8. FRANCE 24 Observers publish chlorine supply-chain investigation naming Chemtrade and Ports Engineering. uk.news.yahoo.com

    Grade B: Corroborated

  9. FRANCE 24 and C4ADS trace the Garri cylinder to Chemtrade and Ports Engineering uk.news.yahoo.com

    Grade B: Corroborated

  10. C4ADS press release: Ports Engineering is majority-owned by Giad; Karmetal shipment detail; chlorine diversion "unbeknownst to Chemtrade". c4ads.org

    Grade B: Corroborated

  11. OFAC designates TMAC, Tariq Madani, SBL Energy, Alok Choudhari and Ports Engineering; cites Egyptian, Indian, Emirati and Turkish suppliers. home.treasury.gov

    Grade A: Official record

  12. OFAC designates TMAC, its managing director Tariq Hussain Muhammad Madani, Ports Engineering, SBL Energy and Alok Choudhari; Egyptian, Emirati and Turkish suppliers described but not named. content.govdelivery.com

    Grade A: Official record

9 more events below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

Geography

Tags come from the recorded jurisdiction and from place names in the records. Coordinates on the map are approximate.

Based in
Sudan
Also named
United Arab Emirates (2), Türkiye (1), India (1), Kenya (1)
Places
Port Sudan, Al-Jaili / Garri, Red Sea State

Position in the network

Derived by analysing the documented relationships. Nothing in this section is a finding.

Still connected to the SAF when only official records are counted. Ranks 11 in the file for how often it sits on the shortest documented chain between two others.

›Possible links to investigate · 1

  • Defense Industries System (DIS) hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary; named in the other actor's record; cited in the same source (via Sudan Master Technology / Giad Industrial Group).