AGrade A: Official recordStrongest record: official record
55 documented ties
Also recorded as: SAF; القوات المسلحة السودانية; Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) - recruitment and use of children; forced recruitment; Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) - UN-verified grave violations against children in 2025 (UN SG report S/2026/357); JEM/Dabajo; Kibir's militia; Musa Hilal / SRAC border-guard recruits; Zaghawa Council mobilisation; …
SAF itself. The US TIP Reports 2024 and 2025 place Sudan on Tier 3 and find 'a government policy or pattern of employing or recruiting child soldiers'. TIP 2025: 'The SAF and the RSF recruited and used child soldiers, including children who took direct part in hostilities, children who were coercively recruited, and children younger than 15 years'; 'The SAF and the RSF also supported local militias and armed groups that recruited child soldiers'; 'Some SAF and RSF elements have forcibly recruited civilians to participate in hostilities ... or perform forced labor'. SAF is listed in the annexes of the UN Secretary-General's CAAC report (per Watchlist summary of S/2026/357).
Their response
TIP 2025 records that SAF 'affirmed 18 years as the minimum age for recruitment in a broader call to mobilize volunteers' and that the SAF-affiliated Child Protection Unit held one workshop for 120 officers in Dec 2024. The government reported no investigations or prosecutions of officials for child recruitment.
UN SG (paras 194-195) 'welcome[s] the Sudanese Armed Forces' release of 71 children' and SAF's 'engagement with the United Nations and the appointment of a focal point to develop an action plan'; action plan not yet signed.
Chad (letter of 16 Dec 2024 to the Panel, S/2025/239 fn 57): Government 'remained firmly committed to maintaining a neutral stance'; the individuals 'had been acting in their personal capacities'; unauthorised participation in foreign conflicts 'was considered a criminal act'.
Government of Sudan position to the Panel (S/2025/239 para 56): hunger was due to the RSF 'using "starvation as a weapon of war"'. No SAF response on overflights quoted.
Not captured.
Sudan denies use. Ambassador Al-Harith Idriss (Jan 2025, to the New York Times): the military 'never used chemical or incendiary weapons'. Sudan's charge d'affaires in The Hague (SUNA, 16 July 2026): 'the US government has failed to provide any evidence' to Sudan's embassy in Washington or to the OPCW, and invoked the 1998 strike on the Al-Shifa factory. Government statements call the measures 'political blackmail', 'unilateral and illegal' and 'baseless'.
Sudan (EC-110, October 2025): it gave 'specific answers to specific questions', is engaging with the US 'to collect, test and verify the information', and cannot investigate without the details held by the source of the allegation; it accused Chad of supplying the RSF. Sudan (Conference of the States Parties, November 2025): investigations are continuing, and state bodies are also investigating alleged chemical weapons use by the RSF.
This entry is itself the Government's recorded response to the Panel's findings on SAF air operations in Darfur.
Records
13
Each record carries its own grade. A grade describes the source for that record, not the actor.
AGrade A: Official record
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) - recruitment and use of children; forced recruitment
2023-04 to 2026
SAF itself. The US TIP Reports 2024 and 2025 place Sudan on Tier 3 and find 'a government policy or pattern of employing or recruiting child soldiers'. TIP 2025: 'The SAF and the RSF recruited and used child soldiers, including children who took direct part in hostilities, children who were coercively recruited, and children younger than 15 years'; 'The SAF and the RSF also supported local militias and armed groups that recruited child soldiers'; 'Some SAF and RSF elements have forcibly recruited civilians to participate in hostilities ... or perform forced labor'. SAF is listed in the annexes of the UN Secretary-General's CAAC report (per Watchlist summary of S/2026/357).
Response
TIP 2025 records that SAF 'affirmed 18 years as the minimum age for recruitment in a broader call to mobilize volunteers' and that the SAF-affiliated Child Protection Unit held one workshop for 120 officers in Dec 2024. The government reported no investigations or prosecutions of officials for child recruitment.
Sanctions
No sanction specific to child recruitment. Sudan listed under the US Child Soldiers Prevention Act 2024-2025 (Stimson CSPA tracker). SAF commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan designated by OFAC 16 Jan 2025 under E.O. 14098 (grounds: attacks on civilians, denial of humanitarian access).
SAF recruitment through ethnic militias and paid alliances in Darfur (UN Panel findings)
2023-02 to 2024-11
UN Panel S/2024/65 paras 19-27: both sides engaged in 'extensive ethnic-based recruitments' and 'relied on local armed militias ... which they mobilized, logistically supported and used as auxiliary forces'. SAF: Feb 2023 understanding with Fur leaders to recruit 'several thousand Fur young persons' (para 21); assembled 'several hundred fighters' from Musa Hilal's Mahamid via former border-guard officers in March 2023, though 'Hilal's recruitment efforts were thwarted by the limited financial resources of SAF' (para 22); 'SAF used JEM/Dabajo ... to recruit from the Zaghawa community', and after Bakhit Dabajo ('himself an SAF Major-General') met al-Burhan 'the SAF 16th Division, based in El Fasher, recruited and graduated some 4,000 fighters' (para 25); coordination with ex-Popular Defence Forces elements 'known as "Kibir's militia"' (para 26); recruitment of Masalit in Gedaref (para 27). Para 33: over-reliance on independent commanders weakened command and control. Para 68: 'Local sources confirmed seeing children in the ranks of RSF and SAF, including in recruitment camps'. S/2025/239 paras 10-13: from May 2024 'SAF-aligned joint forces escalated recruitment initiatives in North Darfur'; mobilisation 'coordinated predominantly by the Zaghawa Council'; camps in Kornoi and Umm Barru. Paras 59-60: 'Zaghawa individuals in areas near Am Djarass were recruited into SAF-aligned joint forces, particularly SLA/MM and JEM'; 'Minni Minawi confirmed that Chadian Zaghawa fighters had joined'; Chadian opposition figure Ousmane Dillo 'joined SLA/MM forces in the El Fasher area' in March 2024 and relocated to Dongola by June.
Response
Chad (letter of 16 Dec 2024 to the Panel, S/2025/239 fn 57): Government 'remained firmly committed to maintaining a neutral stance'; the individuals 'had been acting in their personal capacities'; unauthorised participation in foreign conflicts 'was considered a criminal act'.
Sanctions
Musa Hilal: UN 1591, US, EU, UK (first-pass sanctions.json).
›Research notes
Upgrades the first-pass 'Chadian Zaghawa fighters' entry from B to A (UN Panel, with Minawi's confirmation and Chad's formal reply). Recruitment was through kin/political mobilisation, not commercial brokers.
SAF violations of the Darfur arms embargo regime (UN Panel): offensive overflights and military airdrops
2023-08 to 2024-11
S/2024/65 para 37: 'SAF responded to the RSF surge in Darfur with offensive military overflights, an action prohibited by the sanctions regime.' S/2025/239 para 6: SAF 'use of offensive military overflights and widespread and indiscriminate air strikes ... are prohibited pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1591 (2005), violated international humanitarian law and amounted to war crimes'. S/2025/239 para 105: 'Since April, the Panel verified 10 parachuted airdrops of military supplies to SAF and the SAF-aligned joint force in El Fasher. These contained ammunition, light weapons, satellite phones, food, medicines and cash'; additional airdrops at Umm Barru. S/2024/65 paras 17, 38: RSF 'accused SAF of bringing military supplies to its El Fasher military base by using the humanitarian convoys coming from Port Sudan, in collusion with the armed movements escorting the convoys, SLA/MM in particular. While several Panel sources in the movements acknowledged that this was likely, the supplies were too few and limited to alter the conflict dynamics.'
Response
Government of Sudan position to the Panel (S/2025/239 para 56): hunger was due to the RSF 'using "starvation as a weapon of war"'. No SAF response on overflights quoted.
Sanctions
None arising.
›Research notes
The convoy-misuse point is the only UN-documented instance found of humanitarian convoys allegedly used for SAF military resupply; it rests on RSF accusation plus acknowledgment by Panel sources in the movements ('likely').
SAF financing through aligned businessmen (UN Panel finding, unnamed)
2023
S/2024/65 para 115: 'While SAF also controlled several important economic sectors and companies, its profits from these eroded following the beginning of the war ... Currently, SAF relies in large part on wealthy individuals and businessmen aligned with it to finance its military capability.' Footnote 79: 'the Panel received reports on various businessmen purchasing military equipment for SAF.' Para 116: both sides used resources 'owned through proxy and subsidiary companies' to 'acquire weapons, pay salaries, fund media campaigns, conduct lobbying and buy support of other political and armed groups, including in Darfur'; fn 80: 'Several leaders and members of Darfurian armed movements acknowledged that their groups received money and logistics from the warring parties.' Para 124: 'Since the beginning of the war, most of the gold that was previously exported to the United Arab Emirates was now smuggled to Egypt.'
Response
Not captured.
›Research notes
The Panel names no SAF-side businessman or company in the public report (it names RSF companies in detail). The S/2025/239 financing section (paras 81-93) covers only SLA/MM, SLA/AW and RSF.
The Secretary of State determined on 24 April 2025 that the Government of Sudan used chemical weapons in 2024; the determination was announced on 22 May 2025, first measures took effect on 27 June 2025 and a second round on 20 July 2026. The US has never published the evidence: no date, place or agent is given in any official text. At the OPCW the US described the basis only as 'careful study' (October 2025), 'rigorous analysis' (November 2025) and 'rigorous, independent technical analysis' and 'national technical evaluations' (July 2026), and in July 2026 added that Sudan 'remained in non-compliance in 2025'. In November 2025 the US asked Sudan to 'declare and dismantle their chemical weapons program under OPCW verification'; in March 2026 to 'declare any production facilities and chemical munitions'. The only description of the underlying intelligence is press reporting: the New York Times (16 January 2025), citing four senior US officials, said the military used chemical weapons at least twice in remote areas against the RSF, that knowledge of the programme was limited to a small group and that Burhan authorised use; AFP reports the Times as saying the agent was chlorine. The Times reported in September 2026 that visuals from a dossier supplied by a Middle Eastern intelligence agency 'were shared with US intelligence and were used by US officials in January 2025'.
Response
Sudan denies use. Ambassador Al-Harith Idriss (Jan 2025, to the New York Times): the military 'never used chemical or incendiary weapons'. Sudan's charge d'affaires in The Hague (SUNA, 16 July 2026): 'the US government has failed to provide any evidence' to Sudan's embassy in Washington or to the OPCW, and invoked the 1998 strike on the Al-Shifa factory. Government statements call the measures 'political blackmail', 'unilateral and illegal' and 'baseless'.
Sanctions
US Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act measures: first round in force 27 June 2025 (90 FR 27750); second round in force 20 July 2026 (91 FR 45309), reported by AFP as restricting Sudan's access to US financing and exports and banning Sudanese state-owned airlines from US airspace.
›Research notes
Grade A covers the fact, dates and wording of the US determination and measures (official texts). It does not grade the underlying allegation, which the US has not evidenced publicly. HRW (9 Oct 2025) called on the US to 'publish the evidence on which it based its sanctions'. Sources marked summary_only were read through an automated page summary; quotations from them should be checked against the page before publication.
Chemical weapons: the OPCW record (Article IX requests; no fact-finding)
June 2025 - July 2026
›This record describes attacks on civilians. Show
No OPCW body has made a finding on Sudan and no fact-finding or technical assistance mission has been sent. What exists is a clarification process between states. Mauritania (4 June 2025), Chad (11 June 2025) and Benin (16 June 2025), supported by Guinea-Bissau, asked the Executive Council to obtain clarification from Sudan under Article IX(4) of the Convention; Mauritania asked whether chemical weapons had been used or deployed, how the national committee would be impartial, and whether Sudan possessed chemical weapons. The Chairperson forwarded the requests on 17 June 2025; Sudan replied (EC-109/3, 23 June 2025; text not public). At its 109th session (8-11 July 2025) the Council 'noted the requests ... as well as the clarifications provided by the Sudan, and decided to remain seized of the matter', and repeated that at its 110th session (October 2025) after two further Chadian notes. The item was debated again at the 111th (March 2026) and 112th (July 2026) sessions without a decision. The Director-General told the Conference of the States Parties in November 2025 that the Secretariat monitors the allegations 'mainly through its Situation Centre', that 'to date, the Secretariat has not received any sufficiently substantiated request for any additional activity', and that 'the Secretariat has no authority to seize itself of any matter'. France (March 2026) called the allegations that the SAF used chlorine as a weapon in 2024 'credibles'; Canada (July 2026) said the four African states' questions had not received adequate answers; Germany (July 2026) called on Sudan to present the results of its national investigation. Sudan sat on the Executive Council throughout (African Group, term to 11 May 2026, and listed as a participant in July 2026); the US said in March 2026 it would 'revisit our approach to Sudan's seat' and in July 2026 that such a state 'should not be involved in guiding the decisions of this body'.
Response
Sudan (EC-110, October 2025): it gave 'specific answers to specific questions', is engaging with the US 'to collect, test and verify the information', and cannot investigate without the details held by the source of the allegation; it accused Chad of supplying the RSF. Sudan (Conference of the States Parties, November 2025): investigations are continuing, and state bodies are also investigating alleged chemical weapons use by the RSF.
›Research notes
All from OPCW documents downloaded from opcw.org and read in full; Sudan's Arabic statements are scanned images read by OCR, so wording is a working translation. The texts of the Chadian and Beninese notes, Sudan's replies (EC-109/3) and the committee's interim report are on the OPCW's restricted Catalyst platform, not the public site. The Council's October 2026 session had not been held or reported when this was written.
Checkpoint charges in SAF-controlled areas and preferential treatment for security-linked traders (UN human rights office, July 2026)
2023-2025
OHCHR briefing paper on gum arabic (15 Jul 2026), based on remote interviews Sep-Dec 2025: 'traders operating in SAF-controlled areas report increased formal and informal charges, alongside checkpoints and charges administered by national authorities and allied security forces' (para 25); northern and eastern routes towards Port Sudan and Northern State, 'though relatively more secure and more tightly regulated, have also been affected by dense checkpoints, formal and informal charges and, to a lesser extent, reported cross-border smuggling' (para 26). On gum arabic: 'layers of formal and informal charges, including at checkpoints in areas under the control of the SAF and, in some cases, along routes controlled by SAF-aligned armed groups and local actors. At the same time, further information received suggests that some security-linked commercial actors have enjoyed preferential conditions not available to ordinary traders and producers' (para 56); footnote 66: 'traders linked to security companies or armed actors were, in some cases, reportedly able to move large quantities of gum arabic without bearing the full range of taxes, fees and other charges'. Transporters reported about 20 to 40 checkpoints per journey, with costs of up to 60% of shipment value in one account (fn 58). The same paper attributes structured fees, looting and confiscation mainly to the RSF, and says livestock traders face 'dense checkpoint systems, formal and informal charges, extortion' without naming a party.
Response
No response from Sudanese authorities is recorded in the paper; none found.
›Research notes
UN source, but worded as 'information received' from interviews: it names no unit, officer or company. Footnote 66 rests on one producer.
US chemical-weapons determination against the Government of Sudan (24 April 2025)
use in 2024; determination 24 April 2025; announced 22 May 2025
›This record describes attacks on civilians. Show
US State Department statement of 22 May 2025: "On April 24, 2025, the United States determined under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (the CBW Act) that the Government of Sudan used chemical weapons in 2024."
Response
No statement by Sudan's foreign ministry or government spokesperson on the determination was located in the verification pass (a gap, not a confirmed absence).
Sanctions
CBW Act measures, in force 27 June 2025 (90 FR 27750).
›Research notes
The determination names the "Government of Sudan", not the SAF, and does not name the agent, dates or locations; the chlorine / al-Jaili identification is FRANCE 24's, not the US government's. An official determination is not a judicial finding. Read on the US Embassy Khartoum copy; the state.gov copy returned 403. The statement gave "on or around June 6, 2025" for the notice; it was published and took effect on 27 June 2025.
US chemical-weapons determination: Federal Register notice (27 June 2025)
determination 24 April 2025; published and effective 27 June 2025
›This record describes attacks on civilians. Show
Federal Register, Public Notice 12749 (90 FR 27750): "on April 24, 2025 the Senior Official performing the functions of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security determined that the Government of Sudan has used chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law or lethal chemical or biological weapons against its own nationals."
Response
None located (see previous claim).
Sanctions
CBW Act sanctions in force from 27 June 2025.
›Research notes
The determination names the "Government of Sudan", not the SAF, and does not name the agent, dates or locations; the chlorine / al-Jaili identification is FRANCE 24's, not the US government's. An official determination is not a judicial finding. The summary line of the notice reads "has used chemical weapons in violation of international law".
Additional US chemical-weapons sanctions on Sudan (decided 23 June 2026, in force 20 July 2026)
decided 23 June 2026; effective 20 July 2026
Federal Register, Public Notice 13072 (91 FR 45309-45310): "Sudan has not met the Act’s conditions and the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security decided to impose additional sanctions on Sudan on June 23, 2026." Three measures: US opposition to multilateral development bank assistance (waived for basic human needs); further export restrictions (Commerce Control List items under a presumption of denial, with listed exceptions); suspension of foreign air transportation authority for carriers owned or controlled by the Government of Sudan.
Response
None located.
Sanctions
Second-round CBW Act sanctions, 91 FR 45309.
›Research notes
Measures are against Sudan as a state; the notice does not name the SAF.
Government of Sudan response to the UN Panel of Experts (17 December 2024)
response dated 17 December 2024; report dated 17 April 2025
UN Panel of Experts, S/2025/239: "In its response dated 17 December 2024, the Government stated that the SAF actions had been carried out in compliance with international humanitarian law, particularly the principles of distinction, military necessity and proportionality (see annex 6)."
Response
This entry is itself the Government's recorded response to the Panel's findings on SAF air operations in Darfur.
›Research notes
Records the position of the party; carry it alongside the Panel findings on offensive overflights and air strikes.
Chemical weapons: what independent investigations establish, and at what confidence
5 and 13 September 2024
›This record describes attacks on civilians. Show
Two incidents are documented in open sources: barrels of chlorine dropped from aircraft on 5 and 13 September 2024 at the Garri military base and the nearby al-Jaili oil refinery north of Khartoum, then held by the RSF. FRANCE 24 Observers (October and November 2025) reached this with open-source footage and five experts. Human Rights Watch 'independently verified the geolocation of the videos' and said the investigation 'provides the first public elements to corroborate the US allegations, indicating that Sudan's military may have used chlorine in two incidents'; it called for an OPCW Technical Secretariat investigation. No deaths are confirmed from either incident; Euronews (September 2026) reports about 20 refinery workers affected. A 32-page review by former OPCW officials, reported by Euronews, found the evidence 'reliable and consistent' but could not confirm use or identify the substance. The New York Times and Washington Post (5 September 2026) published a dossier of about 150 files and several thousand text messages said to come from senior officers' phones, describing a chlorine-munition project under a brigadier general and an August 2024 voice message about taking cylinders from the al-Manara water plant in Omdurman; experts consulted by both papers called the material plausible or credible but said confirmation needs on-site investigation. The Times noted an unexplained discrepancy: the al-Jaili devices were large cylinders, not the smaller munitions in the dossier. The UN Fact-Finding Mission's report of 1 September 2026 and the UN Panel of Experts reports S/2024/65 and S/2025/239 contain no reference to chemical weapons (text search of all three). No Amnesty International finding on wartime chemical use appeared in the searches run.
Response
SAF spokesperson on the dossier: 'baseless and without material foundation', with a threat of legal action against the New York Times. Sudan's government did not respond to Euronews. See the separate claims for Sudan's position at the OPCW and its national committee.
›Research notes
Grade B: use of chlorine at al-Jaili rests on one investigation (FRANCE 24) with a second organisation's partial verification (HRW geolocation) and a government determination whose evidence is unpublished. The dossier is grade C with an origin flag: it comes from an unnamed 'Middle Eastern intelligence agency', both newspapers received the same material, and UAE media and a UAE-registered US lobbyist have promoted the story. Sources marked summary_only were read through an automated page summary; quotations from them should be checked against the page before publication.
1 more record below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.
Checked against the document
8
Statements compared with the wording of the primary document.
“Since the beginning of the war, the SAF has prioritized weapons acquisition, including Iranian drones and a port-for-weapons deal with Russia, choosing to expand the conflict rather than end it through good-faith negotiations. The weapons and diplomatic support provided by Iran and Russia have emboldened the SAF and lessened their interest in deescalating the conflict.”
“Based on the available information, the mission has reasonable grounds to believe that the Sudanese Armed Forces used foreign-supplied drones and loitering munitions in attacks that struck civilian objects, including Yabus Market in Blue Nile, and may amount to a serious violation of international humanitarian law and a war crime.”
“Taken together, the evidence provides reasonable grounds to believe that the Sudanese Armed Forces carried out successive drone strikes on Ad-Da’ein Teaching Hospital, killing at least 70 people, injuring 146 and rendering the hospital”
“Indiscriminate air strikes violated international humanitarian law and amounted to war crimes, as well as violating paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1591 (2005). [...] Between 1 January to 10 November, the Panel verified 140 air strikes hitting 20 urban areas across Darfur”
“More producers were subject to looting in January 2024 in Zalingei (West Darfur), Al Mujald (West Kordofan) and El Geneina (West Darfur) by RSF and allied militias and SLA/MM. [...] The volumes transported through Tina to Libya along routes controlled by SAF and SLA/MM varied between 30,000 and 40,000 tons during the period from April to October 2024.”
Correction: crime_notes.md states "Gum arabic ... no SAF-side attribution found (gum arabic and museum looting are attributed to the RSF)" and the Arabic thread says the Panel puts smuggling "under RSF protection". The Panel report, which neither thread opened, names SLA/MM alongside the RSF in the section heading and in para 84, and describes a Tina-Libya route "controlled by SAF and SLA/MM" carrying 30,000-40,000 tons. Add a grade-A (UN) entry. The Arabic thread's separate claim that the Panel lists the "Joint Force" among weapons smugglers was not found in the text.
“It also finds reasonable grounds to believe that the Sudanese Armed Forces committed the war crimes of violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; and committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment. [...] It also finds that the Sudanese Armed Forces perpetrated the war crimes of carrying out executions without previous judgment or judicial guarantees and outrages on personal dignity by desecration of the dead.”
Correction: First pass used only the OHCHR press release for the 2025 report. The crime.json #12 quote "Humanitarian assistance has been obstructed, convoys attacked, and aid workers targeted" is not in A/HRC/60/22; it is from the press release, which returned 403 today (could not open).
“it is estimated that unofficial and smuggled gold exports to Egypt account for about 60 per cent of the production from Northern, River Nile and Red Sea states, areas that have shared borders with Egypt. [...] Since the beginning of the war, the SAF has sought to transfer gold to Egypt to prevent it from being sent directly to the UAE, which it accuses of supporting the RSF.”
“The Sudan Shield Forces on January 14 denied accusations it had been involved in abuses against Kanabi communities and expressed support for the SAF-led investigations. [...] The SAF has condemned the abuses in eastern Gezira but described them as “individual transgressions” and said it would hold those responsible accountable.”
Alleged source of 20 chlorine cylinders (intercepted message in a dossier of undisclosed intelligence origin); Egypt declared one chlorine export to Sudan that month, recipient unknown · Aug 2024
alliance 'in exchange for payment, weapons and officer positions within the SAF'; used to recruit Zaghawa (c. 4,000 graduated by SAF 16th Division) · 2023
Requested clarification from Sudan under Article IX(4) of the Chemical Weapons Convention; OPCW Executive Council 'remains seized' · Jun 2025 - Jul 2026
allied force whose members and vehicles were seized in contraband and drug cases by state security bodies in SAF-held Gezira, River Nile and Red Sea states · June 2026
RSF captures about 200 Egyptian military personnel at Merowe air base; Egypt says they were there for joint exercises; 177 flown home on 19-20 April (source URL from citation, not opened; corroborated by Al Jazeera headline). reuters.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
First group of about 100 Ukrainian HUR special forces arrives in Sudan to support the SAF (per WSJ). militarnyi.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Egypt delivers Bayraktar TB2 drones to the SAF, according to the Wall Street Journal (not verified by Reuters). timeslive.co.za↗
CGrade C: Single source
Sudan and Iran resume diplomatic relations after a seven-year break (Reuters report dated 9 Oct 2023 per citation; Iran International says "late 2023"). iranintl.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
First tracked Qeshm Fars Air 747 (EP-FAB) flight Iran-Port Sudan; Planet Labs image shows a 747 at Port Sudan. Further flights 12 Dec, 8, 16, 23, 30 Jan. reuters.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
First EP-FAB (Qeshm Fars Air) flight Tehran-Port Sudan logged by the Sudan Conflict Observatory; further flights 14 Dec 2023, 16, 23, 30 Jan, 11 Mar, 12 Jun, 14 and 25 Jul 2024 (dates from automated summary). mars.gmu.edu↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Calendar year 2023: Egypt reports to UN Comtrade exports to Sudan of military weapons (USD 1.25m), parts (USD 0.85m) and ammunition (USD 0.29m); Turkey reports 12 unmanned aircraft (USD 3.13m) and 46.8 t of HS 9306 munitions. comtradeapi.un.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
Satellite image shows a Mohajer-6 at Wadi Seidna air base (PAX analysis). stripes.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Il-76 EX-76011 removed from Kyrgyz register and transferred to Sudan (later ST-JAN). sudanwarmonitor.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Drone flown by SAF-affiliated fighters drops two 120mm munitions on apparently unarmed people in Halfia al-Moulouk, Bahri (HRW-verified video). hrw.org↗
CGrade C: Single source
Bloomberg: three Western officials say Iran supplied Mohajer-6 drones to the SAF. stripes.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Reuters: Iranian drones helped SAF turn the tide in Omdurman; Sudan's acting FM denies obtaining weapons from Iran. reuters.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Military Watch Magazine reports Algeria is "reportedly set to donate" surplus MiG-29s to Sudan. No delivery documented since. militarywatchmagazine.com↗
DGrade D: Unverified lead
Russian deputy FM Bogdanov visits Port Sudan with military officers; Russia reportedly offers 'unrestricted qualitative military aid'. middleeasteye.net↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Zakat Chamber in River Nile State inaugurates support for 'medical services and the war effort' with the 3rd Infantry Division at Shendi. facebook.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
SAF 2nd Infantry Division and joint forces run a 'preventive security campaign' in Gedaref 'to control foreign presence'; at least 16 Ethiopian refugees arrested. sudanwarmonitor.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
SAF deputy commander Yasser al-Atta says Russia proposed a logistics supply centre in exchange for weapons and ammunition. jamestown.org↗
CGrade C: Single source
Northern State Chamber of Commerce hands combat vehicles to the army and the Popular Resistance in Dongola. facebook.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
Per the NYT dossier, an Antonov from Merowe tests a chlorine munition; Brig. Gen. Tariq Hussain reports "The test went 100 percent". khaleejtimes.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
First Baykar munitions arrive by air at Port Sudan (Aviacon Zitotrans via Bamako). washingtonpost.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Egypt declares a 5,815 kg chlorine export to Sudan; an intercepted message later reported by the New York Times dates an import of 20 cylinders from Egypt to late August 2024 comtradeapi.un.org↗
CGrade C: Single source
Per the NYT dossier, Hussain reports importing 20 chlorine cylinders from Egypt (late August) and taking cylinders from al-Manara water plant (voice message of 26 Aug). khaleejtimes.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
Chlorine barrel dropped on Garri base near al-Jaili refinery; second attack 13 Sep. Barrel serial traced to Chemtrade shipment. uk.news.yahoo.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Chlorine barrel dropped at Garri military base near al-Jaili refinery (first of two incidents; second on 13 September) uk.news.yahoo.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Baykar employee photographed with Burhan in Port Sudan; 9 Sep meeting records Sudanese offer of Abu Amama port and mining rights to Turkish firms. washingtonpost.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
Baykar employee messages video of 'Today's attack'; '2nd attack' on 15 Sep; last delivery flight arrives 15 Sep. washingtonpost.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
Sudan Conflict Observatory publishes "Foreign Facilitators of Weapons Fueling Sudan's Civil War"; Washington Post reports it on 15 Oct. Sudan War Monitor identifies TulAmmo-branded ammunition with SAF soldiers the same month. stripes.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
El Koma market, North Darfur, bombed: at least 65 killed, 200 injured (Sudan Witness). the-star.co.ke↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Il-76 ST-JAN (ex EX-76011) shot down over Malha, North Darfur after SAF airdrop to El Fasher; Russian and Sudanese crew killed. sudanwarmonitor.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Kabkabiya market airstrike; Amnesty International calls it a flagrant war crime. amnesty.org↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Bloomberg: Iran supplied dozens of drones; Russia provided fuel and weapons components; both sought Red Sea bases. iranintl.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
Radio Dalsan reports Somalia agreed to host SAF troops for training at the Turkish-Somali base in Mogadishu (single source). allafrica.com↗
DGrade D: Unverified lead
New York Times: four senior US officials say Sudan's military used chemical weapons at least twice bostonglobe.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
SAF airstrikes on Nyala (2-4 Feb) with OFAB-250 and FAB-series unguided bombs kill dozens of civilians (HRW). hrw.org↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Five SAF airstrikes on Nyala; HRW identifies an OFAB-250 and an FAB-series bomb from remnants. hrw.org↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Sudan's FM Ali Youssef announces 'mutual understanding' with Russia on a naval base. sudantribune.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
Qeshm Fars Air EP-FAB flies Tehran-Port Sudan as W5998 with drones (Iran International, intelligence sources). iranintl.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
EP-FAB flight W5998 Tehran-Port Sudan, said by two sources to carry military equipment including drones. iranintl.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
SMRC director-general visits the General Command and the Armoured Corps and pledges continued 'full support for the regular forces'. facebook.com↗
AGrade A: Official record
UN Panel of Experts report S/2025/239: 140 verified SAF airstrikes on 20 urban areas in Darfur in 2024, amounting to war crimes; no external SAF supplier named. docs.un.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
US determines under the CBW Act that the Government of Sudan used chemical weapons in 2024 (announced 22 May 2025). state.gov↗
AGrade A: Official record
Two Turkish Air Force cargo planes from Kayseri and Tekirdag land at Port Sudan (Flightradar24, per Guardian Nigeria). guardian.ng↗
CGrade C: Single source
UAE Attorney-General announces a foiled attempt to move about five million rounds to the SAF on a private aircraft (UAE state claim). thedefensepost.com↗
DGrade D: Unverified lead
RSF drone attack on SAF airbase near Port Sudan "reportedly targeting facilities used by Turkish and Iranian technical teams". sudantransparency.org↗
CGrade C: Single source
TB2 strike on Nyala airport destroys a cargo aircraft; MEE says the drones were operated by Turks in Port Sudan. RSF strikes on Port Sudan follow from 4 May. middleeasteye.net↗
CGrade C: Single source
Sudan's foreign ministry announces a national committee on the chemical-weapons allegations (press release 50/25) opcw.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
Mauritania requests clarification from Sudan under Article IX(4) of the Chemical Weapons Convention; Chad (11 June) and Benin (16 June) follow opcw.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
Sudan's clarifications circulated to the OPCW Executive Council (EC-109/3) opcw.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
RSF announces first shootdown of an SAF Akinci over El Fasher. military.africa↗
CGrade C: Single source
OPCW Executive Council notes the Article IX requests and Sudan's clarifications and decides 'to remain seized of the matter' opcw.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
FRANCE 24 publishes its investigation of chlorine use at al-Jaili; Human Rights Watch verifies the geolocation and calls for an OPCW investigation allafrica.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Sudan's navy takes part in the Red Wave 8 exercise hosted by Saudi Arabia (9-13 November). facebook.com↗
AGrade A: Official record
OPCW Director-General: the Secretariat 'has not received any sufficiently substantiated request for any additional activity' on Sudan opcw.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
Sudan reportedly offers Russia a 25-year naval base agreement in exchange for arms (WSJ via HSBA); not materialised. smallarmssurvey.org↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Sudan Tribune: Sudan has frozen the Russian naval base; no progress in 2025. sudantribune.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
BBC reports the Sudan Witness dataset: 384 SAF airstrikes (Apr 2023-Jul 2025), over 1,700 civilians reported killed; Sudanese-made SH-250 bomb identified in Zamzam camp. the-star.co.ke↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
South Sudanese army deploys into Heglig under a tripartite agreement; about 3,900 SAF soldiers had crossed into South Sudan and handed over heavy weapons. aljazeera.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Footage from Nyala assessed by UN FFM as likely depicting an SAF Akinci; also Al-Farshaya, South Kordofan, 24 Jan. ohchr.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
Reuters: Pakistan near $1.5bn arms deal with Sudan (10 K-8, 200+ drones, air defence). reuters.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
OPCW Executive Council 111th session: Sudan briefs on its national committee; US says it will 'revisit our approach to Sudan's seat'; France calls the chlorine allegations credible opcw.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
SAF drone strikes on Ad-Da'ein Teaching Hospital on first day of Eid kill at least 70 (UN FFM). Drone type not identified. ohchr.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
SAF drone strikes on Ad-Da'ein Teaching Hospital: at least 70 killed, 146 injured (UN FFM paras 39-43). Platform and munition not identified. ohchr.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
SAF drone attack on Yabus market and water-pump area, Blue Nile (29 or 30 Mar): at least 13 civilians killed; remnants consistent with YIHA-III. ohchr.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
GNU chief of staff Al Namroush receives SAF Military Intelligence director Mohamed Ali Sabir in Tripoli; training and intelligence exchange agreed. thenationalnews.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
YIHA-III wreckage dated to this day on the Kazgeil axis, North Kordofan (images surfaced 13 June 2026). military.africa↗
CGrade C: Single source
Reuters: Pakistan puts $1.5bn Sudan arms deal on hold after Saudi objection; Burhan meets MBS in Jeddah. al-monitor.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
UAE refers 13 individuals and six companies (including Portex Trade Limited) to the State Security Court over alleged ammunition trafficking for the SAF (UAE state claim; noted by UN FFM para 127). emirates247.com↗
DGrade D: Unverified lead
5th Joint Belarusian-Sudanese Commission for Cooperation meets in Minsk (no military content reported). mfa.gov.by↗
AGrade A: Official record
Belarus and Sudan sign a general agreement on export credits in Minsk. reform.news↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
SMRC's Blue Nile office sends a support convoy to the 13th Infantry Brigade. facebook.com↗
AGrade A: Official record
Drone strike on Abu Zaima market, Hamrat El Sheikh, North Kordofan: nine bodies reportedly recovered at the site and three injured persons later died; the UN Fact-Finding Mission has reasonable grounds to believe the SAF carried out the strike (A/HRC/63/23, paras 44-45). ohchr.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
Bloomberg: SAF has curbed purchases of Iranian weapons to court the Trump administration. bloomberg.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
Bloomberg: senior SAF source says the army is no longer seeking Iranian weapons; State Department says Islamist factions still receive Iranian technical support worldview.ranenetwork.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
Sudan Tribune: about 100 Pakistani Mohafiz armoured vehicles received in batches; Shahpar drone deliveries said to begin. sudantribune.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
Sudan's national committee interim report, circulated at the OPCW Executive Council session (7-10 July), finds no evidence of chemical weapons use; the US calls for OPCW access. armscontrol.org↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
YIHA-III identified in SAF-attributed strike in Abu Zabad, West Kordofan (UN FFM). ohchr.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
OPCW Executive Council 112th session: US says Sudan 'remained in non-compliance in 2025' and should not sit on the Council; Sudan circulates its committee's interim report finding no evidence opcw.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
UN human rights office publishes briefing paper on gum arabic: checkpoint charges in SAF-controlled areas; security-linked traders reportedly exempt. ohchr.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
Sudan's foreign ministry says it is ready to cooperate with the OPCW and that the US did not take up invitations to send experts aawsat.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Sudan joins the Saudi-led multinational defensive maritime coalition at its founding meeting in Riyadh. facebook.com↗
AGrade A: Official record
Approx. 100 Pakistani Mohafiz armoured vehicles reported delivered to the SAF. thedefensepost.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
Chad says SAF aircraft and drones bombed a convoy more than 100 km inside Chad (Ennedi Est); Sudan rejects blame pending investigation. internazionale.it↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Chief of Staff Yasir al-Atta is received by the Turkish chief of staff for military talks. facebook.com↗
AGrade A: Official record
UN FFM report A/HRC/63/23: reasonable grounds to believe the SAF used foreign-supplied drones and loitering munitions in attacks on civilian objects, which may amount to war crimes; findings on SAF supply 'preliminary'. ohchr.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
UN FFM report A/HRC/63/23: SAF used foreign-supplied drones and loitering munitions in attacks on civilian objects; SAF-side findings "preliminary"; no supplier named (paras 101-107). ohchr.org↗
AGrade A: Official record
New York Times and Washington Post publish investigations based on a dossier from a Middle Eastern intelligence agency describing an SAF chlorine-munition programme; SAF calls it baseless. khaleejtimes.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
Sudan Tribune: more than 40 Shahpar drones delivered since July 2026 (single outlet, unnamed military sources; not corroborated). sudantribune.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
62 more events below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
31 more events at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
4 more events at grade D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
Geography
Tags come from the recorded jurisdiction and from place names in the records. Coordinates on the map are approximate.
Based in
Sudan
Also named
Chad (7), United Arab Emirates (3), Egypt (1), United States (1), Canada (1), France (1)
Places
Port Sudan, Khartoum, Omdurman, Gedaref, El Fasher, Dongola, Al-Jaili / Garri, Northern State, Darfur
Position in the network
Derived by analysing the documented relationships. Nothing in this section is a finding.
Still connected to the SAF when only official records are counted.