Complicit Dossier

Procurement and supply networks · cargo airline · Russia

Aviacon Zitotrans

  • Reported or alleged link, not established
  • Grade A: Official recordStrongest record: official record
  • 3 documented ties · 1 step from the SAF

US-sanctioned Russian cargo airline identified by the Washington Post as flying Baykar weapons to Port Sudan via Bamako in 2024; its Il-76TDs are tracked by OSINT accounts flying Istanbul-Port Sudan in 2026.

Their response

  • No airline response found in sources accessed.

Records

4

Each record carries its own grade. A grade describes the source for that record, not the actor.

Grade A: Official record

Official record: OFAC designation of 26 January 2023 names the two aircraft now tracked to Port Sudan

2023-2026

OFAC designated JSC Aviacon Zitotrans (Russian registration number 1026602311240; established 2 June 1995; Yekaterinburg; 'freight air transport') on 26 January 2023 under E.O. 14024, in the action that named the Wagner Group a transnational criminal organisation. Treasury: it 'has handled cargo shipments for sanctioned Russian Federation defense entities' and 'has shipped military equipment such as rockets, warheads, and helicopter parts all over the world', and 'as of September 2022, Aviacon Zitotrans sought to use a Turkish company and Turkish diplomats to facilitate the sale of Russian defense equipment abroad on behalf of Rosoboroneksport'. OFAC identified four Il-76s as its property, including RA-76502 and RA-78765, the two airframes the flight tracker reports on the Istanbul-Port Sudan route in 2026. OpenSanctions also shows Canadian and Ukrainian (NSDC, 19 Oct 2022) listings. Flightradar24's public page for RA-76502 showed three flights on 23-24 Sep 2026 with origin and destination 'not available'; nothing for RA-78765. The 2026 Port Sudan flights themselves remain a single-tracker report.

Response
Not found.
Sanctions
OFAC SDN since 26 Jan 2023 (RUSSIA-EO14024); Canada; Ukraine NSDC. Not found on EU or UK lists as downloaded.
›Research notes

A for the sanctions record. The tracker's additional posts (RA-78765 Astrakhan to Port Sudan; RA-76834 Moscow to Port Sudan; dates not read) were seen in search results only.

Grade B: Corroborated

Aviacon Zitotrans

Aug - Sep 2024 (WaPo); Mar, Jun, Aug 2026 (OSINT)

US-sanctioned Russian cargo airline identified by the Washington Post as flying Baykar weapons to Port Sudan via Bamako in 2024; its Il-76TDs are tracked by OSINT accounts flying Istanbul-Port Sudan in 2026.

Response
No airline response found in sources accessed.
Sanctions
OFAC SDN since 26 Jan 2023 (Russia/Wagner-related authorities); also sanctioned by Ukraine and Canada.
Grade C: Single source

Defense News investigation, September 2026: same airline 'may be supplying opposing sides'

2024 - 2026

A Defense News investigation published 30 September 2026, based on flight records and leaked internal company documents, says Aviacon Zitotrans works for both the UAE and Russia, so that 'the same aircraft may be supplying opposing sides', 'sometimes flying from Russia and Turkey into Port Sudan, the SAF's main supply point'. The article is mainly about UAE missions; the Port Sudan flights get one sentence, with no dates, registrations or cargo. It is a second outlet, after the Washington Post, placing the airline on Turkey-Port Sudan routes.

Response
No airline response on Sudan found.
Sanctions
OFAC (RUSSIA-EO14024): JSC Aviacon Zitotrans and aircraft RA-76842, RA-76502, RA-76846 and RA-78765 are on the SDN list. The listing concerns Russia, not Sudan. Defense News says the airline is also sanctioned by Canada and Ukraine.
›Research notes

Cargo was not observed. Defense News relies partly on leaked company documents; this entry uses only its published conclusion. Sources marked summary_only were read through an automated page summary; quotations from them should be checked against the page before publication.

3 more records below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

2 more records at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

Relationships

4

← means the other party acts on this one; → means this one acts on the other.

Arms and supply · 4

4 more relationships below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

4 more relationships at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

1 more relationship at grade D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.

Dated events

4
  1. OFAC designates Aviacon Zitotrans and identifies four Il-76s as its property, including RA-76502 and RA-78765. home.treasury.gov

    Grade A: Official record
  2. First Baykar munitions arrive by air at Port Sudan (Aviacon Zitotrans via Bamako). washingtonpost.com

    Grade B: Corroborated
  3. Flight tracker reports about ten Istanbul to Port Sudan cargo flights in 48 hours by Air Master and Aviacon Zitotrans (single source; cargo not documented). x.com

    Grade D: Unverified lead
  4. Defense News: Aviacon Zitotrans aircraft 'may be supplying opposing sides', including flights from Russia and Turkey into Port Sudan defensenews.com

    Grade C: Single source

3 more events below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

2 more events at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

1 more event at grade D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.

Geography

Tags come from the recorded jurisdiction and from place names in the records. Coordinates on the map are approximate.

Based in
Russia
Also named
Türkiye (6), United Arab Emirates (2), Mali (2), Ukraine (1)
Places
Port Sudan, Istanbul, Moscow, Bamako

Position in the network

Derived by analysing the documented relationships. Nothing in this section is a finding.

Connected to the SAF only when single-source claims are counted.

›Possible links to investigate · 2
  • Mirghani Idris Suleiman hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary; cited in the same source (via Baykar, Defense Industries System (DIS)).

  • Türkiye hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary; cited in the same source (via Baykar, Defense Industries System (DIS)).