ComplicitDossier

The file profiles 192 actors. Another 192 organisations appear only as the other party in a relationship and have no record of their own; they are the small dots. A larger mark has more documented ties.

58 actors are in the file only as commercial counterparties or as context: a telecoms company, a law firm on a public register, a state where nothing was found. They are drawn as faint rings.

A filled mark is part of the army, fights beside it, or is a documented supplier. A plain ring is a reported link that is not established.

The EU’s sanctions regulation records DIS as owned and controlled by the army. The US Treasury calls it “Sudan’s largest defense enterprise”, making small arms, conventional weapons, ammunition and military vehicles for the SAF.

It controls Sudan Master Technology, known as Giad. Through Giad it controls the two companies that import for the army: Target Multiactivities, or TMAC, and Ports Engineering.

Sudan’s company registers, compiled by the research group C4ADS, record 264 shareholdings among these bodies: vehicle plants, steel, printing, insurance, housing funds. Most are graded B. They are register filings, the latest from 2019 to 2021, and some will be out of date.

“Sudan’s largest bank, Omdurman National Bank, is at least 86.9% owned by the SAF, hidden by several layers of corporate ownership.”

The mining company Sudamin, the investment arm Zadna, the armed forces’ social-security fund and the mineral regulator sit in the same structure.

Take the shortest chain between every pair of entities in the file. DIS sits on more of those chains than any other body; Giad and Omdurman National Bank follow.

Distance grows outward and places are approximate. Every line into Sudan is a documented supply relationship. The next steps take them one at a time.

On 26 Jun 2026 the US Treasury sanctioned SBL Energy, an Indian explosives manufacturer, for supplying TMAC. Treasury counts “over 200 shipments” and says the explosives are “used in bombs deployed by the SAF”.

The same notice says Egyptian companies supplied TMAC with explosives and related material. It does not name them.

Ports Engineering received ammunition belts and boxes of weapons from a Turkish company, and uniforms and footwear worn by Sudanese intelligence personnel from an Emirati one. Treasury names neither.

Trade records point to one route. The Turkish manufacturer Karmetal sold 20,000 “plastic bodies” and 3,000 “metal boxes” to Bond Technologies FZE in the UAE, the notify party on shipments that Ports Engineering received.

Portex Trade, registered in Hong Kong, is run by Ahmad Abdalla, a DIS official. Treasury says he “coordinated the acquisition of Iranian-made UAVs from an Azerbaijani defense company for shipment to Sudan”. The Azerbaijani company is not named.

US prosecutors allege that Atlas International Business, an Omani company, was broker and seller in a contract worth EUR 61.66 million for Iranian Mohajer-6 drones for Sudan’s Ministry of Defence, and that Shamim Mafi ran the company.

Baykar, the Turkish drone maker, sold six TB2 drones, three ground stations and 600 warheads under a US$120 million contract. Mirghani Idris, the director-general of DIS, signed for the buyer. The source is the Washington Post, working from leaked documents.

Chemtrade International exported chlorine cylinders from India to Ports Engineering in 2024. Chapter 07 follows where one of them was found.

Explosives from India and Egypt. Drones and munitions from Türkiye and Iran. Components through the Emirates, Hong Kong and Azerbaijan.

The links named in sanctions notices are grade A. The drone contract and the chlorine route are grade B. Four suppliers that the US named only by nationality are still unidentified.

Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Libya, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Somalia. For most, the record is a meeting, an agreement or a single report.

Pakistan negotiated an arms package worth US$1.5 billion that was put on hold in April 2026.

The United Arab Emirates, which Port Sudan accuses of arming the other side, bought about 97% of the official gold exported from army-held areas in 2024. South Sudan pays transit fees to move its oil to Port Sudan.

Listing them describes a trade. It does not accuse them.

Serbia, Chad, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan are outlined, not filled. The research looked for support from each and recorded that it found none.

Sudan’s mineral regulator declared 64.4 tonnes of gold production in 2024 and 70 in 2025. The peak before the war was 107 tonnes, in 2017.

The central bank recorded 22.9 tonnes of official gold exports in 2024 and 14.7 in 2025. About 41 and 55 tonnes of declared production do not appear in the export figures.

Sudan’s finance minister put the flow to “a neighbouring country” at 48 tonnes in 2024. That is his estimate, as cited by Chatham House. It is not a customs statistic.

In 2024 the United Arab Emirates took 97% of official exports by value. Sudan cut ties in May 2025 and the UAE halted flights and port traffic that August. The UAE’s share for the year fell to 56%, and Egypt took a third.

The UAE reported importing between 17 and 51 tonnes of gold a year from Sudan from 2019 to 2023. It has not reported 2024 or 2025 to UN Comtrade.

No source names a buyer of the gold in the Gulf, Türkiye or India. One company is named in Egypt.

The army relies on the Central Bank of Sudan for its international transactions. El Nilein Bank keeps a branch in Abu Dhabi, licensed by the UAE’s central bank. Omdurman National Bank is military-owned. None of the three has been listed.

Under US foreign-agent rules, Sudan’s embassy retained Ballard Partners at US$50,000 a month from October 2024, the Vogel Group at US$40,000 from June 2025, and the Williams Group at US$60,000 for 2026.

These firms are listed as professional counterparties on a public register, not as accused parties. The UK and EU lobbying registers show no such engagement.

The UN Fact-Finding Mission reports that a drone attack “attributed to the Sudanese Armed Forces” struck the main market, “killing at least 13 civilians”. Components of a YIHA-III loitering munition were identified at the site. Baykar displays the YIHA-III as its product.

Chlorine was air-dropped near the al-Jaili refinery on 5 and 13 September 2024. One cylinder filmed there carried the serial of a batch that Chemtrade had shipped to Ports Engineering that July.

At Ad-Da’ein Teaching Hospital on 20 March 2026, the UN mission found reasonable grounds to believe the army “carried out successive drone strikes”, “killing at least 70 people, injuring 146”. No remnant was identified.

The file holds 6 incident findings and 16 records on weapon systems. It grades attribution and supply separately.

The US listed DIS and Giad on 1 Jun 2023. The UK followed on 12 Jul 2023 and the EU on 22 Jan 2024. The UN Security Council has listed no one on the army’s side since the war began.

Each mark sits at its first listing. A dotted line joins it to a later listing by another authority.

Of 27 army-controlled bodies documented at grade A, 13 are on none of the four lists checked. They include Omdurman National Bank, the Central Bank, the mineral regulator, the social-security fund and Military Intelligence.

TMAC and Ports Engineering, the importers at the end of the chain, were listed by the US alone, on 26 Jun 2026: more than three years into the war. Portex was listed by the US in Jan 2025 and by the UK in Jul 2026.

For scale, the same lists hold 50 records on the Rapid Support Forces’ side and 25 on the army’s.

No public evidence of cryptocurrency use. No private military contractors on the army’s side. No vessel named as carrying military cargo. No named exchange house, no named Islamist financier, no gold buyer named in the Gulf.

21 gaps are still open, and the ledger says what was searched for each.

Fact-checkers rated them false or misleading. They stay in the file, verdict first and with the claim folded away, so that nobody picks them up as findings.

The file was last updated on 3 Oct 2026. It draws on sanctions notices, UN reports, court filings, company registers and press investigations, and it says which of those each statement rests on.

Where a party has responded publicly, the response sits above its records; 90 of 192 have one. The research is still open: some quotations await a check against the original document, and 20 records are under legal review.