Findings

AZ Media PR Inc. (no. 6868) for Sudan's Ministry of Petroleum, 2020-09-10 to 2022-12-01. RB Crowe LLC (no. 7203) for Barkal Ltd, a UK-registered 'venture capital' company, to promote US-Sudan trade and investment, 2022-12-15 to 2023-06-30.

Response

No response located in the sources reviewed.

Sanctions

None found in OFAC SDN / EU / UK lists checked 2026-10-03

Two official records, from opposed governments, describe the same mechanism. (1) US v. Mafi (FBI affidavit): payments by Sudanese Ministry of Defence representatives for Iranian Mohajer-6 UAVs, bomb fuses and ammunition were routed in cash through 'a Turkish money exchange' and 'a currency exchange located in Dubai' ('UAE Currency Exchange-1'), with an Omani front company ('Omani Company-1') as nominal buyer; a co-conspirator advised paying 'through exchange solutions, and this is important due to sanctions'. (2) UAE prosecution: the Sudanese army paid a UAE importing company 'using the hawaladar method' under fake sugar-import contracts. Neither names the exchange houses.

Why this grade

A for the existence of the US allegations (court record, unproven); C for the UAE account

Response

No response from Sudan's Ministry of Defence found in sources read. No defence statement for Mafi found (first pass).

Sanctions

None on the exchange houses (unnamed). Mafi charged with conspiracy to violate IEEPA.

Official EU reporting shows no licensed military exports to Sudan in 2024 apart from one French ML13 licence.

Response

n/a

Sanctions

EU arms embargo on Sudan in force

Annex I-B of S/2026/357 lists, among 'Parties in the Sudan': 'Justice and Equality Movement a,f', 'Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi a,f', 'Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North Malik Agar faction a,f', 'Third Front-Tamazuj a' (a = recruits and uses children; f = has concluded an action plan). JEM, SLA-MM and SPLM-N Agar fight alongside SAF. FFM A/HRC/57/23 para 65: 'the Sudanese Armed Forces leadership has been pursuing alliances with armed groups that have been listed ... for the recruitment and use of children in hostilities, including the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi and the Justice and Equality Movement.' Para 64: 'multiple credible reports that the Sudanese Armed Forces have played a role in the training and arming of children who have joined the popular mob[ilization]'. OHCHR A/HRC/58/29 para 43: reports that 'armed groups associated with or supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces, including three Darfuri movements, had also recruited children' in eastern Sudan, and that 'three eastern armed groups, as well as mustanfreen, had recruited and trained children'.

Response

Not captured. These listings pre-date the war (carried over from Darfur-era listings with action plans).

Sanctions

JEM leader Gebreil Ibrahim: OFAC 12 Sep 2025 (first-pass sanctions.json).

UN Panel S/2024/65 para 124: since the war 'most of the gold that was previously exported to the United Arab Emirates was now smuggled to Egypt'. Head of Sudan's Gold Exporters Division (Dabanga, 25 Sep 2026): Sudan produces 'more than 70 tonnes of gold a year worth an estimated $8 billion, but only about $2 billion reaches the state treasury'; he 'alleged that influential entities export gold outside formal channels'. STPT (23 Jul 2026): official exports shifted from the UAE (99% to 56%) towards Egypt in 2024-25 while smuggling 'continued at high levels in 2025'. An investigative report republished by Sudan Akhbar (8 Aug 2026; original outlet not identified) says gold bound for Egypt is collected at Al-Ansari market (Red Sea State) and Al-Abyar market near Wadi Halfa and, per smugglers' testimony, delivered in Aswan to the Egyptian state-owned Shalateen Mineral Resources Company; a 'Sudanese security source' said 'a number of medium-scale mining sites in Red Sea, River Nile and Northern states belong to the Sudanese Armed Forces or are run in partnership with them, while other sites belong to armed movements allied with the army, and the output of these sites is handed to "official Egyptian entities" at the border' - the report states it 'was unable to verify this independently'. Shalateen, the Egyptian Mineral Resources company and the Central Bank of Egypt did not reply.

Why this grade

A (direction of flow: UN Panel); C (exporters' division claim of 'influential entities'); D (SAF-run mining sites delivering to Egyptian state buyers: unverified, original outlet unknown)

Response

No reply from Shalateen, the Egyptian Mineral Resources company or the Central Bank of Egypt (per the report). No SAF response captured.

Sanctions

None on the entities named here.

UN Panel S/2025/239 paras 83-89 (see Joint Force entry): SLA/MM implicated with RSF in looting in January 2024; '30,000 and 40,000 tons' moved 'through Tina to Libya along routes controlled by SAF and SLA/MM' (Apr-Oct 2024); fee 'around $3,300 [per ton] in Dabbah on the route from north Sudan to Egypt'. Ayin (26 Mar 2026), quoting a trade expert: 'During the first two years of the war, we saw gum arabic and even livestock from the west of the country, from regions controlled by the RSF, arriving in Port Sudan and being exported ... private sector actors transported gum arabic on behalf of the RSF and paid bribes at the army checkpoints to get through. This trafficking has decreased but still exists.' Dabanga (24 Sep 2026): an economist said government 'fees and levies exceed 40%' with '32 fees' on gum arriving at El Obeid; looted gum from En Nahud is re-exported via Chad (attributed to the RSF).

Why this grade

A (SLA/MM looting and SAF/SLA-MM-controlled export route: UN Panel); C (bribes at army checkpoints: single outlet, anonymous expert)

Response

Not captured.

UN Panel S/2024/65 para 147: diesel at about $10/litre in southern Libya against $25 in Darfur 'fuelled smuggling of this key good from Libya to Darfur, including for the resupply of Sudanese warring parties'. S/2025/239 paras 71-72: 'Oil smuggling across the Libyan-Sudanese border continued unabated'; 'RSF sought to dominate several key smuggling routes'; the Sovereign Council discussed closing the border in Aug 2024 but 'the limited military capacity of SAF hindered the effective enforcement'; 'the SAF-aligned joint force ... controlled the Altroe to Bin Hansin border zone'. Darfur24 (4 Dec 2023): in-kind fuel levies at armed-movement gates before Mellit (see Joint Force local-reports entry). Al-Taghyeer / Sudanese Center for Democratic Media (25 Jun 2026): in army-held areas constraints 'created opportunities for speculation and monopoly'; the May-June 2026 'eight tankers' crisis exposed import concentration in a few private companies; the Energy Ministry issued warnings to importers. The piece itself notes these statements 'are not legal proof of corruption'.

Why this grade

A (smuggling flow; Joint Force border control); C (in-kind levies); no evidence (SAF officers running fuel smuggling)

Response

Not captured.

Three points of provenance should travel with any use of this material. The September 2026 dossier came from 'a Middle Eastern intelligence agency' on condition of anonymity, and both US newspapers worked from the same files. A US lobbying firm, American Defense International, filed with the Justice Department under FARA (registrant 6567) on 13 July 2026 that it was distributing The National's article on the US demand for inspections 'on behalf of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates'. Opinion articles in South African IOL titles (February and September 2026) add unsourced detail, including a vessel name. None of this bears on whether the allegations are true; it bears on how much weight repetition in UAE-linked outlets should carry.

A/HRC/63/23, "Fuelling Sudan's conflict: weapons, fighters and external support networks" (advance unedited version, 1 September 2026): "Foreign-supplied drones also expanded the Sudanese Armed Forces’ long-range strike capabilities, although the mission’s findings on external support to the Sudanese Armed Forces remain preliminary." The report names no state or company as a supplier to the SAF (no mention of Iran, Türkiye, Egypt, Russia or Pakistan).

Read together, the official pages of the Defense Industries System, the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces show a sanctioned arms conglomerate and its minister travelling and exhibiting through the war: Istanbul (IDEF 2023, IDEF 2025, SAHA 2026), Riyadh (World Defense Show 2024, meeting with the Saudi military-industries regulator), Beijing (Poly, CPMIEC, Norinco, Sept 2024), Cairo (EDEX 2025, Military Production ministry), Baku (ADEX 2026, defence ministers), Doha and Jakarta (Sept 2026). The posts state aims ('transferring modern technologies', 'activating agreements', 'strategic partnerships') and name state bodies; outside the Beijing signings they name no supplier company and no delivery.

PRODUCTION ATTRIBUTED TO RSF-HELD AREAS, NOT SAF. New Lines: both Khartoum-area labs operated in RSF-controlled neighbourhoods; 'It is unlikely that operations of such a scale could have functioned without at least implicit approval from the RSF'. The Feb 2025 Al-Jaili lab (capacity ~100,000 pills/hour) was seized by GIS after SAF retook the area. SAF-SIDE EXPOSURE is limited to transit: New Lines notes four captagon interdictions in Red Sea State since April 2024 and that 'repeated captagon consignments routed through the Port of Sudan could point to potential bribery and corruption among local forces and customs agents' (speculative). STPT: 'There is an atmosphere of secrecy surrounding the Captagon trade in SAF-controlled areas'; unnamed sources say militias and the Joint Forces 'are also active in distributing Captagon and other drugs in SAF-controlled areas'; 'no significant seizures of Captagon manufacturing facilities have been officially announced since the war, apart from those discovered north of Khartoum after the RSF withdrawal'. EUDA/EU-ACT (2026) links trafficking only to 'areas under the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan'.

Why this grade

B (labs, seizures, RSF-area attribution); D (SAF-side corruption at Port Sudan - inference only)

Response

Sudan's Interior Ministry accused the RSF 'and an Arab state' of distributing drugs free to youth (June 2024, per STPT).

Sanctions

None

Chatham House: 'unofficial and smuggled gold exports to Egypt account for about 60 per cent of the production from Northern, River Nile and Red Sea states'; 'upward of 100 kg per day, equating to more than 60 tonnes since the war began (2023 and 2024)', against official 2024 exports to Egypt of only $16m. 'Since the beginning of the war, the SAF has sought to transfer gold to Egypt to prevent it from being sent directly to the UAE'. 'Egypt has profited substantially from conflict gold smuggled from SAF-held areas'. Carriers are cross-border networks 'mostly men from the Ababda, Rashaida and Bishari tribes' (MEE; STPT calls them 'armed gangs'). Beam Reports quotes a source that 'traders and smugglers in Sudan, within certain networks linked to the government, are involved', and that complicit officials are of 'two types: one part receives instructions from higher officials ... and another part takes bribes from traders'. Chatham House records pre-war 'impunity of the NISS, the SAF and the RSF for involvement in gold-smuggling operations'.

Why this grade

B (scale and routes); C (official complicity - anonymous sourcing)

Response

No SAF or Egyptian government response located. MEE: Egypt 'is turning a blind eye to the passage of gold' while its army uses lethal force against smugglers.

Sanctions

SAF-linked gold/defence companies Sudan Master Technology, Red Rock, Zadna, Defense Industries System appear on EU/US lists (verify per-entity in the sanctions thread).

Sudan Tribune (Jul 2026): army-aligned groups manage checkpoints on northern and eastern routes (Shendi-Atbara, Port Sudan-Kassala); 'joint armed movements' on the Debba-El Fasher axis; 108+ checkpoints on the Khartoum-Sennar highway; gold tolls of 10-15% in mining areas (RSF extracts far larger sums in the west). STPT/New Features: 'supporting the war effort' is 'often exploited as a pretext to justify extorting money from citizens' by localities, inter-state crossing points and customs points; 'fees are collected at crossing points by force in the presence of armed men ... in areas controlled by both SAF and RSF, and sometimes the collectors are in military uniform' (example: Chamber of Commerce in Ad-Dabba, Northern State). STPT also reports that pro-SAF businessmen who 'donated money and food supplies to support the SAF' were rewarded with monopolies over gold export and fuel/sugar/food imports, and that the Sovereignty Council chairman 'personally intervenes' in central-bank gold sales to importers (anonymous Central Bank sources).

Why this grade

B (pattern: STPT + Sudan Tribune + STPT Conflict Monitor); C (specific patronage claims)

Response

No official response documented in the sources.

Sanctions

None

NO DIRECT SAF NEXUS DOCUMENTED. MEE: 'at least 200 vehicles are moving every day between the two countries carrying the gold, fuel, human beings and other smuggled materials'. Networks operate through SAF-held territory and move the gold that Chatham House says SAF prefers to route to Egypt; STPT says the Sudan Shield Forces maintain relationships with Rashaida-run smuggling gangs in eastern Sudan (single source).

Why this grade

B (networks); C (SSF-Rashaida relationship)

Sanctions

None

NO SAF NEXUS DOCUMENTED beyond SAF/SLA-MM taxation of flows at al-Muthalath in 2023 (GI-TOC). Subul al-Salam and the LAAF are assessed as RSF suppliers/allies (Chatham House, GI-TOC, MEE). Joint Forces clashed with Haftar-aligned Libyan militias in the triangle (MEE).

Why this grade

B (networks' RSF alignment); C (SAF-side taxation)

Sanctions

None relevant to SAF

GI-TOC (Chad report, Nov 2025): Ousmane Dillo 'had joined the ranks of Sudanese Armed Forces-aligned Zaghawa groups in Darfur'; after the Feb 2024 killing of his brother, opposition figure Yaya Dillo, this 'reportedly persuaded many Zaghawa fighters to travel to Sudan to join'. ACSS lists 'Chadian Zaghawa Fighters' led by Ousmane Dillo among SAF-side foreign fighters. Mobilisation is communal/political, not via criminal brokers.

Response

Chad accused Sudan of supporting 'terrorist' groups aiming to destabilise Chad, referring to Dillo's mobilisation in El Fasher; Sudan had filed an AU complaint against Chad over alleged RSF support (Nov 2024).

Sanctions

None

Al-Taghyeer (8 Aug 2025) reports that in the Kamil Idris cabinet the SAF-allied movements kept: Finance (Gebreil Ibrahim, JEM, in post since 2021); Minerals (Nour al-Daim Taha, SLM-Minawi); Human Resources and Social Welfare (Mutasim Ahmed Saleh, JEM political secretary) - a portfolio that includes 'the Zakat Chamber' and the social security fund and its investment arm; Infrastructure and Transport (GSLF nominee). Unnamed sources told the paper that the state Sudanese Mineral Resources Company 'is only nominally under the Ministry of Minerals, while in practice it is subject to shared political and economic influence between the Sudan Liberation Army Movement and the Sovereignty Council, under an undeclared agreement on sharing the financial resources collected from the mining sector'; and that Sea Ports Corporation revenue 'does not appear in the general budget' and the corporation is 'effectively run by the security agencies' of the Sovereignty Council under the direct supervision of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Ibrahim Jaber.

Why this grade

B (ministerial appointments - public record); C (revenue-sharing and off-budget claims - single outlet, anonymous sources)

Response

None captured in the article for the revenue-sharing claims.

Sanctions

Gebreil Ibrahim: OFAC 12 Sep 2025.

Customs (16 Mar 2026): anti-smuggling in Red Sea State, 'in coordination with the General Intelligence Service', seized 238 kg of 'ice' (methamphetamine), 15 weapons and '700 kilograms of copper ore'; three arrests. Official reports say copper smuggling rose during the war as networks dug up power cables, 'especially in areas that saw a Rapid Support Forces presence'. Cabinet Decision 50/2024 bans export of copper, aluminium and iron. SAF-side nexus alleged once: two copper loads seized in Gedaref from Joint Force personnel, with a brigadier-rank officer intervening (see Joint Force local-reports entry).

Why this grade

B (market and seizures: official statements); D (Joint Force officers' involvement: aggregator, original unidentified)

Response

See Joint Force entry.

Elsewedy Electric's sustainability reports say the Giad Elsewedy plant 'was not operational in 2023 due to the ongoing conflict' and that both Sudan plants were not operational in 2024. C4ADS reports brass cups for 7.62mm cartridges consigned to Giad Elsewedy Cables in August and October 2023. The two statements have not been reconciled by either company.

Giad/SMT and Sudamin: confirmed as co-shareholders of Hypokwan Mining (70/30, 2013), which matches Chatham House's account of Block 3A. Omdurman National Bank and Zadna: confirmed as sister companies under the armed forces' social security fund (C4ADS; EU); no loan, guarantee or shareholding between the two was found. Aswar and Giad/SMT: both dealt with Meroe Gold - Aswar as security contractor, 'SMT' as the military-owned licence partner - but no document shows a contract or shareholding between Aswar and Giad/SMT; open. Baykar and Zadna: no evidence of any relationship; the link is an artefact of one official having chaired Zadna and signed for the Defense Industries System.

Ayin's article names no company. The figure of about 35 army, intelligence and allied-movement gold companies is attributed to a single gold-sector trader. From official and investigative records the following can be named with an owning body. Army / Defense Industries System: Red Rock Mining (SMT Engineering); Advanced Mining Works (Red Rock 99%, Giad for Cars 1%); Hypokwan Mining (SMT Engineering 70%, Sudamin 30%). Military intelligence: Aswar Multi Activities (OCCRP, 2022). General Intelligence Service: Sabika (Chatham House). State companies the UK says provide the army with gold revenue: Sudamin (Ministry of Minerals), Ariab Mining (state, via Industrial Development Bank), Omdurman Mining (Rida Engineering 82%, Sudamin 18%). State refinery: Sudan Gold Refinery (central bank 82.35%, Ministry of Finance 17.65%). Sudamin also holds minority stakes in foreign-run concessions (Manub 22%, Alliance, Kush). No company owned by the Justice and Equality Movement, SLM-Minnawi or another Joint Force movement is named in any source found. STPT (2024) refers to leaked official lists of exporting companies 'several of which are allegedly fronting for the SAF' but does not publish the names.

The Ministry of Finance table published by the central bank shows US$1.2bn of drawings in 2025, almost all multilateral or commodity grants (UN, World Bank, African Development Bank, IFAD, Arab Fund), and zero from any state. That is humanitarian and development money, not military support. No central-bank deposit from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Russia, Egypt or China since April 2023 was found; the Saudi and UAE deposits that searches return are from 2019. New commitments are frameworks rather than cash: the Belarus export-credit agreement (signed 7 May 2026), Turkey's joint economic committee and Argaz gas-berth memorandum, Saudi statements on reconstruction priority and a reported US$300m, 30-year copper concession to an unnamed Chinese company in Red Sea State (opposed locally; Sudan's share put at 30%). State support to the military, where reported, takes the form of arms financing and deliveries recorded in the arms thread, outside these accounts.

Gum arabic: the OHCHR briefing paper of 15 Jul 2026 adds to the UN Panel's finding - checkpoint charges in SAF-controlled areas and on routes held by SAF-aligned groups, and security-linked traders reportedly exempt from them. Sesame: Chatham House (Apr 2024) says SAF 'now controls over 90 per cent of the disputed areas in the Al Fashaga triangle', built four bridges over the Atbara river and 'took control of the agricultural sector in the area', and names DIS and Zadna as SAF-linked agricultural companies; it does not describe sesame smuggling or levies by named SAF units. Livestock and meat: formal trade only (DIS subsidiary and Kadro slaughterhouse already recorded; meat exports to Kuwait resumed 25 Sep 2026 through private slaughterhouses); OHCHR notes extortion of livestock traders without naming a party. Charcoal: nothing found. Fuel imports, scrap/copper and antiquities: nothing new beyond earlier passes.

Seizures announced by SAF-side authorities: Red Sea State, Jan 2026 - 493 kg of crystal meth and 100 kg of heroin, 11 arrests including four foreigners (SUNA); Red Sea police, 27 Jun 2026 - 430 kg of meth 'recently'; Khartoum, 23 Jul 2026 - two complete meth labs, 150,000 captagon pills, 260,000 tramadol pills, 4 kg of cocaine, captagon precursors, two fibre-optic spools of the kind used to guide attack drones, two foreign suspects (Customs anti-smuggling with GIS). Attribution: Sudan Tribune writes of 'accusations directed at forces loyal to the army of involvement in drug trafficking' and names only the Joint Force (see its entry). Arabic and English searches for any charged or convicted SAF officer or militia commander returned nothing. The Sudan Shield allegation remains single-source.

NO WARTIME SAF NEXUS DOCUMENTED in sources reviewed. Networks operate in SAF-held territory. On 30 Sept 2026 a joint force of the Anti-Smuggling Administration and the General Intelligence Service reportedly freed 150 people held for ransom at 'Fereiniga' east of Wad Bayya, Kassala State; suspects fired on the force and fled across the Atbara river (single secondary report citing RT). Pre-war: HRW (2014) documented Sudanese police and military handing Eritreans to traffickers in Kassala; a 2018 IRIN investigation (republished by Statewatch 2025) reported 'numerous accounts of the involvement of Sudanese officials in the trafficking industry' including police tip-offs to traffickers.

Why this grade

C (wartime incident); B (pre-war official complicity)

Response

Authorities present the Sept 2026 operation as enforcement against trafficking.

Sanctions

None

GI-TOC: after SAF and SLA-MM took control of the tri-border area in mid-2023, 'SLA-MM forces in al-Muthalath were reportedly imposing taxes in kind - taking a fraction of the fuel, food or goods being transported ... By the end of the year, however, the SAF in al-Muthalath appeared to have taken over these duties.' On people-smuggling specifically: 'It is unclear whether the SAF and SLA-MM's profiteering extended to human smuggling', though GI-TOC judges it likely one or both 'took over the RSF's role of managing migration along the border'. Onward transport is by Libyan Tebu and Zway smugglers.

Response

No response from SAF or SLA-MM located.

Sanctions

None

Pre-war context. STPT: in April 2019 police seized three containers of synthetic drugs (15 tons and 18 million pills); defendants said the shipment arrived on a Kazakhstan-registered Il-76 that landed at the runway of Safat Aviation, 'a subsidiary of the Defense Industries System'. STPT: unloading 'at either the Khartoum military airport or Safat's private runway strongly indicates the involvement of high-ranking military figures'; the four foreign defendants (three Syrians, one South Sudanese) were freed months into long sentences. STPT frames this as 'a history of large, unprosecuted drug seizures' suggesting 'potential involvement by high-level officials'.

Response

None located.

Sanctions

Defense Industries System designated by OFAC June 2023 (per OFAC release of 16 Jan 2025) and listed by EU - for arms procurement, not narcotics.

Omdurman, March 2024: the Emergency Lawyers group said old Omdurman neighbourhoods 'were subjected to widespread looting of civilian homes by members of the armed forces and other groups at gunpoint' after the army took control; resistance committees made the same accusation; markets for stolen goods existed in army-held Karrari. Southern Khartoum, Feb 2026: the industrial federation said ~450 factories were '100% looted', perpetrators 'hold military ranks and are seen loading looted goods'; systematic extraction and smuggling of copper from transformers and cables described as the 'greatest economic crime' after the war. HRW World Report 2026 notes SAF-allied fighters were reported to have carried out looting, killings and detentions in eastern Khartoum.

Response

Police spokesman confirmed theft reports in old Omdurman and joint patrols (Mar 2024). A Sudan Tribune headline ('Sudanese army orders crackdown on looting in recaptured areas', sudantribune.com/article298453/) indicates an army order against looting; the article could not be opened (403) and is not relied on. The industrial federation said no official inquiry had been opened.

Sanctions

None

Chatham House: 'Both the RSF and the SAF have sought to control the lucrative and essential illicit fuel trade from southern Libya, which has scaled up dramatically since 2022'. GI-TOC: SLA-MM, then SAF, levied in-kind taxes on fuel and goods at al-Muthalath in 2023. The Libyan suppliers (LAAF and Subul al-Salam) are assessed as RSF-aligned.

Response

None located.

Sanctions

None

NO WARTIME SAF NEXUS DOCUMENTED. STPT: post-Assad crackdowns 'appear to have displaced some Syrian drug networks to Sudan'; individuals 'speaking Arabic with a Levantine accent, most likely Syrians' were observed at sites in RSF-held Nyala; New Lines: lab equipment 'similar to that found in lab busts in Syria'. Only SAF-linked data point is the pre-war April 2019 case (three Syrians; shipment landed at a DIS-subsidiary runway).

Why this grade

C (RSF-area presence); no evidence (SAF nexus)

Sanctions

None

Ayin reports 35 security and military companies belonging to the army, the intelligence service and allied armed movements operate in gold; only ~20% of shipment value reaches the state and ~80% is smuggled (to Egypt, Libya, Chad, South Sudan, UAE).

Response

Sudanese Mineral Resources Company says Q1 2026 revenue was 113% of target (Ayin); see SMRC denial in the Egypt-gold entry.

Source

Ayin Network / عاين (independent Sudanese investigative outlet)

Darfur24 investigation: Egypt receives about 6 tonnes of Sudanese gold a month; smuggling in the desert is dominated by Rashaida groups; aircraft of Russian and Jordanian companies land near mines; influential government companies backed by 'regular agencies' evade repatriating export proceeds. Sources are mostly anonymous officials who refused to name the companies.

Response

DENIED. 'الشركة السودانية للموارد المعدنية نفت وجود "نسبة تهريب للذهب" وقالت أي جهة تقول غير ذلك "كاذبة"'.

Source

Darfur24 (independent Sudanese outlet)

Arabic Post relaying Middle East Eye (Mar 2024): traders say 70-80% of medicines entering Sudan are smuggled with help from army soldiers or RSF; both forces tax goods at checkpoints; smugglers need cover from SAF or RSF depending on the area. No officers or units are named.

Response

No official response in the article.

Source

Istanbul-based, Qatar-linked; MEE is London-based, Qatar-linked

LEAD ONLY, no evidence of financing the SAF. The C4ADS dataset of Empowerment Removal Committee decisions records '100% shares seized' in five exchange companies. The central bank's 'Authorized Exchange Bureaus' page lists what appear to be the same five under variant spellings (Alride, Yamama, Irgane, Dinar, Leira) among 21 licensed bureaus. The committee's decisions were cancelled wholesale after the October 2021 coup.

Response

None sought or found.

Sanctions

None found.

Ayin (April 2026) quotes analysts estimating the movement's global assets at up to US$50bn, about US$200m a year in real-estate income, and US$500m of capital in 27 fuel-import companies set up inside Sudan, moved through hawala, real estate, front companies and gold trading. These are analysts' estimates; no documents, company names or financiers are given. No source read in this pass or the first pass documents a specific transfer from a named financier abroad to the SAF or to mobilisation units.

Why this grade

C for the Ayin estimates; negative finding otherwise

Sanctions

Organisation-level only: Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood (Sudanese Islamic Movement and Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade) designated SDGT and FTO by the US on 9 Mar 2026; Ali Karti (OFAC 28 Sep 2023, EU 24 Jun 2024); Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade (OFAC 12 Sep 2025). No financier, bank, charity or company is designated as funding them. The Hamza / Al-Zawaya listings are for financing Hamas.

Ministry of Energy and Petroleum set state-owned companies' share of petroleum imports at 50%, with 30 private companies in five consortia covering the rest; nine more companies were to join. Sudan imports 60,000-70,000 tonnes of diesel a month, mainly from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states after the UAE embargo. STPT's 2024 oil paper says companies affiliated with the SAF and the General Intelligence Service 'together with a handful of their business associates and Islamist capitalists' dominated petroleum distribution, and that SAF-owned Omdurman National Bank tried and failed to set up a parallel fund for strategic-commodity imports. None of the companies is named.

Response

n/a

Ayin (27 Apr 2026): about 35 security and military companies belonging to the army, the intelligence service and the armed movements dominate gold; c.20% of value reaches the state.

Why this grade

C (Ayin's claim); candidates individually graded A-B in their own records. The mapping of any candidate to Ayin's 35 is NOT established.

Dabanga (8 Mar 2024), citing 'an informed source at the Argeen crossing': 'A forged visa now costs about SDG3 million'; 'The Sudanese investigations police arrested two members of these visa gangs last week. The prosecution was questioning them when influential police officers intervened and released the accused. They also removed the members of the investigations team.' Official fees: passport fee raised to SDG 150,000 (Sept 2023), called 'blackmail' by an analyst; al-Burhan then 'directed the police to review' it (Dabanga, 3 Sep 2023). Wadi Halfa customs clearers struck in Aug 2024 over weekly rises in the customs dollar and because 'every party related to the crossings ... imposes its own illogical taxes'; al-Burhan moved supervision of customs clearance to the Sovereignty Council (Dabanga, 22 Aug 2024). Smuggling route: Ayin (17 Jul 2024), GI-TOC (Oct 2024, first pass) and Dabanga describe Sudanese and Egyptian smugglers, desert 'storage' hand-over points and deaths from heat; Amnesty (18 Jun 2024) documents Egyptian police and Border Guard returning detainees via Qustul-Ashkeet 'to Sudanese authorities'.

Why this grade

C (police protection of visa forgers: single outlet, one anonymous source); B (route and fee burden)

Response

None captured from Sudanese police on the Argeen allegation.

Sanctions

None.

No SAF command link documented. State forces appear in public reporting as rescuers: Kassala authorities said a joint security force freed 'more than sixty-five' people of several nationalities held in chains by trafficking gangs (5 Sep 2025); in Khartoum the 'General Administration for Anti-Smuggling ... in direct coordination with the Military Police' freed 74 foreign hostages and arrested 12 suspects (Sudan Tribune, 23-24 Jul 2026). Complicity allegations are generic: ACJPS report 'Human Trafficking in Sudan' (June 2025) says some networks are 'allegedly colluding with "security officials or elements of the government forces"' and cites 'corruption within state institutions'. Survey data: MMC 4Mi, Port Sudan (320 Eritrean, Ethiopian and South Sudanese respondents, Jun-Sep 2024): as likely perpetrators of abuse along the journey respondents 'cited armed groups/militias (28%), military/polic[e] (25%), and people from the local community (19%)', smugglers 13%; 32% said smugglers' services included 'dealing with authorities'. MMC-UNHCR, eastern Sudan (Mar-May 2024, n=312): kidnapping reported by 25-29%, bribery/extortion by 17-20%, trafficking/exploitation 16-20% (no perpetrator breakdown). US State Dept 2024 human rights report attributes kidnapping-for-ransom in Sudan to the RSF ('kidnapping replaced looting as the most significant income source for its militants').

Why this grade

C (official complicity: generic, unnamed); B (prevalence of kidnapping and extortion on routes through eastern Sudan)

Response

Sudanese authorities present these operations as evidence of enforcement.

Sanctions

None.

STPT: 'Often, gold transactions in Dubai end up in the accounts of the Nilein Bank or Asawer Company in Dubai.'

Response

No response located in the sources reviewed.

The whole dataset (1,003 nodes, 1,411 edges) was scanned for non-Sudanese or foreign-labelled shareholders. In companies that have a military, DIS/Giad or SAF-fund shareholder, it contains: (1) Qatari armed-forces committee, 30% of Sur International Investment (reg. 17410); (2) Syrian Military Housing Corporation, 50% of Sudanese Syrian Housing and Development (reg. 17715); (3) Elsewedy Electric companies (Egypt), 45% of Giad Elsewedy Cables and 99.98% of Giad Elsewedy for Transport (reg. 25987); (4) an Italian company labelled 'Italian Company 20054 Nova Milane Sermac S P A', 43.88% (historical) of Giad Sermak (reg. 28365); (5) a Swiss-addressed entity labelled 'Kirchstrasse 11 CH-9400 Rorscha Controls Engineering', 51% (historical) of Gia Constport (reg. 33571, registered 23 Sept 2008, capital 300,000,000) beside Giad's automotive company 40%; (6) 'Swedish Monetary Fund for Developing Country Industries' (probably Swedfund), 10.08% of Khartoum for Dairy Products (reg. 2104) beside the Martyr Organization 89.92%; (7) in White Nile Sugar (reg. 13527), where Omdurman National Bank has 5.1% and Sheikan 1.12%: Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development 14.16%, Egyptian Integrated Sugar and Industries 4.22%, National Investment Bank of Egypt 2.38%; (8) 'The Islamic Bank of Dubai', 74.28% (historical) of Sudanese Free Zones and Markets (reg. 8323); (9) historical minority holders of Sudatel (Siemens 0.51%, Bitar & Co 0.51%) and of the National Petroleum Corporation (Al-Qubaisi Projects 7.77%, Baabod Trade and Navigation Agencies 2.59%). Co-shareholders of Giad/Safat companies whose domicile the dataset does not state and which could not be identified: Arab Reval Trading (50% of Jeval Investment, reg. 35411), AROK Holding 'Sait Saha' (30% hist. of Nubian Global Investment, reg. 54279), Belchina Investment and Integrated Solutions (30% hist. of Andonile Investment, reg. 34102), Falcon International (50% hist. of Giad for Maritime and Transportation), International Trade Group (50% of Giad for Investment Services), Vega Aviation (30% hist. of Safat Training Complex), Viva Aviation and Engineering Systems Ltd (50% of Blue Optics), 'Yogish' (18.75% of ESCAD Agricultural Development, reg. 33039). Foreign partners of Sudamin, the UK-sanctioned state mining holder: Managem (78% of Manub, reg. 41818), Dubai International Mining Company (73% hist. of NGM International Mining, reg. 46261), plus locally-labelled majority partners in Crown Hills, Duichat, Qaysan, Royal Nubian, Alnawati and Seraquet. Outside SAF chains the dataset lists ordinary state joint ventures: CNPC and BGP, Petronas, Total, Lonrho, Nissho Iwai, the Kuwait Investment Authority and the governments of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the Arab Fund, Libyan Arab Foreign Investment, Cominor (Ariab, historical), Tahe (Delgo 82%), Princely Enterprise (Orshab 73%), Edgo, Grand Prairie, N-Ren, a Turkish electrical firm (70% of Sudanese Turkish Electric Industries, reg. 47420), Janan Investment of Abu Dhabi (60% of Amtar), and the Ras Al Khaimah Academy for Roads and Traffic (49% of a police-side traffic academy, reg. 35275). Caveats: one dataset, a 2019-2021 snapshot, with machine-translated labels ('Swedish' is El Sewedy). A shareholding is not support for the war, and the unidentified co-shareholders are leads, not findings.

What exists. Middle East Eye (15 Feb 2024): one traveller said 'we stopped at many police, army and security checkpoints and they... let us through, even though it was clear we were travelling with smugglers'; another, of checkpoints between Abu Hamad and the border: 'I don't know if they were official checkpoints but the soldiers had Sudanese police uniforms on'; a third suspected 'an illegal network made up of Sudanese and Egyptian traders who have ties with the police in both countries'. Beam Reports (2025), quoting one gold trader: the Abu Hamad desert routes are 'coordinated in advance with government bodies and border intelligence in both Sudan and Egypt'; of officials, 'one part receives instructions from higher officials and carries them out, and another part takes bribes from traders'. Sudan Tribune (29 Jul 2026, now read directly) says tolls on the Shendi-Atbara line are collected at checkpoints 'managed by army-aligned groups'. What was searched and found empty on the Sudanese side: Refugees International (Feb 2025), The New Humanitarian (Dec 2025), Ayin (Jul 2024; despite its title it documents Egyptian enforcement), ACJPS via Dabanga (Apr 2025: 'some border security officers are complicit ... for bribes', nationality unspecified), Freedom United/LSE (2025). No source names a unit, checkpoint, officer or tariff; no exit-visa or passport racket beyond the Argeen visa-forgery episode and official fee rises already recorded; no prosecution of any Sudanese official found.

One flight tracker (@AfriMEOSINT) reports a dense pattern of cargo flights into Port Sudan by two Egyptian carriers (Sky Vision Airlines, Air Master), two Belarusian carriers (Rubystar, TAE Avia), the US-sanctioned Russian carrier Aviacon Zitotrans and a Russian Ministry of Defence An-124. Corroborated by flight data independent of the account: Air Master SU-SAW Istanbul to Port Sudan on 15 Jul 2026 (Flightradar24), flight MR8002 Istanbul to Port Sudan on 25 Jun, 15 Jul and 23 Jul 2026 (Airportia); Sky Vision SU-SKF Cairo to Port Sudan on 4 Aug 2026 and a Port Sudan-Ljubljana-Port Sudan rotation on 4-5 Aug 2026 (Flightradar24 and Airportia). Corroborated by official record: the Aviacon aircraft RA-76502 and RA-78765 and the An-124 RA-82040 are named as blocked property on the OFAC list; Rubystar and TAE Avia are OFAC-designated carriers, TAE Avia for shipping 'ammunition and weapons to foreign conflict zones'. Not corroborated: any landing at Port Sudan by the Il-76s and the An-124 in 2026 (Flightradar24 shows departures from Minsk with destination 'not available'); the flights from Tekirdağ Çorlu; the number of flights; and above all the cargo. No UN report, news agency or investigative outlet found says what any of these flights carried. Sudan Tribune reports that EgyptAir, SalamAir and Qatar Airways resumed scheduled services to Port Sudan in mid-2026, so civil traffic there is ordinary. Flightradar24's Port Sudan arrivals board on 3 Oct 2026 showed only scheduled passenger flights. Historical flight data (OpenSky, ADS-B Exchange, adsb.lol archives) could not be accessed from this environment.

Former investment minister and Umma party figure Mubarak al-Fadil alleges gold output in army-held areas is ~60 t/yr worth $6bn, all going to war financing and arms purchases, managed without oversight by the army commander and the central bank governor. Ayin also reports that gold was exported in hand luggage on scheduled flights to the UAE until the UAE halted Port Sudan flights on 6 Aug 2025.

Response

No government response to al-Fadil's claim in the article.

Source

Ayin Network / عاين (independent Sudanese investigative outlet); the claim itself is by a partisan political figure

A sudaneseonline.com forum post claims to reproduce an Africa Intelligence article on Burhan relying on Bashir-era political figures, business-federation heads and businessmen for war finance and arms deals. Names are deliberately NOT recorded here; verify against the Africa Intelligence original first.

Source

open discussion board; unverified repost; forum is heavily polarised

Erem News quotes a member of the ERC secretariat and two analysts saying Burhan cancelled the confiscation decisions, that over US$1bn in recovered assets went back, and that about US$400m a year is diverted to the organisation through companies used as commercial fronts. The reader rendered the companies as Giad, Danfodio Holding, Zadna and defence-industry entities.

Response

No Sudanese government response in the article.

Unexplained statistical lead: Ghana reported to UN Comtrade exports to Sudan of HS 93 goods worth USD 3.51m (2022) and USD 2.43m (2023, of which HS 9306 bombs/ammunition USD 2.25m, 62 t, and HS 9301 military weapons USD 177,057), plus HS 8710 armoured vehicles USD 4.33m (2022).

Why this grade

D (unexplained customs entries; could be re-exports, UN/contingent equipment movements or miscoding)

Response

Not sought.

Sanctions

None

Reports in regional media that Turkish cargo aircraft flew from Tekirdag Corlu (an airfield associated with Baykar) to East Oweinat, the Egyptian airstrip near the Sudanese border from which Akinci drones operate.

Response

The Standard: 'Turkish, Egyptian and Sudanese authorities had not publicly confirmed the flights, their cargo or their destination'; 'the reports remain unverified'.

Sanctions

None

Beyond Qeshm Fars Air and Aviacon Zitotrans (already profiled), carrier names come from one open-source researcher's flight-tracking posts relayed by a blog (November 2025): Egyptian-registered Boeing 737 freighters of Air Master (SU-SFY, SU-SAW) on Istanbul-Port Sudan rotations; a Sky Vision Airlines A321 freighter (SU-SKF) Cairo-Port Sudan; Qatar Emiri Air Force C-17 and C-130 flights from Al Udeid; a Turkish government Gulfstream (TC-IHA); and Belarusian aircraft of Rubystar and Rada Airlines routed towards Eritrea. Atalayar (December 2025) cites an 'IGAD team' counting 16 cargo flights into Port Sudan on 1-17 December 2025, mostly from Istanbul, against 8 in all of November. The Standard (Kenya, July 2026) reports unconfirmed Turkish cargo flights from Tekirdag Corlu to East Oweinat in Egypt. In no case was cargo observed, and scheduled or chartered freight into the country's only functioning international airport is not in itself military. An Il-76 crashed at Osman Digna airbase on 10 December 2025 with the loss of its crew; operator and registration were not disclosed. No carrier has been sanctioned for flights to the SAF: the OFAC listings of Qeshm Fars Air (Iran), Aviacon Zitotrans, Rubystar and Rada Airlines (Russia and Belarus programmes) predate or are unrelated to Sudan.

Two sources connect flights from Tekirdağ Çorlu airport with Baykar deliveries. (1) @AfriMEOSINT, 16-17 Sep 2026: Sky Vision A320 freighter SU-SKD flew Çorlu to Port Sudan, 'bringing the total to seven cargo flights in 48 hours linked to Bayraktar drone deliveries to the SAF'; and Rubystar EW-383TH flew Çorlu to Cairo, which 'may be linked to drone deliveries'. The link is the tracker's inference from the airport of origin; it shows no cargo evidence. (2) The Standard (Kenya), July 2026: reports 'circulating in regional media' of Turkish cargo flights from Tekirdağ Çorlu to East Oweinat in southern Egypt, mentioning Baykar, and stating that 'Turkish, Egyptian and Sudanese authorities had not publicly confirmed the flights, their cargo or their destination by Saturday, July 11'. The article cites no named source; near-identical items appeared on low-quality syndication sites, which suggests placed content. A Guardian (Nigeria) item of 14 May 2025 says Flightradar24 showed two Turkish Air Force cargo planes flying from Kayseri and Tekirdağ to Port Sudan on 26 April 2025, without stating the cargo. None of this documents what was carried. Baykar's factory is beside Çorlu airport, which also handles other cargo and Baykar's exports to other customers (the same tracker reports Çorlu to Abuja flights for Nigeria).

Rubystar's Il-76TD EW-383TH is listed by another tracker (@MenchOsint, 7 Feb 2026) among aircraft on UAE flights it attributes to supplying the RSF, while @AfriMEOSINT reports Rubystar aircraft on Minsk and Istanbul routes towards Port Sudan and Massawa. Sky Vision's freighters fly regular Cairo-Sharjah-Benghazi rotations (Flightradar24) as well as Port Sudan. This matches what Defense News reported about Aviacon Zitotrans on 30 Sep 2026 (already in the dossier). These are charter carriers selling lift to whoever pays; a flight by one of them is not evidence of whose cargo was aboard.

One open-source flight tracker (@AfriMEOSINT) has posted flight-by-flight reports of cargo aircraft reaching Port Sudan since June 2026. The pattern it describes: about ten Istanbul to Port Sudan flights in 48 hours on 25-27 June 2026 by Air Master (Egypt, Boeing 737 freighters SU-SAW and SU-SFY) and Aviacon Zitotrans (Russia, Il-76 RA-76502 and RA-78765; US-sanctioned); 'at least 27 suspected cargo flights' between 3 July and 8 August 2026, 'mostly from Turkey, Egypt and Belarus', about 20 of them to Port Sudan and four to Massawa in Eritrea; 'seven cargo flights in 48 hours' from Tekirdag Corlu to Port Sudan by Sky Vision Airlines (Egypt, SU-SKD) around 17 September 2026, which the tracker links to Bayraktar deliveries; repeated Minsk departures by Rubystar Il-76s (EW-567TH, EW-383TH) and a TAE Avia Il-76 (EW-356TH) 'to either Port Sudan or Massawa'; and a Russian 224th Flight Unit An-124 (RA-82040) on 2 October 2026. Limits: this is one account. For the Belarus flights the tracker itself gives the destination as Port Sudan or Massawa. No post documents what any aircraft carried; 'military supplies' is the tracker's inference. The registers thread found flight-history pages that corroborate some Air Master and Sky Vision rotations (grade C); nothing corroborates the Il-76 or An-124 landings.

Source

independent flight-tracking account; widely reposted, including by partisan accounts

The same tracker reported on 13 August 2026 that 'since the RSF struck Port Sudan in mid-2025, activity at Massawa Airport in Eritrea has increased sharply', with two Belarus-registered Il-76s making repeated visits. Single source; no official or independent confirmation found. It bears on the open question of Eritrean support.

The tracker reported on 20 September 2026 that Atbara airport's runway had been 'extended by 385 metres to around 3 km', which it said would allow heavy transports such as Il-76s to deliver there 'as an alternative to Port Sudan', and that the RSF attacked the airport that day. Based on the account's reading of satellite imagery; not independently confirmed.

A weapons-identification account (@war_noir) posted on 15 January 2026 that SAF fighters were using an 'AZ-7,62' assault rifle 'made and supplied by' Azerbaijan, and on 5 August 2026 that an SAF-affiliated fighter showed a 'UP-7.62' machine gun 'produced and supplied by' Azerbaijan. The identifications are the account's own, from fighters' videos; how the weapons reached Sudan is not shown. This is the only open-source trace found that bears on the unnamed Azerbaijani defence company in the US sanctions text of January 2025, and it does not identify that company.

The flight tracker (20 September 2026) and a pro-Turkish news account (@clashreport, 9 September 2026) describe Bayraktar Akinci drones as operated by the SAF. Earlier reporting by the New York Times and Reuters placed Akinci operations at an Egyptian base. Whether the SAF now operates the type itself is not established by either post.

Source

@clashreport is a pro-Turkish outlet

The tracker reported that a Sky Vision Airlines freighter (SU-SKF) flew Cairo to Port Sudan on 28 August 2026 'before continuing to Sharjah', calling it unusual given the ban and asking 'Could it have been carrying gold?'. That is a question, not a finding. It sits beside the earlier unverified lead that the same airline carries gold.

Heavy armed UAV used in SAF-attributed long-range strikes in Darfur and Kordofan and operated from East Oweinat, Egypt.

Response

See Baykar/Turkey/Egypt.

One-way attack drone used by the SAF in Kordofan and Blue Nile; components identified at the Yabus market strike.

One-way attack UAV identified by the UN FFM at Yabus market and Abu Zabad (first pass). Maker now pinned down: Janes reports Baykar displayed the type for the first time in April 2026, effectively identifying it as the Baykar Sivrisinek, previously identified as a joint Baykar-NASTP development.

Why this grade

A for SAF use (UN FFM); B for manufacturer (Janes plus company video); export path to Sudan UNDOCUMENTED

Response

No Baykar, NASTP, Turkish or Pakistani statement on supply to Sudan found.

Sanctions

None

A/HRC/63/23, paras 47 and 104: "The mission also received images regarding the attack on Yabus Market on 29 or 30 March 2026, which military experts assessed as depicting components consistent with a Yiha III loitering munition. The same munition type was identified in verified open-source footage relating to other incidents attributed to the Sudanese Armed Forces, including a strike in Abu Zabad, West Kordofan, on 6 July 2026." Para 47 records "at least 13 civilians" killed in the strike near the water pump. The mission names no manufacturer; attribution to Baykar and NASTP comes from other sources.

Armed UAV in SAF service from Jan 2024; credited with SAF gains in Omdurman.

Response

See Iran.

Sanctions

Manufacturer under US sanctions (pre-existing).

Reconnaissance/strike UAV; SIPRI notes possible licence production in Sudan as Zagil-3.

Response

See Iran.

Armed UAV; 8 delivered to SAF Aug-Oct 2024; credited with 2025 SAF advances and the 3 May 2025 Nyala airport strike.

Response

See Baykar/Turkey.

Unguided air-dropped bombs used in SAF airstrikes on Nyala, 2-4 Feb 2025.

Response

Government of Sudan to the UN Panel (17 Dec 2024): SAF actions comply with IHL principles of distinction, necessity and proportionality.

MALE reconnaissance/strike UAV reported in SAF service in 2026.

Why this grade

B for presence of the type (Sudan Tribune x2, Ayin OSINT review); C for quantity and dates (single outlet)

Sanctions

None

Air-dropped unguided bombs used by the SAF on populated areas. Relevant to foreign support because OFAC says imported explosives (SBL Energy, Egyptian firms via TMAC) "are subsequently used in bombs deployed by the SAF".

Response

SAF did not respond to the BBC; it has previously said airstrikes are 'directed solely at RSF gatherings, locations and bases recognized as legitimate military targets'.

Sanctions

DIS/MIC designated by the US (2023)

Documented: (1) Chemtrade exported three chlorine consignments from India in July, September and November 2024 (trade records; Indian customs statistics); (2) the exporter identifies Ports Engineering Company as consignee; (3) Ports Engineering is state-owned through Giad and the Sea Ports Authority and was managed by a serving SAF colonel (FRANCE 24; OFAC confirms the ownership); (4) a cylinder bearing serial GC-1983-1715 from the July batch was filmed at Garri on 5 September 2024 (FRANCE 24, geolocation checked by HRW). Assessed, not documented: that the SAF dropped it (inferred from air delivery, which only the SAF could perform); that Ports Engineering knowingly diverted the gas; the fate of the other 123 cylinders. Claimed on intelligence of undisclosed origin: a parallel SAF project making smaller chlorine munitions, 20 cylinders imported from Egypt and cylinders taken from the al-Manara water plant, which aid agencies had supplied (New York Times, Washington Post). Knowledge: C4ADS says diversion was 'unbeknownst to Chemtrade'; nothing shows knowledge by any Egyptian supplier or by the aid agencies. Not found: the vessel, shipping line or forwarder in any primary source.

Used by SAF-affiliated fighters in two verified attacks on unarmed people in Bahri (Jan and Mar 2024).

MALE drone reported in SAF service in 2026.

Turkish air-defence systems said to be operated by the SAF at Wadi Seidna.

Standard munitions of the Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci. Sudan War Monitor infers they are the kind of munition capable of the 20 March 2026 Ad-Da'ein hospital strike. No remnant has been identified in any source opened.

Why this grade

D for use in any specific incident (inference from platform capability); B that such warheads were contracted (first pass)

Sanctions

None

Series of strikes attributed to SAF drones in which no source opened identifies the drone or munition type.

Why this grade

A for the FFM-documented cases (attribution to SAF); C for Gbeish and Soug El Na'am; no system link

Response

SAF 'has consistently denied deliberately targeting civilians' (Sudan War Monitor). For Abu Zaima, neither side claimed responsibility at the time (Emergency Lawyers did not name a perpetrator); the FFM later attributed it to the SAF.

HRW identified an OFAB-250 unguided bomb at the strike beside Mecca Eye Hospital and an FAB-series bomb 140 m away; witnesses described a large cargo-type aircraft.

Why this grade

B (HRW with remnant photographs; Sudan Witness corroboration); supplier of bombs not identified

Response

Government of Sudan (to the UN Panel, first pass): its actions complied with IHL.

Air-dropped unguided bombs from SAF aircraft; no source opened identifies a foreign-supplied munition or aircraft in these strikes.

Why this grade

B for SAF attribution (Sudan Witness/BBC, Amnesty); no system link

Response

Amnesty's Kabkabiya statement was a reaction to reports, not an investigation. SAF general denials as above.

Chad's army says SAF aircraft and drones pursued and bombed a convoy more than 100 km inside Chadian territory.

Why this grade

B (Reuters; Chadian army communique)

Response

Sudan's foreign ministry: surprised at being blamed without an independent investigation; forces act 'while respecting the sovereignty of its neighbours and without targeting their territory'.

Docket entries 23 to 29 (23 July to 11 September 2026) are orders, a stipulation, an appointment of counsel, a status conference and a minute order resetting hearings. No plea agreement, superseding indictment, co-defendant or trial has appeared. Trial remains set for 19 January 2027 on the last order that could be read.

A/HRC/63/23, para 127: "in April 2026, the United Arab Emirates initiated proceedings concerning alleged transfers of military materiel linked to the conflict in Sudan. Although those proceedings concern alleged support to the Sudanese Armed Forces rather than the Rapid Support Forces". The mission names no defendant and does not endorse the allegations. Grade A is for the existence of the proceedings only; the content of the UAE allegations stays at C or D.

No verbatim quotation: the list gives names and dates, no reasons. Global Affairs Canada's consolidated autonomous sanctions list (read 3 October 2026) shows: Defense Industries System and Zadna, 12 April 2024; Ali Karti, 12 April 2024; Mirghani Idris Suleiman, 6 February 2025; Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin (Air Force commander), Salah Gosh, Mohamed Atta Elmoula Abbas and Sudan Master Technology, 5 March 2025. Burhan is therefore listed by the United States and Canada, not the United States alone.

UAE Attorney-General Hamad Saif Al Shamsi referred 13 individuals and six UAE-registered companies (reported in some outlets as '19 defendants') to the Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeal (State Security circuit) on charges of illicit trafficking in military materiel, forgery and use of official documents, and money laundering. Prosecutors allege two linked deals: (1) a contract concluded outside the UAE with a declared value of US$13m against an actual value of about US$10m, the difference being commissions shared among defendants and moved through UAE-licensed companies and bank accounts under sham commercial contracts; (2) more than US$2m of those proceeds used inside the UAE to buy Goryunov (7.62x54) ammunition, brought in by private aircraft and labelled as medical/humanitarian cargo consigned to Sudan's Federal Ministry of Health. Six further deals for up to 5 million rounds were allegedly planned. The April 2025 statement had put the intermediaries' margin at US$2.6m and said the Sudanese army paid the importing company 'using the hawaladar method' with fake contracts and invoices describing the funds as sugar imports. Prosecutors say the deals were made 'at the direct request of the armament committee of the Port Sudan Authority, chaired by Abdel Fattah Al Burhan and his deputy Yasser Al Atta', coordinated by the authority's financial officer, with former intelligence chief Salah Gosh in a 'direction and coordination' role. ALLEGATIONS ONLY: no verdict located.

Response

30 Apr 2025: SAF spokesman Brig. Gen. Nabil Abdullah rejected the claim: 'Whenever the UAE's failed attempts to invade Sudan are thwarted, it tries to invent a new lie, such as arms smuggling ... an attempt to mislead and cover up its heinous crimes, represented by sponsoring and supporting the Daglo militia' (Sudan Tribune; English as rendered by the outlet via an automated reader). April-May 2026 referral: agency copy says 'The Sudanese army did not immediately respond to a request for comment'; no Sudanese government, army or Gosh statement on the 2026 referral or trial was found in six targeted searches (Arabic and English). Defence counsel argued in court on 6 Aug 2026 that some defendants had been used by co-accused to set up shell companies in their names, with the accounts run by the instigators.

Sanctions

UAE criminal charges (trafficking in military materiel, forgery, money laundering). Prosecution says the network dealt with 'individuals and companies on US sanctions lists and Interpol lists' without naming them in the reports read; Portex Trade Limited and Salah Gosh are on the OFAC SDN list.

UAE prosecutors allege a network (including Portex Trade Limited and named Sudanese figures) attempted to move rifles, machine guns, grenades and ammunition through the UAE for the SAF/Port Sudan authority.

Response

No response from the named individuals or the Sudanese government found in sources accessed.

Sanctions

UAE criminal proceedings (State Security Court).

UAE Attorney-General referred 13 individuals and six UAE-registered companies to the State Security Court on 30 April 2026 for attempting to move ammunition through the UAE to the "Port Sudan Authority". Date and wording now verified from the WAM text; the UN FFM notes the proceedings.

Why this grade

D for the underlying allegations (single state party with an adverse interest); A for the fact that proceedings exist (WAM; UN FFM para 127)

Response

AFP contacted the Sudanese army for comment in April 2025; no response is recorded in the texts read. No statement by the named individuals found.

Sanctions

Portex Trade Limited is US-designated (Jan 2025)

OFAC 26 Jun 2026: 'Ports Engineering has imported uniforms and footwear worn by Sudanese intelligence personnel from an Emirati company, and ammunition belts and boxes of weapons from a Turkish company'; TMAC imported explosives 'from Egyptian and Indian companies'. None of the Turkish/Emirati/Egyptian firms is named.

Why this grade

A (existence of the supply relationship); identity unknown

Supplied uniforms and footwear worn by Sudanese intelligence personnel to Ports Engineering Company since April 2023.

Response

None (unnamed).

Sanctions

Not designated; not named by OFAC.

OFAC states TMAC imported explosives and related material from "Egyptian and Indian companies".

Response

None (unnamed).

Sanctions

Not designated; not named.

Source from which Ahmad Abdalla coordinated acquisition of Iranian-made UAVs for shipment to Sudan, per OFAC.

Response

None (unnamed).

Sanctions

Not designated; not named.

OFAC describes but does not name: an Azerbaijani defence company from which Ahmad Abdalla coordinated acquisition of Iranian-made UAVs; Egyptian companies exporting explosives to TMAC; an Emirati company supplying uniforms and footwear to Ports Engineering; a Turkish company supplying ammunition belts and boxes.

Why this grade

A (existence, per OFAC); identities unconfirmed

Response

n/a

Sanctions

Not designated

No document, investigation or news report opened in three passes names the Azerbaijani defence company (OFAC, 16 Jan 2025), the Egyptian explosives companies, the Turkish supplier of 'ammunition belts and boxes of weapons' or the Emirati supplier of 'uniforms and footwear worn by Sudanese intelligence personnel' (OFAC, 26 Jun 2026). OFAC's SDN entries for Portex, Ahmad Abdalla, TMAC and Ports Engineering carry no 'Linked To' reference to any such company. The only candidate on the public record is Karmetal, via Bond Technologies FZE, for the Turkish item: the goods FRANCE 24 and C4ADS documented in early 2024 ('metal boxes' and 'springs' that C4ADS reads as link belts) fit OFAC's description, but Treasury does not name Karmetal, Karmetal denies the goods were military, and neither company is on the SDN list. FRANCE 24 also refers to an Emirati maker of intelligence-service uniforms and shoes without naming it. For the Egyptian item, Egypt's customs returns show a single wartime explosives-related export to Sudan (HS 3603, June 2024, USD 485,821), exporter unknown. Nothing at all was found on the Azerbaijani company.

According to intercepted messages in a dossier given to the New York Times and the Washington Post, Brig. Gen. Tariq Hussain, head of the SAF chlorine-bomb project, 'reported the import of 20 chlorine cylinders from Egypt - enough to make 1,100 bombs'.

Response

SAF spokesperson to the NYT: the dossier's findings are 'baseless and without material foundation'; threatened legal action. Sudan's national committee reported in July 2026 that it found no evidence of chemical weapons use. No Egyptian response found.

Sanctions

None (supplier unidentified). Tariq Hussain Muhammad Madani was designated by OFAC on 26 June 2026 as managing director of TMAC.

Al-Taghyeer (2 September 2025, unnamed sources) said the first gold shipment to Oman left Port Sudan on a Sky Vision Airlines cargo aircraft. The only airline of that name found is an Egyptian private carrier based in Cairo, founded in 2022, with three Airbus freighters and published routes to Egyptian resorts and Russian cities; no Sudan or Oman service is listed. No second source repeats the claim, and no flight-tracking record was checked. STPT (2024) says two unnamed local airlines carry official and unofficial gold from Port Sudan at US$70 per kilogram. Oman's direct scheduled link (SalamAir, Muscat-Port Sudan) began only in January 2026. The airline should not be named as a gold carrier on this evidence.

No public evidence found. None of the OFAC SDN entries under the SUDAN-EO14098 or DARFUR programmes carries a digital-currency address (SDN XML checked 2026-10-03). The one search run on Chainalysis/TRM Labs/Elliptic reporting returned no Sudan-specific SAF finding (results concerned the Houthis and the IRGC).

Why this grade

A for the OFAC-list check; otherwise absence of evidence

Response

n/a

Sudan is not on the FATF list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring of 19 June 2026 (South Sudan is). It was removed from FATF monitoring in October 2015, and MENAFATF moved it from regular follow-up to biennial updates in April 2016. Its only mutual evaluation dates from 2012. No second-round MENAFATF evaluation or wartime follow-up report was found. De-risking is practical rather than list-driven: Sudan Tribune notes the war 'substantially reversed' the 2021 reconnection, pushing remittances to informal transfer services and Bankak.

Why this grade

A for the June 2026 FATF list; B for the rest

Response

n/a

Three further searches of Chainalysis, TRM Labs and Elliptic material (general, Iran-arms and Sudan-specific) returned nothing on Sudan. The one detailed court record of SAF arms payments (US v. Mafi) describes cash and exchange houses in Turkiye and Dubai and contains no reference to crypto. Context only: Iran's defence export agency Mindex said in early 2026 that it accepts 'cryptocurrency agreed upon in the contract' (Financial Times via Decrypt); Chainalysis's March 2026 drone-procurement research covers Russian and Iranian networks and does not mention Sudan.

Why this grade

Absence of evidence; A for the OFAC-list and court-record checks

Response

n/a

Sanctions

No digital-currency address on any Sudan-programme SDN entry (first-pass check of the SDN XML, 3 Oct 2026).

Why this grade

A that these register entries exist; no evidence of connection

No source read in either pass documents a SAF link to a transnational criminal organisation or a commercial mercenary/recruitment broker. What exists: (1) Chadian Zaghawa fighters and Libya-based Darfurian groups joined SAF-aligned forces through kin and political mobilisation (UN Panel S/2025/239 paras 59-63; grade A). (2) Colombian mercenaries were contracted for the RSF (S/2025/239 para 15: allegations 'were credible'; Colombia 'formally apologized to the Government of the Sudan'). (3) Tigrayan fighters: Al-Taghyeer (4 May 2024) reports an Ethiopian federal government statement that it 'received information' that former TPLF forces remaining in refugee camps in Sudan were fighting alongside the Sudanese army, and that Ethiopia blamed the UN refugee system - a state allegation by an interested party, unverified. (4) Ukrainian military-intelligence special forces reportedly operated against RSF/Wagner-linked targets in Omdurman (Kyiv Post and CNN reports summarised by Sudan War Monitor, 10 Nov 2023) - state forces, not a broker, and never officially confirmed. (5) Captagon/meth, Libyan and Egyptian-border smuggling networks: no SAF command link (first pass).

Why this grade

A (items 1-2: UN Panel); D (item 3: state allegation by an adversary, unverified); C (item 4: media, unconfirmed); confirmed negative (TCO / broker nexus)

Response

Chad's reply to the UN Panel (see recruitment entry). No SAF comment on the Tigrayan or Ukrainian reports captured here.

OHCHR A/HRC/58/29 para 43 records reports that 'three eastern armed groups, as well as mustanfreen, had recruited and trained children to support the military efforts of the Sudanese Armed Forces'. FFM CRP.6 para 88: 'some groups from eastern Sudan have also aligned their forces with the SAF'. On crime: an Al-Taghyeer analysis (16 Sep 2026) only poses the question - 'How will they finance their forces and activities? Will the search for resources draw them into arms trafficking, human smuggling, drug trafficking or other forms of organised crime?' - without alleging that it has happened.

Why this grade

A (child recruitment reports: OHCHR, unverified 'reports'); no evidence (smuggling/trafficking nexus)

Response

n/a

Sanctions

None located.

EU Transparency Register (full export of 2 October 2026, 17,897 registrants): no registrant lists the Government of Sudan, its embassy, the army or any army-linked company as a client. Thirty entries mention Sudan, almost all NGOs. Two commercial entries touch the war and neither is for the army side: law firm Alber & Geiger lists the United Arab Emirates as a client (EUR 300,000-399,999) on dossiers including 'EU Initiatives to Support Efforts to End the War in Sudan'; B&K Agency lists a small engagement for the Istituto Milton Friedman on 'The Sudanese war: event in the European Parliament'. UK Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists, quarterly client returns from Q1 2023 to Q1 2026 (about 10,700 rows): no client name contains 'Sudan' or 'Khartoum'. The UK Foreign Influence Registration Scheme register could not be opened (Cloudflare challenge). No auditor, PR firm or sanctions-delisting counsel for an army-linked company was identified; one search for EU General Court annulment actions by listed Sudanese entities returned nothing. The US FARA record from earlier passes stands (Ballard, VS Global, Vogel, Williams).

OFAC's SDN list as published on 2 October 2026 has 87 entries under the Sudan (EO 14098), Darfur and South Sudan programmes; none carries a digital-currency address. Two further searches of Chainalysis, TRM Labs and Elliptic material for 2025-2026 returned only ISIS and Iran items, nothing on Sudan's army or its procurement network. The Mafi affidavit describes cash and exchange houses, not crypto. The earlier finding stands.

Checked again. The State Department TIP Office report list ends at the 2025 report; the URLs /reports/2026-trafficking-in-persons-report/ and .../sudan/ return 404; a web search for the 2026 report returned only the 2025 edition and older items. The 2025 report (Sudan: Tier 3) remains the latest.

World Drug Report 2026 (Highlights, June 2026): Sudan is marked on the captagon routes and seizures maps; the text says only that there are 'reports of a reconfiguration of captagon manufacturing over the past year as traffickers seek out new locations, resulting in a partial shift in such manufacturing towards other countries in North, Southern, West and Central Africa'. No armed actor in Sudan is named. Only the Highlights booklet was read; unodc.org returned a maintenance page on 3 Oct 2026, so the full booklets and the Global Report on Trafficking in Persons page could not be opened. A search found no edition of the trafficking report later than 2024.

No verbatim quotation: the finding is an absence. The full text of S/2024/65 (15 January 2024) was searched: no mention of Iran, Russia, Baykar or Pakistan; Türkiye and Egypt appear only as locations of interviews or visits.

No verbatim quotation: the finding is an absence. The Security Council 1591 Committee reports page, opened on 3 October 2026, lists S/2025/239 (17 April 2025) as the latest report, preceded by S/2024/65 (15 January 2024). No 2026 Panel final report is listed. The symbol S/2026/239 exists but is an unrelated document.

Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (bilgibankasi.ito.org.tr): the page loads and the search posts to JSON endpoints (api/commerce-title-search, api/former-titles-search, api/company-detail, api/partners, api/company-officials, api/company-newspaper-informations), but every search form requires a Google reCAPTCHA token, so no name was searched. Türkiye Ticaret Sicili Gazetesi (ticaretsicil.gov.tr): empty reply. MERSIS and the Ankara Chamber's member application (e-uygulama.atonet.org.tr): connection refused by the egress proxy. TOBB (tobb.org.tr, sanayi.tobb.org.tr, b2b.tobb.org.tr): certificate chain could not be verified, not bypassed. İzmir Chamber: unreachable. KAP list of listed companies (read directly): no entry for Baykar, Sarsılmaz, Karmetal, Sur Uluslararası, Zawaya, Zadna, Giad, Tahe, Derya, Burgu or BMC, and none containing 'Sudan'; these are unlisted companies, so this says nothing about their existence. OpenCorporates holds no Turkish register data (searches for 'baykar' in jurisdiction tr: 0). Searches for a gazette notice on Karmetal's former name and for Sur International's Turkish partners returned only press and trade-fair pages already known. OpenCorporates, all jurisdictions: 'karmetal' returns only Karmetal Anstalt (Liechtenstein) and its French registration, unrelated on the evidence; 'zawaya gida' 0; 'sur international investment' 0.

Answered: (1) Central Bank of the UAE register PDF, August 2026: El Nilein Bank listed; no Bank of Khartoum; none of the other dossier names (text search for Khartoum, Sudan, Rashed, Omar, Masarra, Yellow, Apollara, Kaloti, Sudam, Giad, Zadna, Expresso, Nile). (2) DMCC business directory, queried through the page's own data endpoint: hits for 'expresso' (Expresso Telecom Management Services FZCO, active) and 'kaloti' (M Kaloti FZCO; Kaloti Precious Metals Suriname FZCO, both active); no entries for sudan, sudatel, zadna, zawaya, safat, yarmouk, sheikan, omdurman, nilein, sudamin, ariab, red rock, aswar, etegahat, multiple directions, matz, portex, bond technologies, rashed omar, wardat, yellow sand, apollara, s b l, karmetal, baykar, sarsilmaz, new way cargo, astraway, emiral, atlas international business, shalateen, elsewedy, sur international, master technology, khartoum; 'rida', 'sbl' and 'nile' returned only unrelated names (Florida Diamonds, ESBL Consulting, SBLE Gold, Nile Atlantic Trading and similar). The directory lists only current licence holders that agreed to publication. (3) OpenCorporates mirrors of the DIFC register (ae_du) and an Abu Dhabi register (ae_az), 50 names each: only Expresso Telecom Group Ltd (DIFC no. 0494, active); nothing for the rest, including the six companies in the UAE prosecution, Bond Technologies FZE, SBL, Emiral, Astraway, Kaloti. Not searchable: National Economic Register (growth.gov.ae, ner.economy.ae: certificate chain could not be verified; not bypassed); Dubai DET (403 / reset); invest.dubai.ae (403); DIFC public register (bot checkpoint, HTTP 429); ADGM registry (403); DAFZA (bot wall); JAFZA, RAKEZ, Ajman Free Zone, Hamriyah, Dubai Silicon Oasis (no directory at the URLs tried: 404); Fujairah Free Zone (unreachable); SAIF Zone (the investors-directory endpoint returns an empty table for every query, including a blank one); Sharjah SEDD licence search (connection reset); Abu Dhabi TAMM licence search (reCAPTCHA). So no UAE register entry was found for Bond Technologies FZE, Rashed Omar Brokerage, Wardat Al Masarra Trading, Sudamina, Yellow Sand Trading, Apollara Electronics Trading, S B L Overseas Trading, SBL International Trading FZCO, Astraway FZC, Emiral Resources or a Rida, Giad or Zadna office, but the registers where most of them would sit (Dubai DET, DAFZA, Sharjah, Ajman, the national register) could not be queried.

GAFI's site is a single-page application with no company search or Investment Gazette viewer in its public bundle; its content API answers 401 without a login and its e-services portal reset the connection. The older gazette host does not resolve. A further Arabic search for a commercial-register or Investment Gazette notice for the Egyptian-Sudanese Company for Development and Multiple Investments returned only the 2021 press reports already in the dossier; no registration number, incorporation notice or shareholder extract was found, and the same goes for Shalateen Mineral Resources, the Holding Company for Food Industries, South Valley Development and the NSPO companies. The Ministry of Civil Aviation site (civilaviation.gov.eg) was read: it publishes no list of air operator certificate holders, and the authority's own host (ecaa.gov.eg) is blocked from this environment, so the certificates of Sky Vision Airlines and Air Master could not be checked against an official list. The Egyptian Exchange was not queried for Elsewedy Electric (its Sudan joint venture is already covered from the company's own reports). OpenCorporates holds no Egyptian register data.

Attribution in every source read is to the RSF or to criminal networks: Sudan Tribune, 27 Mar 2025 ('Sudan official accuses RSF of looting gold, destroying artifacts at national museum'); Blue Shield Sudan's secretary-general to Ayin (10 Dec 2025) calls heritage destruction 'a planned, systematic tactic used by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces'; police (27 Feb 2026) arrested a trafficking network in Mayo, south Khartoum, with 18 pieces, describing the items as looted 'during the period of the rebel militia's control of Khartoum State'. State role on the SAF side is recovery: GIS handed 570 recovered artefacts to the Culture Ministry on 13 Jan 2026.

Why this grade

B (RSF/criminal attribution); no evidence (SAF nexus)

Response

n/a

GI-TOC (Dec 2025): 'The collapse of internal military control and the fragmentation of command structures enabled a rapid proliferation of arms outflows from both the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces' (SAF) stockpiles in Sudan into regional markets'; in eastern Chad 'traders maintained counterparts linked both to the RSF and SAF, enabling them to procure weapons and ammunition from either side'. Endnote 38: 'While multiple sources corroborated supply lines benefiting the RSF through Libya and eastern Chad, no comparable evidence was found of sustained large-scale arms pipelines supporting the SAF through Libyan or Chadian territory, aside from the mobilization of Darfurian rebel groups based in Libya or eastern Chad that aligned with the SAF in late 2023 and throughout 2024. These groups ... appear to have operated with their own weapon stocks rather than through external supply chains.' Before the war 'There was no systematic involvement of the RSF or SAF' in the Chad-Libya arms trade. UN Panel S/2025/239 para 106: Nyala arms markets were stocked 'predominantly from diversion and seizures', including 'materiel captured by RSF from smaller SAF units and command posts'; S/2024/65 para 31: belligerents 'provided weapons to the civilians supporting them'.

Why this grade

B (leakage from both sides' stocks); confirmed negative (SAF arms pipeline or mercenary circuit through Libya/Chad)

Response

n/a

Seven more searches and a dozen direct reads did not produce a single refinery or bullion dealer named as buying gold from army-held Sudan in the UAE, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey or India. Bloomberg, Reuters, STPT (July 2026), SWISSAID (November 2025), CORRECTIV (May 2026), Africa Confidential and C4ADS (May 2025) all stop at country level. Reuters reported in October 2025 that Port Sudan had explored Qatar, Oman, Egypt and Saudi Arabia 'but none had worked out so far'. The exceptions: in Egypt, the part-military Egyptian-Sudanese Company is reported to have imported 2-3 tonnes in 2025 (The New Arab, leaked documents); in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Gold Refinery Company said in January 2026 it was ready to buy, with no purchase confirmed. STPT says about 55 tonnes left Sudan off the books in 2025, 'most likely' via security-sector companies. Egypt removed all duties on gold imports in May 2023, and SWISSAID says some gold classed as 'recycled' in Egypt may be Sudanese.

The FBI affidavit in US v. Mafi, the reported May 2026 indictment and the UAE prosecution all describe Sudanese defence money moving through exchange houses or hawala (Turkey and Dubai). None names one. Nothing in the OFAC list, the UK notice of 16 July 2026 or the EU listings names an exchange house, hawaladar or bank as a channel for the army or the Defense Industries System. No verdict in the Abu Dhabi case was found (last reported hearing 12 August 2026). No Turkish court or regulator action was found. The one structural channel documented is local-currency and barter trade with Egypt through the Egyptian-Sudanese Company, which STPT's Suliman Baldo calls 'the main avenue for evading sanctions since no US dollars or euros are exchanged'.

Tested against OFAC, the March 2026 terrorist designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, The Sentry (its October 2025 report is on the RSF's UAE network), Africa Confidential, Ayin's April 2026 piece and Arabic searches on the revived Empowerment Removal Committee. No sanctioned, charged or senior public figure is documented as financing the army or its allied brigades. Ayin carries analysts' estimates only (US$50bn in assets; at least 27 fuel-import companies with US$500m capital) with no names. US envoy Massad Boulos said in July 2026 that 'additional designations and sanctions remained under consideration', which implies none had been made on financing. Africa Intelligence could not be searched usefully (paywall; no result surfaced).

Confirmed negative within the sources reached. The UN Special Rapporteur on Eritrea's June 2024 report, as summarised by Amnesty International, 'detailed grave violations against Eritrean refugees, particularly women and girls in Sudan, in areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces'. State forces appear as rescuers (Kassala, 4 Sep 2025: 65 hostages freed). The only wartime allegation against state forces is from One Day Seyoum, an Eritrean diaspora advocacy group (5 Jul 2023): in Gedaref 'Eritrean refugees have been arrested and detained by armed forces and have been told they will be sent back to Eritrea if they do not pay them' - unnamed force, no corroboration found (grade D). SAF's 2nd Infantry Division announced a 'preventive security campaign' in Gedaref on 20 May 2024 'to control foreign presence'; at least 16 Ethiopian refugees were arrested (Sudan War Monitor, EEPA) - no payment or trafficking is alleged. Pre-war context only: two army lieutenants were charged with human trafficking in Gedaref in April 2015 after 65 Ethiopians were found in their military lorry (outcome unknown); a diaspora monitor reported fines of SDG 200,000-400,000 on Eritreans in 2022. No source ties the Eastern Orta or other Eritrea-trained groups to smuggling.

A/HRC/61/24 (13 Jan 2026) makes its ransom finding against the RSF alone. OHCHR's Khartoum detention report records payments in RSF facilities only (its SAF section covers the period to June 2024, before the recapture of Khartoum and Gezira). HRW (Apr 2026) documents the security-cell system and one instance of money taken on release. The Gezira observatory figures (SDG 5-20 million) recorded in pass 2 remain the only quantified source. Sennar: HRW cites ACJPS (Apr 2025) on Military Intelligence detentions in Sinja; no payment allegation. ACJPS, SIHA and Emergency Lawyers originals were not reached in this pass.

Searched: GI-TOC and Small Arms Survey for SAF procurement through traffickers or brokers; ENACT/ISS (17 Dec 2024), which says 'a few LAAF-linked actors smuggle fuel from coastal depots to the southern city of Kufra and across into SAF-controlled areas' and that smuggling 'often occurred with the knowledge and protection of RSF- and SAF-affiliated actors', but ties organised arms trafficking to LAAF and RSF officials; GIGA Focus (2024), which describes SAF supply as state-to-state and domestic; UNODC World Drug Report 2026; Egyptian military statements on a 'cross-border organized crime network' in Aswan (Aug 2026), which do not mention Sudan's army; Eritrean and Chadian angles through the eastern-Sudan and drug searches. Nothing links SAF or its allies to a named Libyan, Egyptian, Chadian or Eritrean criminal network, mercenary broker or arms trafficker.

Across about 11,250 posts on 46 pages, including 3,500 posts of the armed forces' page from 19 April 2023 to 2 October 2026, announced support to the army from organisations came from state bodies (the Mineral Resources Company, the Zakat Chamber, state governments, foreign ministry staff) and small business associations (the Northern State Chamber of Commerce's combat vehicles; a bus operators' committee at Merowe), plus the already known Zadna convoy. The one bank found supporting the forces is the army-owned Omdurman National Bank, in kind (sacrificial animals for the Central Reserve Forces, medical mattresses for the Medical Corps, 2026). No other bank, no telecom operator and no large private group appears as a donor. Sudatel's and Giad's pages show commercial and charity content only. Donations by villages, tribes and individuals are frequent on the armed forces' page and were not recorded.

The pages of Sudan's embassies in Riyadh (205 posts, Feb 2023 - Sep 2026), Moscow (170 posts), Doha (100 posts, Mar - Oct 2026), Cairo (300 posts, Jan - Oct 2026) and Abu Dhabi (70 posts to July 2025) carry consular, cultural and political content and voluntary-return programmes; none announces a collection for the army. The only trace of money from missions is the foreign ministry staff donation of December 2024, which included 'missions abroad'. The armed forces' page carried one item on a solidarity event by Sudanese in New Jersey (July 2023) without mention of money.

NOT SAF-ALIGNED per sources reviewed: ACSS (July 2026) lists Tamazuj (leader Mohamed Ali Qureshi, ~2,400) as RSF-aligned. Included only to record that the brief's assumption of an SAF link is not supported.

NOT documented as an SAF supplier. Named by the Washington Post for extensive contact with RSF procurement chief Algoney Hamdan Daglo Musa; included because the brief asked about it.

Response

Arca executive (Ozgur Rodoplu) said the company never sold weapons to the RSF but did not answer questions about contacts with Musa. RSF adviser said he was unaware of the conversations.

The two foreign armed-forces bodies inside SAF companies - the Qatari committee in Sur International Investment and Syria's Military Housing Establishment in Sudanese Syrian Housing and Development - are pre-war shareholders (2013 and about 2001). Searches in Arabic and English, sanctions lists and the press of Qatar and Türkiye produced nothing tying either to supply, finance or services for the SAF after April 2023.

Cyprus register: MATZ HOLDINGS LIMITED (HE 157551) and MATZ DUNGASH LTD (HE 311213), both struck off; SAFAT AIR (CY) LIMITED (HE 124765, incorporated October 2001 as Lafal Corporation Limited, renamed May 2002, struck off) - name coincides with the SAF's Safat Air, link unconfirmed; nothing under Giad, Zadna, Sur International, Sudatel, Expresso Telecom, Etegahat, Zawaya or Agrogate. OpenCorporates: 'Zadna International Company for Investment LLC' (Virginia, formed 21 Dec 2016, inactive) - identical name, link unconfirmed; 'Expresso Telecom Group Ltd' (Dubai, no. 0494, active) - probable Sudatel holding company; 'Giad' returns 46 companies in 15 jurisdictions, none with any visible Sudan connection; nothing for Safat Aviation, Sur International Investment, Etegahat, Sudan Master Technology. Not reachable or not searchable without login/CAPTCHA: Türkiye's trade registry gazette (connection refused), Egypt GAFI (no public company search), Malaysia SSM (login), UAE free-zone registers (no fetchable search), Virginia SCC (CAPTCHA), Austria's Firmenbuch (paid).

Searches for statements by India's Ministry of External Affairs, DGFT or the Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organisation on Chemtrade (from November 2025) or on SBL Energy (from June 2026) returned none; Indian press coverage of the SBL designation opened in this pass carries only the company's denial. Indian customs data show chlorine exports to Sudan ended in November 2024 and explosives exports in January 2026.

Still open after targeted searches in both languages. Additions: Beam Reports' trader testimony of prior coordination with 'government bodies and border intelligence in both Sudan and Egypt' and of bribes; Beam's estimate that it is 'likely' a large share of output from SAF-held areas goes to Egypt, with the Central Bank of Sudan recording only USD 16 million of gold exports to Egypt in 2024; Atar's data that Egypt exported more gold to the UAE than it produced in 2023-2025; Egyptian arrests and sentences of prospectors in 2026. The Shalateen allegation has no second source and its original publisher was not found. The Al-Jareeda reference to officers implicated in gold smuggling at Wadi Halfa (Oct 2025) could not be corroborated: an Arabic search for arrests, referrals or trials returned only Egyptian items.

Five searches (English and Arabic) for named platforms, charities, business donors or diaspora campaigns funding the Popular Resistance or the Al-Baraa bin Malik brigade returned no usable source. A search of UK Charity Commission inquiries returned only unrelated cases (Gaza, Yemen). No US, Turkish or Qatari enforcement action against a charity for funding SAF-side forces was found. Al Araby TV's 2023 investigation of the brigade and The New Arab's 2025 feature on diaspora giving do not address military fundraising. Material from UAE-aligned outlets (Hafryat, Al-Ain, Sky News Arabia) appeared in results and was not used. An Al-Rakoba article titled 'Bribes and extortion: where are Popular Resistance fighters funded from?' could not be opened.

Still a negative after targeted searching. What exists: (1) Bloomberg (December 2024), relayed by ADF, says Russia delivers fuel through its 'shadow fleet' and that Iran 'can quite easily send ships from the Gulf area into Port Sudan', based on satellite images, shipping data and Sudanese officials; the article could not be opened and the relay names no ship. (2) Reuters (April 2024, LSEG data) names tankers Pavo Rock, Conga and Marabella Sun delivering Russian diesel to Port Sudan; this is commercial fuel, not military cargo. (3) An opinion article in South Africa's Cape Argus and Mercury (16 Feb 2026) names a vessel and an owner for the July 2024 chlorine batch, citing an unnamed investigation (names withheld here because the claim is unverified); FRANCE 24 and C4ADS, who hold the bill of lading, name no vessel. That claim is unverified and, even if true, would describe an ordinary liner carrying a water-treatment chemical. No UN Panel annex lists vessels or port calls. No shipping line or freight forwarder has been sanctioned in connection with deliveries to the SAF.

A Facebook page 'زادنا- فرع تركيا' (ZADNA_TURK, about 230 followers) advertises dates from Gaziantep. Nothing on the page connects it to Sudan or to Zadna International Company for Investment; its language and products point to an unrelated business using a common Arabic word. Recorded so that the name match is not mistaken for a foreign branch of the sanctioned company.

SSM e-Search accepts a registration number only and requires a reCAPTCHA, so no name search is possible there. Bursa Malaysia's announcement search returned HTTP 403. No Labuan FSA public register page was found at the URL tried. OpenCorporates' Malaysian data (sourced from SSM) was searched for 38 names. No entries: zadna, sudatel, sudapet, petrodar, heglig, kenana, greater nile petroleum, white nile petroleum, nile petroleum, hi-tech petroleum, omdurman, safat, yarmouk, sheikan, nilein, sudamin, ariab, rida engineering, red rock mining, aswar, etegahat, portex, sur international, sudanese, defense industries, al shamal, petronas sudan, carigali nile. Name-similar entries, none tied to a Sudanese state or army company by anything in the register (the mirror shows name, number, status and town only; no officers, shareholders or dates): DANFODIO RESOURCES SDN. BHD. (956347-D, existing, Kuala Lumpur) - the name matches Sudan's Islamist-era Danfodio holding, possible match, unconfirmed; SUDAN CATTLE INDUSTRIES (M) SDN. BHD. (670266-K, winding up); PT. SUDAN AGROTECH SDN. BHD. (814959-X, existing); AL-LION (SUDAN) SDN. BHD. (832823-D, existing); SUBALIPACK (SUDAN) SDN. BHD. (583194-V, dissolved); EL KHARTOUM SDN. BHD. (870298-T, existing); GIAD TRAVEL AND TOUR SDN. BHD. (1255846-K; a travel agency by name, no link to Giad Industrial Group shown); ZAWAYA SDN. BHD. (355464-X, dissolved, Kuantan; already noted in pass 3); MATZ INTEGRATION (M) SDN. BHD. (1272873-K, Penang); ASTRAWAY (M) SDN. BHD. (597484-D, inactive). All are possible matches, unconfirmed, and most are probably unrelated small businesses. Petronas's Sudan-era vehicles do not appear under Sudan-related names (Petronas Carigali Overseas Sdn Bhd and Petronas Carigali International Sdn Bhd exist; the register does not say what they held). No Malaysian affiliate of Giad, Zadna, Al Zawaya or the army's social security fund was identified.

Belarus's state register API (egr.gov.by) reset every connection, so Rubystar (600436180) and TAE Avia (100027245) could not be checked beyond the OFAC entries. OpenCorporates, all jurisdictions: no entries for 'bond technologies fze', 'apollara', 'wardat al masarra', 'yellow sand trading', 'rashed omar brokerage', 'sudamina', 'emiral resources', 'sky vision airlines', 'zawaya gida' or 'sur international investment'. 'astraway' returns ASTRAWAY AVIATION LTD (UK 03788771, inactive) and ASTRAWAY (M) SDN. BHD. (Malaysia, inactive): possible matches for the Astraway FZC named in the dossier, unconfirmed, name only. 'new way cargo' returns only US companies. 'portex trade' returns PORTEX TRADE LIMITED (Hong Kong 1602116, already in the dossier) and unrelated or inactive namesakes in the UK, Belize, Oregon, California and Israel. 'rubystar' and 'air master' return only unrelated namesakes.

NONE DOCUMENTED. No source accessed documents a PMC contract with the SAF.

Why this grade

n/a (negative finding)

No documented supply to the SAF. Serbian-made weapons identified in Sudan are attributed in the sources opened to the RSF or to unknown acquisition paths.

Why this grade

n/a (negative finding for SAF side)

Response

President Vucic (to the FT, on Serbian ammunition generally): 'What they do with that in the end is their job.' Yugoimport did not respond to Human Rights Watch (per BHRRC).

Sanctions

None

No documented support to the SAF as a state. Chad is identified by the UN FFM as transit territory for RSF support, and in August 2026 accused the SAF of bombing inside Chad.

Why this grade

n/a (negative finding for SAF side)

Response

Chad to the FFM (16 June 2026): strict neutrality, no knowledge of transfers through its territory. Sudan's foreign ministry (27 Aug 2026): 'surprised' the army was blamed without an independent investigation; its forces act 'without targeting their territory'.

Sanctions

None

No documented support to the SAF. Reporting places Kenyan-labelled ammunition on the RSF side.

Why this grade

n/a (negative finding for SAF side)

Response

Kenya's Ministry of Defence 'distances itself from the allegations' (to Bellingcat).

Sanctions

None

No documented support to the SAF. Named by the UN FFM, ACLED and HSBA on the RSF side; the SAF government accuses Ethiopia of assisting the RSF.

Why this grade

n/a (negative finding for SAF side)

Response

Ethiopia did not respond to the FFM (para 129).

Sanctions

None

Nothing found linking any of these states to weapons, training or logistics for the SAF.

Why this grade

n/a (nothing found; lightly tested)

Response

n/a

Sanctions

None

NONE IDENTIFIED BY NAME. No vessel, shipping line or freight forwarder carrying military cargo for the SAF into Port Sudan is named in any source opened in either pass.

Why this grade

n/a (gap)

Response

n/a

NONE DOCUMENTED. The first-pass negative finding ('no documented PMC contract') is CONFIRMED in the additional sources read; it is not overturned.

Why this grade

n/a (negative finding)

A search of X in Arabic and English for vessels delivering weapons to Port Sudan since January 2025 returned partisan and anonymous claims only, for example an unsourced December 2025 post citing 'a security source' on an Iranian ship. No post names a vessel with tracking data. The sea-logistics gap stays open.

Radio Dabanga (28 Dec 2023) interviewed the director of the Center for International Private Enterprise's Sudan office: gold revenue goes 'essentially into the pockets of the military establishment and the RSF'; she cited the central bank as confirming that 70% of gold output did not reach the treasury before the war.

Fact-check

None.

Source

independent (Radio Dabanga, exile broadcaster based in Amsterdam)

An Al-Jareeda column (14 Oct 2025) alleges that company representatives rejected CBOS's exclusive right to export gold and demanded direct export with proceeds returned to the companies, that the finance minister backed them, and that Burhan dismissed the governor the day after he walked out of the meeting – concluding that the top leadership benefits through these companies. The companies are not named.

Fact-check

None found.

Source

opposition-leaning (Al-Jareeda daily's channel; opinion columns hostile to the SAF-led government and Islamists)

An Al-Jareeda column (1 Oct 2025) refers to a case of officers implicated in smuggling gold at Halfa and alleges an official cover-up and 'influential networks inside the ruling authority' smuggling gold abroad. No names, amounts or documents.

Fact-check

None found.

Source

opposition-leaning (Al-Jareeda daily's channel; opinion columns hostile to the SAF-led government and Islamists)

An Al-Jareeda column (30 Mar 2026) reports a public lecture by an investigative journalist: after the US terrorist designation of Sudan's Muslim Brotherhood (9 Mar 2026), GCC states jailed 14 Sudanese businessmen and businesswomen for selling real-estate assets to Islamists, and the movement 'lost' Türkiye and Qatar as safe havens. No individuals are named in this record.

Fact-check

None found. Not fact-checked.

Source

opposition-leaning (Al-Jareeda daily's channel; opinion columns hostile to the SAF-led government and Islamists)

Headline of an Al-Jareeda column (16 Feb 2026) asserts that the UAE arms the RSF while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Türkiye arm the army and Egypt and Ethiopia provide bases. No evidence is offered; recorded only because pass 1 found nothing sourced on Qatar.

Fact-check

Beam Reports found a viral 'Qatar deposits USD 2bn in the central bank' video misleading (2021 footage) and a 'Qatari ambassador' investment statement fabricated.

Source

opposition-leaning (Al-Jareeda daily's channel; opinion columns hostile to the SAF-led government and Islamists)

Pro-army channel post (11 July 2024) claims donations by 'the sons of River Nile' for the popular mobilisation in support of SAF reached '19 trillion' (old pounds, i.e. SDG 19 billion) and that two brigades were ready to be armed. Donors are private citizens and are not recorded.

Fact-check

None.

Source

pro-SAF (unofficial news-aggregator channel 'السودان', ~212K subscribers; reposts official and partisan items)

Ethiopia's army chief accused Sudan, Eritrea and Egypt of supporting Tigray rebels; claims of TPLF-SAF collusion.

Response

TPLF rejects Ethiopia's claims of collusion with Sudan (Sudan Tribune headline).

UNVERIFIED. HRW (July 2024) reported 'accusations by the RSF that Tigrayan forces were fighting alongside Sudanese Armed Forces', noting the risk this posed to Ethiopian refugees in Gedaref. In Sept 2026 Ethiopia's army chief accused Sudan and Egypt of backing the TPLF in renewed fighting.

Response

The Sudanese military called Ethiopia's Sept 2026 allegations 'baseless' and counter-alleged RSF support from Ethiopian territory.

Sanctions

None

RSF spokesperson statement (4 May 2024) claims 'documented information' that non-signatory TPLF forces fight alongside SAF, and that foreign personnel serve in SAF air force, engineers, artillery and drone units; says bodies of 'mercenaries' were flown out via Port Sudan in Nov–Dec 2023. No evidence is attached.

Fact-check

TPLF statement of 6 May 2026 called the collaboration allegations 'unfounded, irresponsible' while acknowledging a 'humanitarian' historical relationship with Sudan's government (Sudan War Monitor, read directly).

Source

RSF official channel (party to the conflict; pro-RSF, UAE-aligned narrative)

Launching the single window for gold exports in Port Sudan on 9 Dec 2024, Lt Gen Ibrahim Jabir tied economic institutions to the war: enemies wanted 'an economic war too, in which Sudanese economic institutions were the first line of defence'.

Fact-check

None.

Source

official SAF-side (Transitional Sovereignty Council media office channel; presents as official, signed 'إعلام مجلس السيادة الانتقالي', active since 2020; not cross-verified from a government website)