Complicit Dossier

Procurement and supply networks · company · Oman

Atlas International Business LLC

  • Reported or alleged link, not established
  • Grade A: Official recordStrongest record: official record
  • 2 documented ties · 3 steps from the SAF

Also recorded as: Atlas Global Holding; Atlas Global Holdings; Atlas Tech LLC

ALLEGED (US v. Mafi): 'MAFI and Co-Conspirator-1 own and operate an Omani company, Atlas International Business LLC ("Atlas International," also known as "Atlas Global Holding" and "Atlas Tech LLC")'. Mafi 'facilitated a contract valued at over EUR 60 million for the sale of Iranian-made Mohajer-6 armed UAVs from Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Sudan' and 'brokered the sale of 55,000 bomb fuses to the Sudanese Ministry of Defense'. A Jan 2025 contract amendment named an 'Omani front company (Omani Company-1)' as buyer 'on behalf of the government of Sudan'; payments routed via a Turkish money exchange and a UAE currency exchange. An End User Certificate dated 21 Jan 2025 signed by Sudan's Minister of Defense covered 500 OJAN-500 aircraft bombs.

Response

No response is recorded. Named parties have not yet been asked for comment.

Records

1

Each record carries its own grade. A grade describes the source for that record, not the actor.

Grade A: Official record

Atlas International Business LLC

mixed sourcing

ALLEGED (US v. Mafi): 'MAFI and Co-Conspirator-1 own and operate an Omani company, Atlas International Business LLC ("Atlas International," also known as "Atlas Global Holding" and "Atlas Tech LLC")'. Mafi 'facilitated a contract valued at over EUR 60 million for the sale of Iranian-made Mohajer-6 armed UAVs from Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Sudan' and 'brokered the sale of 55,000 bomb fuses to the Sudanese Ministry of Defense'. A Jan 2025 contract amendment named an 'Omani front company (Omani Company-1)' as buyer 'on behalf of the government of Sudan'; payments routed via a Turkish money exchange and a UAE currency exchange. An End User Certificate dated 21 Jan 2025 signed by Sudan's Minister of Defense covered 500 OJAN-500 aircraft bombs.

Why this grade
A (court record - allegations, unproven)

Checked against the document

3

Statements compared with the wording of the primary document.

  • “For example, she facilitated a contract worth more than $70 million for the sale of the Iranian-made Mohajer-6 drone from Iran's defense ministry to Sudan's military. [...] She coordinated the Sudanese delegation's travel to Iran and was paid more than $7 million. [...] A complaint is merely an allegation of criminal conduct, not evidence. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.”

    USAO C.D. Cal. press release 26-067, "Iranian National Living in San Fernando Valley Arrested on Federal Complaint Charging Her with Selling Weapons for Iran's Government"20 Apr 2026verified verbatim

    Correction: Brief said the release was April 2026: it is dated Monday 20 April 2026, number 26-067. She "was arrested on Saturday night" = 18 April 2026 (the docket's Report Commencing Criminal Action also gives "date of arrest: 4/18/2026"); the 19 April date from MEF is wrong.

  • “MAFI facilitated a contract valued at over €60 million for the sale of Iranian-made Mohajer-6 armed UAVs from Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (“MODAFL”) to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Sudan. MAFI coordinated the Sudanese delegation’s travel to Iran, received over €6 million in payments, and issued payment receipts under the contract. [...] The total value of the contract was €61,656,000, to be paid by the customer in four installments.”

    US v. Mafi complaint, paras 8 and 39(e), 39(l)18 Apr 2026verified verbatim

    Correction: Resolution of "$60m vs $70.6m": the court documents give EUR 61,656,000 ("over €60 million"); the DOJ release says "more than $70 million". "$60 million" (e.g. Courthouse News) is a euro figure mislabelled as dollars; "$70.6m" appears in neither primary document. Likewise payments: complaint "over €6 million", DOJ "more than $7 million" - arms.json "Atlas received >$7 million in 2025" should be attributed to the DOJ release and read "Mafi was paid", not Atlas. The 7 Jan 2025 amendment was for EUR 30,828,000 with an "Omani front company" as buyer on behalf of the government of Sudan.

  • “Atlas International is a limited liability company registered on November 28, 2022, in Oman. Atlas International’s registration number is 1459420. [...] MAFI referred to her Omani company alternatively as Atlas International Business LLC, Atlas Tech LLC, and Atlas Global Holding, but I believe these all are the same company with the same Omani registration number (1459420).”

    US v. Mafi complaint, para 8, footnotes 1 and 1218 Apr 2026verified verbatim

Relationships

2

← means the other party acts on this one; → means this one acts on the other.

Ownership and control · 1

Arms and supply · 1

Weapons, sites and other subjects

1

Recorded links to things, places, events and authorities rather than to organisations or people.

  • From Hawala / exchange channels used to pay for SAF arms purchases (unnamed operators)

    received payments on its behalf (US allegation) · 2025-01 to 2025-04

    Grade A: Official record

Geography

Tags come from the recorded jurisdiction and from place names in the records. Coordinates on the map are approximate.

Based in
Oman
Also named
Iran (2), United Arab Emirates (1), Türkiye (1)

Position in the network

Derived by analysing the documented relationships. Nothing in this section is a finding.

Still connected to the SAF when only official records are counted.

›Possible links to investigate · 2
  • Iran hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary (via Shamim Mafi).

  • Sur International Investment hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary (via Ministry of Defense of Sudan).