Complicit Dossier

Procurement and supply networks · state military enterprise · Sudan

Defense Industries System (DIS)

منظومة الصناعية الدفاعية · هيئة التصنيع الحربي · منظومة الصناعات الدفاعية

  • Part of the SAF or state-controlled
  • Grade A: Official recordStrongest record: official record
  • Sanctioned byCAEUUKUS
  • 53 documented ties · 1 step from the SAF

Also recorded as: MILITARY INDUSTRY CORPORATION; DEFENSE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION; DEFENSE INDUSTRY SYSTEM; Defense Industries Corporation; Systém pro obranný průmysl; DIS; Military Industry Corporation; Military Industrial Corporation; …

OFAC: 'Sudan's largest defense enterprise... manufactures a range of small arms, conventional weapons, ammunition, and military vehicles for the SAF'; 2026: 'supports and maintains the SAF's arsenal of arms, ammunition, vehicles, and material, often acquired from Iran and other external backers'. Counterparty to the Nov 2023 Baykar contract (WaPo).

Their response

  • DIS / Sudanese government did not respond to WaPo.
  • None in this article. Sudan's government has repeatedly rejected sanctions on DIS and its director (see Mirghani Idris entry).

Records

13

Each record carries its own grade. A grade describes the source for that record, not the actor.

Grade A: Official record

Defense Industries System (DIS)

OFAC: 'Sudan's largest defense enterprise... manufactures a range of small arms, conventional weapons, ammunition, and military vehicles for the SAF'; 2026: 'supports and maintains the SAF's arsenal of arms, ammunition, vehicles, and material, often acquired from Iran and other external backers'. Counterparty to the Nov 2023 Baykar contract (WaPo).

Why this grade
A (sanctions findings); B (subsidiary shareholdings - C4ADS/Ministry of Finance inventory, data to ~2021)
Sanctions
US OFAC, SUDAN-EO14098, 2023-06-01; EU, 2024-01-22; UK; Canada (SEMA); Switzerland (SECO)
Grade A: Official record

Defense Industries System (DIS)

pre-war to present

SAF-owned conglomerate; US Treasury: 'Sudan's largest defense enterprise, generating an estimated $2 billion in revenue via hundreds of subsidiaries'. Parent/umbrella of Sudan Master Technology (Giad), Aswar and, through subsidiaries, shareholder in Omdurman National Bank.

Response
No response located in the sources reviewed.
Sanctions
US OFAC SDN (E.O. 14098) 2023-06-01; EU (Reg. 2024/384) 2024-01-22; UK; Canada; Switzerland.
Grade A: Official record

Defense Industries System (DIS)

2023 - 2026mixed sourcing

SAF's primary weapons production and procurement arm; contract counterparty for Baykar; controls Giad and TMAC.

Response
DIS / Sudanese government did not respond to WaPo.
Sanctions
OFAC SDN since 1 Jun 2023.
›Research notes

The Baykar contract element rests on a single investigation (grade C).

Grade A: Official record

Defense Industries System – Garri military manufacturing complex

On 25 Jan 2025 Burhan inspected the DIS military-manufacturing headquarters at Garri after its recapture, with al-Atta and Mirghani Idris, and committed the state to rebuilding it.

Fact-check
None.
Source
official SAF-side (Transitional Sovereignty Council media office channel; presents as official, signed 'إعلام مجلس السيادة الانتقالي', active since 2020; not cross-verified from a government website)
Grade A: Official record

DIS at the World Defense Show, Riyadh: meeting with the head of Saudi Arabia's military-industries regulator (February 2024)

2024-02-13 to 2024-02-16

The DIS page reported on 16 Feb 2024 that director-general Mirghani Idris met the governor of Saudi Arabia's General Authority for Military Industries during the World Defense Show and discussed 'developing cooperation between Saudi military industries and the Sudanese Defense Industries System'. The same post says he met directors of 'major Chinese, Turkish and Saudi companies' and war-production bodies of 'friendly and brotherly states' to discuss 'developing cooperation agreements' and 'activating agreements'. No company is named.

Why this grade
Grade A is for the fact that the page announced this. The page was identified as official by its name and content; no verification badge was detected.
Response
No Saudi response looked up.
Sanctions
DIS: US 1 Jun 2023; EU 22 Jan 2024; UK.
›Research notes

Source alignment: official SAF-side channel. Grade applies to the fact that the announcement was made, not to its content. Page is not badge-verified on Facebook; treated as official because its output is the body's own press material (same texts are carried by the state news agency) and it is referenced by other official pages. Original: 'بحث سيادته تطوير التعاون بين الصناعات العسكرية السعودية ومنظومة الصناعات الدفاعية السودانية'. DIS was already under US sanctions (1 June 2023) at the time. No Saudi statement was looked up in this pass.

Grade A: Official record

DIS stands at foreign arms fairs during the war: Istanbul 2023, 2025, 2026; Cairo 2025; Baku 2026

2023-07 to 2026-09

DIS's own page records a national stand at IDEF 2023 in Istanbul (27 Jul 2023: 'smart bombs and guided missiles' on show), IDEF 2025 (22 Jul 2025: opened in the presence of President Erdogan, Sudan's defence minister and the DIS director-general; stated aim 'transferring modern technologies in defence fields' and 'building strategic partnerships with regional and international companies'), SAHA 2026 in Istanbul (5 May 2026: 'more than 90 products and services'; attended by the DIS director-general, the defence minister, DIS's deputy for defence products, Sudan's ambassador to Türkiye and the consul in Istanbul) and EDEX 2025 in Cairo (2 Dec 2025). The Ministry of Defence page adds ADEX 2026 in Baku (29 Sep 2026), where the defence minister was accompanied by DIS's deputy director-general.

Why this grade
Grade A is for the fact that the page announced this. The page was identified as official by its name and content; no verification badge was detected.
Response
Organisers and host governments not contacted; no statement looked up.
Sanctions
DIS: US, EU, UK.
›Research notes

Source alignment: official SAF-side channel. Grade applies to the fact that the announcement was made, not to its content. Page is not badge-verified on Facebook; treated as official because its output is the body's own press material (same texts are carried by the state news agency) and it is referenced by other official pages. A sanctioned body exhibiting at fairs hosted by Türkiye, Egypt and Azerbaijan is a fact about access; the posts name no contract or counterpart.

Grade A: Official record

DIS and Chinese companies, Beijing, 4-6 September 2024: the body's own account (Poly, CPMIEC, Norinco, China Energy, AHCOF)

2024-09-04 to 2024-09-06

DIS's own posts give the primary text for the Beijing signings already in the dossier and add two counterparts. (1) 6 Sep 2024: agreement with 'Poly (POLY)' for 'strategic cooperation in vital and defence fields', signed by Mirghani Idris; the post calls it 'an extension of continued and successful cooperation with POLY' and says 'these contracts' will help 'sustain defence and security readiness'. (2) 6 Sep 2024: cooperation agreement with CPMIEC, 'specialised in vital defence industries', signed by DIS's director of international cooperation. (3) 6 Sep 2024: Burhan received NORINCO's general manager with Idris present; NORINCO 'affirmed continued cooperation in joint defence and strategic projects'. (4) 4 Sep 2024: DIS and 'CHINA ENERGY International Group' signed agreements in energy, ports and airports; the Chinese side put their value at US$30 million; DIS's Energy and Mining Group spoke of 1,500 MW of solar power, transmission lines and iron-ore mining. (5) 4 Sep 2024: DIS's 'Export Development Group' signed agricultural agreements with 'AHCOF', described as one of the largest importers of Sudanese farm products.

Why this grade
Grade A is for the fact that the page announced this. The page was identified as official by its name and content; no verification badge was detected.
Response
No response from the Chinese companies found in earlier passes; not searched again.
Sanctions
DIS: US, EU, UK.
›Research notes

Source alignment: official SAF-side channel. Grade applies to the fact that the announcement was made, not to its content. Page is not badge-verified on Facebook; treated as official because its output is the body's own press material (same texts are carried by the state news agency) and it is referenced by other official pages. These posts are the origin of the texts earlier passes read through the state news agency. Company names are given as written in the posts; the Chinese legal entities were not verified. No Chinese company statement was found in earlier passes.

Grade A: Official record

DIS and Egypt's Ministry of Military Production: talks at EDEX 2025

2025-12-02

On 2 Dec 2025, at the EDEX 2025 fair in Cairo, DIS director-general Mirghani Idris met Egypt's Minister of State for Military Production. According to DIS's post the minister said the meeting should 'set mechanisms to develop cooperation in a number of fields of military manufacturing' and that integration between Military Production companies and their Sudanese counterparts should rest on 'strategic partnership'; Idris spoke of 'continuous coordination with the Ministry of Military Production' and DIS's interest in Egyptian companies, 'foremost the Military Production companies'.

Why this grade
Grade A is for the fact that the page announced this. The page was identified as official by its name and content; no verification badge was detected.
Response
Egyptian ministry statement not looked up.
Sanctions
DIS: US, EU, UK.
›Research notes

Source alignment: official SAF-side channel. Grade applies to the fact that the announcement was made, not to its content. Page is not badge-verified on Facebook; treated as official because its output is the body's own press material (same texts are carried by the state news agency) and it is referenced by other official pages. Talks only; no agreement, product or delivery is stated. Original: 'وضع آليات لتطوير علاقات التعاون بين الجانبين في عدد من مجالات التصنيع العسكري'.

Grade A: Official record

DIS states that its products 'contributed to the victories': Army Day exhibition, August 2026

2026-08-18

DIS's page reported on 18 Aug 2026 that Burhan and Chief of Staff Yasir al-Atta visited its stand at the Army Day defence-products exhibition. The post says al-Atta admired 'the products that contributed to the victories of the battles of Dignity' and lists what DIS produces: 'various ammunition, light and medium weapons, armoured vehicles, the latest electronic technologies, unmanned aircraft and logistical and technical equipment'.

Why this grade
Grade A is for the fact that the page announced this. The page was identified as official by its name and content; no verification badge was detected.
Sanctions
DIS: US, EU, UK.
›Research notes

Source alignment: official SAF-side channel. Grade applies to the fact that the announcement was made, not to its content. Page is not badge-verified on Facebook; treated as official because its output is the body's own press material (same texts are carried by the state news agency) and it is referenced by other official pages. Own statement of the supplier's role in the war; no figures. Original: 'المنتجات النوعية التي ساهمت في انتصارات معارك الكرامة'.

Grade A: Official record

DIS civil contracts and state business during the war: Kilanaieb power station, Starlink terminals, return trains from Egypt

2024-02 to 2025-07

Three own announcements show DIS acting as a state contractor and logistics arm. (1) 12 Aug 2024, Port Sudan: the finance and energy ministers signed a contract to complete the Kilanaieb power station (about 335 MW) with the 'National Company for Energy and Engineering', signed for the company by DIS's deputy director-general for civil products; the energy minister said the project falls 'within the war-economy programme'. (2) 25 Feb 2024: DIS's deputy director-general handed Khartoum's governor Starlink internet terminals described as 'a gift from the Commander-in-Chief' for Karari locality. (3) 27 Jul 2025: DIS organised free return trains for Sudanese from Egypt 'in cooperation with the Egyptian National Railways', thanking Egypt's deputy prime minister and transport minister.

Why this grade
Grade A is for the fact that the page announced this. The page was identified as official by its name and content; no verification badge was detected.
Sanctions
DIS: US, EU, UK.
›Research notes

Source alignment: official SAF-side channel. Grade applies to the fact that the announcement was made, not to its content. Page is not badge-verified on Facebook; treated as official because its output is the body's own press material (same texts are carried by the state news agency) and it is referenced by other official pages. How the Starlink terminals were obtained is not stated. Contract value for Kilanaieb is not stated.

Grade A: Official record

DIS denies owing money to a US-sanctioned businessman (July 2025)

2025-07-20

On 20 Jul 2025 DIS's media centre issued a 'clarifying statement' denying media reports of a debt owed by DIS to Ashraf Sid Ahmed al-Hussein ('al-Cardinal'): he 'has no debt owed by it or by any of its subsidiaries', and DIS 'has nothing to do with' his reported summons. DIS threatened legal action against those repeating the claim.

Why this grade
Grade A is for the fact that the page announced this. The page was identified as official by its name and content; no verification badge was detected.
Response
This is DIS's own denial.
Sanctions
DIS: US, EU, UK.
›Research notes

Source alignment: official SAF-side channel. Grade applies to the fact that the announcement was made, not to its content. Recorded as DIS's response to an allegation this pass did not trace to its origin; the underlying reports were not opened. A person of this name was designated by the US Treasury in 2019 under the Global Magnitsky programme (not re-checked in this pass). Legal review before publication.

Grade C: Single source

Defense Industries System (DIS)

US Treasury action reported 26 June 2026 again targets DIS as the country's largest defence institution supplying SAF with weapons, ammunition and vehicles, and designates a procurement network beneath it (Giad/SMT, TMAC, SBL Energy, Ports Engineering).

Why this grade
Press report of an official act. The primary record is cited in another record for this actor.
Response
None in this article. Sudan's government has repeatedly rejected sanctions on DIS and its director (see Mirghani Idris entry).
Source
Al Bayan (UAE daily, Dubai government-owned; UAE is accused of backing the RSF) reporting a US Treasury (OFAC) action
  1. 1Al Bayan · albayan.ae · 26 Jun 2026

NamesGiad (SMT)TMACSBL EnergyPorts Engineering

1 more record below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.

1 more record at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.

Checked against the document

7

Statements compared with the wording of the primary document.

  • “Defense Industries System is Sudan’s largest defense enterprise, generating an estimated $2 billion in revenue via hundreds of subsidiaries across various sectors of Sudan’s economy. DIS manufactures a range of small arms, conventional weapons, ammunition, and military vehicles for the SAF, and uses a complex system to hide its ownership of these subsidiaries and to obtain favorable letters of credit from the Sudan Central Bank.”

    US Treasury press release jy1514, "Treasury Sanctions Military-Affiliated Companies Fueling Both Sides of the Conflict in Sudan"1 Jun 2023verified verbatim

  • “The Defense Industries System (DIS), Sudan’s largest defense enterprise, supports and maintains the SAF’s arsenal of arms, ammunition, vehicles, and material, often acquired from Iran and other external backers. DIS controls numerous subsidiaries, including the Sudanese conglomerate, Giad Industrial Group (Giad)—also known as Sudan Master Technology—through complex and opaque structures from which DIS has generated billions of dollars.”

    US Treasury press release sb054426 Jun 2026verified verbatim

  • OFAC recent-actions pages and SDN.XML published 2 Oct 20262 Oct 2026verified verbatim

  • “the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Sudan, represented by a Sudanese official (“Sudanese Representative-2”), as the parties to the agreement. [...] MAFI received a WhatsApp message from an Egyptian national appointed to represent Defense Industries System, a Sudanese defense contractor, in the negotiation and signing of the Bomb Fuses Contract (“Sudanese Representative-4”). [...] a contract dated September 5, 2024, for a total value of $100,800,000, for the sale of 240 million rounds of 7.62x39mm AK-47 ammunition from Iran to the Sudanese MOD.”

    US v. Mafi complaint, paras 39(c), 41(a), 41(i); indictment paras 12-13, 211 May 2026verified verbatim

    Correction: First pass missed three things: (1) the complaint names DIS and says an Egyptian national represented it in the fuse contract; (2) the indictment values the ammunition contract at $100,800,000 for 240 million rounds (arms.json says only "millions of rounds"); (3) NEITHER the complaint nor the indictment alleges that any drone, fuse or round was delivered to Sudan - they allege brokering, contracts and payments. The dossier must not say Iran delivered these items on the strength of this case. A list of 12 Sudanese nationals for UAV training in Iran was "signed and stamped by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sudan".

  • “Defense Industries System (‘DIS’) is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 as it is associated with the SAF (an involved person), supports the activity the SAF is involved in, is involved in the supply to Sudan (specifically the SAF) of military goods or military technology or of material related to such goods or technology, and thereby engages in activity which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan.”

    UK Sanctions List, SUD000812 Jul 2023verified verbatim

  • “Defense Industries System (DIS), previously known as the Military Industrial Corporation (MIC), is a large Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)-owned conglomerate which manages a network of military-controlled companies. DIS generates substantial annual revenues, estimated at USD 2 billion in 2020.”

    Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/384, Annex, B.122 Jan 2024verified verbatim

  • Washington Post, "A Turkish arms firm helped fuel Sudan’s brutal civil war, records show" (7 March 2025)7 Mar 2025could not open

    Correction: From the reprint: (1) "six vs eight" is resolved - the contract covered six TB2s; Baykar "sent at least $120 million worth of weapons — including eight of its signature TB2 drones", two more having been delivered in October 2024. (2) The first pass omits a caveat the Post itself gives: "The Post could not independently confirm the date of the signing." Add it wherever the 16 Nov 2023 date is used. (3) Say "at least $120 million", as the Post does.

Relationships

67

← means the other party acts on this one; → means this one acts on the other.

Ownership and control · 49

38 more relationships below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

3 more relationships at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

Arms and supply · 10

5 more relationships below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

4 more relationships at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

Money · 1

Political ties · 7

Sanctions listings

3
  • United States (OFAC)1 Jun 2023OFAC SDN UID 43536

    ›Stated reason

    Defense Industries System is Sudan’s largest defense enterprise, generating an estimated $2 billion in revenue via hundreds of subsidiaries across various sectors of Sudan’s economy. DIS manufactures a range of small arms, conventional weapons, ammunition, and military vehicles for the SAF, and uses a complex system to hide its ownership of these subsidiaries and to obtain favorable letters of credit from the Sudan Central Bank. Defense Industries System not only defaults on the loans obtained under these letters of credit but also uses these favorable funds guarantees to compete unfairly with civilian businesses that do not enjoy such favorable financial terms. In addition, between the opaque ownership structure of its subsidiaries and certain tax exemptions, Defense Industries System [...] home.treasury.gov

  • United Kingdom12 Jul 2023SUD0008

    ›Stated reason

    Defense Industries System (‘DIS’) is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 as it is associated with the SAF (an involved person), supports the activity the SAF is involved in, is involved in the supply to Sudan (specifically the SAF) of military goods or military technology or of material related to such goods or technology, and thereby engages in activity which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan. sanctionslist.fcdo.gov.uk

  • European Union22 Jan 2024EU.11092.32

    ›Stated reason

    Defense Industries System (DIS), previously known as the Military Industrial Corporation (MIC), is a large Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)-owned conglomerate which manages a network of military-controlled companies. DIS generates substantial annual revenues, estimated at USD 2 billion in 2020. DIS manufactures and provides the SAF with a range of military equipment, including weapons, ammunition, aircraft and military vehicles, which are used by the armed forces in the conflict in Sudan. DIS controls together with SMT Engineering (SMT), through a network of direct and indirect shareholdings, numerous companies of the SAF-controlled GIAD conglomerate, which is also involved in the production of weapons and vehicles for the armed forces, as well as in the provision of services to the SAF, in particular through a partnership between GIAD for Automotive Services and the Corps of Engineers. The [...]

Dated events

17
  1. MASAD/DIS reportedly signs a memorandum of understanding with RMIL and other Indian defence-related entities (C4ADS). c4ads.org

    Grade C: Single source
  2. OFAC designates the Defense Industries System and Sudan Master Technology (release jy1514). home.treasury.gov

    Grade A: Official record
  3. DIS exhibits at IDEF in Istanbul; its page says the stand showed 'smart bombs and guided missiles'. facebook.com

    Grade A: Official record
  4. Giad Elsewedy Cables imports 112 packages (about 84,574 kg) of 7.62mm brass cups from RMIL, after US sanctions on DIS and SMT. c4ads.org

    Grade C: Single source
  5. Date on $120m Baykar-DIS contract for 6 TB2, 3 ground stations, 600 warheads, signed by Mirghani Idris Suleiman. washingtonpost.com

    Grade B: Corroborated
  6. DIS director-general arrives in Algiers on Burhan's delegation. facebook.com

    Grade A: Official record
  7. DIS director-general meets the governor of Saudi Arabia's General Authority for Military Industries at the World Defense Show in Riyadh. facebook.com

    Grade A: Official record
  8. Government signs the contract to complete the Kilanaieb power station with a DIS company in Port Sudan. facebook.com

    Grade A: Official record
  9. In Beijing DIS signs agreements with China Energy (value put at US$30m) and AHCOF; Giad signs with Dongfeng and others. facebook.com

    Grade A: Official record
  10. OFAC designates DIS director Mirghani Idris Suleiman; cites Iranian drones and a port-for-weapons deal with Russia. home.treasury.gov

    Grade A: Official record
  11. Washington Post publishes Baykar document trove. washingtonpost.com

    Grade B: Corroborated
  12. C4ADS publishes "Indirect Fire" on DIS procurement of ammunition components from India. c4ads.org

    Grade C: Single source
  13. DIS exhibits at IDEF 2025 in Istanbul; Sudan's defence minister and the DIS director-general attend the opening with President Erdogan. facebook.com

    Grade A: Official record
  14. DIS director-general and Egypt's Minister of State for Military Production discuss cooperation in military manufacturing at EDEX 2025. facebook.com

    Grade A: Official record
  15. DIS exhibits 'more than 90 products and services' at SAHA 2026 in Istanbul. facebook.com

    Grade A: Official record
  16. Defence ministers of Sudan and Azerbaijan meet at ADEX 2026 in Baku; DIS's deputy director-general attends. facebook.com

    Grade B: Corroborated
  17. Civil Defence receives the DIS-made 'Safat 02' helicopter. facebook.com

    Grade A: Official record

6 more events below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

3 more events at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

Geography

Tags come from the recorded jurisdiction and from place names in the records. Coordinates on the map are approximate.

Based in
Sudan
Also named
Egypt (11), China (8), Türkiye (7), Saudi Arabia (6), Azerbaijan (3), Iran (1)
Places
Port Sudan, Khartoum, Omdurman, Al-Jaili / Garri, Cairo, Istanbul, Riyadh, Baku, Beijing

Position in the network

Derived by analysing the documented relationships. Nothing in this section is a finding.

Still connected to the SAF when only official records are counted. Ranks 1 in the file for how often it sits on the shortest documented chain between two others.

›Possible links to investigate · 12
  • Special Fund for the Social Security of the Armed Forces (SFSSAF) hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary; cited in the same source (via SAMITX FOR FABRIC AND INVESTMENT [reg 3765], Zadna International Company for Investment Ltd, Omdurman National Bank (ONB)).

  • Holding Company for Food Industries (Egypt) hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary; named in the other actor's record (via Etegahat / Multiple Directions Company, Egyptian-Sudanese Company for Development and Multiple Investments (ESC)).

  • SBL Energy Limited hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary; named in the other actor's record; cited in the same source (via Target Multiactivities Company Ltd (TMAC)).

  • Advanced Mining Works hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary; named in the other actor's record (via BROUJ INDUSTRY SERVICES AND CONSULTANCY CONSTRUCTION [reg 23778]).

  • Abdel Fattah al-Burhan hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary; named in the other actor's record (via Mirghani Idris Suleiman).

  • Ports Engineering Company Ltd hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary; named in the other actor's record; cited in the same source (via Sudan Master Technology / Giad Industrial Group).

  • Ashoka Manufacturing hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary (via Marble Engineering, Target Multiactivities Company Ltd (TMAC)).

  • National Service Projects Organization (NSPO), Egypt hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary; named in the other actor's record (via Egyptian-Sudanese Company for Development and Multiple Investments (ESC)).

  • Meroe Gold / M Invest / Al-Solag Mining hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary (via Aswar Multi Activities Co. Ltd, Sudan Master Technology / Giad Industrial Group).

  • Saria Industrial Complex hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary; named in the other actor's record (via Sudan Master Technology / Giad Industrial Group).

  • Norin Mining Limited hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary (via Norinco).

  • Sudanese Mineral Resources Company (SMRC) hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary (via Zadna International Company for Investment Ltd, Omdurman National Bank (ONB)).