Also recorded as: Baykar Teknoloji; Baykar Tech; Baykar Makina Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S.; Baykar (Baykar Makina / Baykar Technologies); Baykar field team in Sudan; Baykar (Bayraktar TB2 maker); Baykar - financial context; Baykar (Bayraktar TB2) – repeated RSF shoot-down claims of SAF drones; …
Washington Post (7 Mar 2025, leaked documents/messages): contract dated 16 Nov 2023 worth USD 120 million between Baykar and DIS, signed for DIS by Director General Mirghani Idris Suleiman, covering 600 warheads, six TB2 drones and three ground control stations; first shipment reached Port Sudan Aug 2024, final delivery 15 Sep 2024; cargo routed via Bamako on aircraft of sanctioned carrier Aviacon Zitotrans; Baykar staff coordinated deliveries toward Shendi and Atbara. Secondary reports cite 'at least eight TB2 drones' delivered. DIS had been OFAC-designated on 1 Jun 2023, i.e. before the contract.
Their response
Baykar, the Sudanese military and the Sudanese government 'did not respond to requests for comment' (Washington Post). No public Baykar statement on Sudan located.
Baykar did not respond to the Washington Post; employees Ozkan Cakir and Esref Evliyaoglu did not respond. Baykar and the SSB did not respond to Reuters (Feb 2026).
Baykar did not respond.
Baykar, the Sudanese army and government did not respond to the Post; a Turkish embassy official said Turkey has refrained from giving military support to any party since the conflict began (as relayed by Erem; wording is reader paraphrase).
No Baykar statement in the sources read.
Records
7
Each record carries its own grade. A grade describes the source for that record, not the actor.
BGrade B: Corroborated
Baykar field team in Sudan
Aug 2024 - May 2025
Company personnel on the ground in Port Sudan during TB2 delivery and first strikes (Sep 2024); MEE reports TB2s 'operated by Turks fighting alongside the Sudanese army in Port Sudan'.
Baykar – TB2 in SAF service (wreckage evidence, Dec 2025)
Sudan War Monitor verified RSF footage of a crashed TB2 near Al Khuwai/Abu Gaoud (10 Dec 2025): Sudanese Air Force insignia; labels on recovered parts show manufacture in 2023 – i.e. airframe built after the war began.
Fact-check
No Baykar or Turkish comment located in this pass.
Source
independent OSINT monitor (Sudan War Monitor; has issued public retractions)
Washington Post (7 Mar 2025, leaked documents/messages): contract dated 16 Nov 2023 worth USD 120 million between Baykar and DIS, signed for DIS by Director General Mirghani Idris Suleiman, covering 600 warheads, six TB2 drones and three ground control stations; first shipment reached Port Sudan Aug 2024, final delivery 15 Sep 2024; cargo routed via Bamako on aircraft of sanctioned carrier Aviacon Zitotrans; Baykar staff coordinated deliveries toward Shendi and Atbara. Secondary reports cite 'at least eight TB2 drones' delivered. DIS had been OFAC-designated on 1 Jun 2023, i.e. before the contract.
Why this grade
Regraded from A: the registration is official record; the Sudan contract rests on one investigation.
Response
Baykar, the Sudanese military and the Sudanese government 'did not respond to requests for comment' (Washington Post). No public Baykar statement on Sudan located.
›Research notes
[Verification: Washington Post: "The Post could not independently confirm the date of the signing." The contract covered six TB2s; Baykar "sent at least $120 million worth of weapons - including eight of its signature TB2 drones", two more arriving in October 2024. Read on a reprint, not the original.]
See first pass (Washington Post investigation). Euronews summary adds: contract covered six TB2, three ground stations, 600 warheads and 48 personnel for in-country support; deliveries by air to Port Sudan from August 2024.
Why this grade
Regraded from A: company figures are self-reported; the Sudan contract rests on one investigation.
Response
No Baykar statement in the sources read.
›Research notes
Baykar publishes no audited accounts; the percentage comparison is my arithmetic, not a sourced figure.
Contract 16 Nov 2023; deliveries Aug - Nov 2024; Akinci from 2025
Sold and delivered TB2 armed drones, ground stations and warheads to the SAF procurement arm DIS under a contract dated 16 Nov 2023; sent a delivery/technical-support team to Port Sudan; Akinci drones later in SAF service; co-developer of YIHA-III.
Why this grade
Regraded from B: one investigation, repeated by other outlets.
Response
Baykar did not respond to the Washington Post; Baykar and the SSB did not respond to Reuters (Feb 2026).
Sanctions
Not sanctioned. Counterparty DIS was OFAC-designated on 1 Jun 2023, five months before the contract date.
›Research notes
[Verification: Washington Post: "The Post could not independently confirm the date of the signing." The contract covered six TB2s; Baykar "sent at least $120 million worth of weapons - including eight of its signature TB2 drones", two more arriving in October 2024. Read on a reprint, not the original.]
Per a Washington Post investigation relayed by Erem, Baykar concluded a $120m arms supply deal with the Sudanese army, including TB2 drones and warheads delivered from Sept 2024.
Why this grade
Regraded from B: one outlet relaying the same investigation.
Response
Baykar, the Sudanese army and government did not respond to the Post; a Turkish embassy official said Turkey has refrained from giving military support to any party since the conflict began (as relayed by Erem; wording is reader paraphrase).
Source
Erem News (UAE-based; UAE-aligned); relaying The Washington Post
1Erem News↗ · eremnews.com · not stated on page (WaPo investigation, 2025)
DGrade D: Unverified lead
Baykar (Bayraktar TB2) – repeated RSF shoot-down claims of SAF drones
RSF/Tasis statements claim downing Turkish-made Bayraktar drones operated by SAF: Mersheng, S. Darfur (4 Sept 2025); Abu Gaoud, N. Kordofan (16 Sept 2025, 'sixth in three months'); Abu Gaoud (10 Dec 2025); Barno, S. Kordofan (27 Dec 2025); Farshaya (24 Jan 2026); Blue Nile (24 Sept 2026).
Why this grade
Regraded from B: statements by a party to the war.
Fact-check
SAF does not usually comment on losses. SWM notes cause could be gunfire or mechanical failure.
Source
RSF official channel (party to the conflict; pro-RSF, UAE-aligned narrative)
7 more records below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
5 more records at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
1 more record at grade D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.
Checked against the document
3
Statements compared with the wording of the primary document.
“Technical analysis identified features consistent with Bayraktar Akıncı combat drones, including twin-turboprop propulsion components, distinctive propeller assemblies, munition-release mechanisms, and manufacturer markings on recovered wreckage. Footage from Nyala, South Darfur, on 8 January 2026, and Al-Farshaya, South Kordofan, on 24 January 2026, was assessed as likely depicting Akıncı platforms.”
Correction: arms_notes.md says "Akinci wreckage with manufacturer markings was verified" and the crime notes say the FFM "documents foreign-supplied Bayraktar Akinci drones". The FFM wording is weaker: "features consistent with" and "assessed as likely depicting". Use the FFM's own hedges. The FFM does not name Baykar as a company or say who supplied or operated the aircraft.
Correction: From the reprint: (1) "six vs eight" is resolved - the contract covered six TB2s; Baykar "sent at least $120 million worth of weapons — including eight of its signature TB2 drones", two more having been delivered in October 2024. (2) The first pass omits a caveat the Post itself gives: "The Post could not independently confirm the date of the signing." Add it wherever the 16 Nov 2023 date is used. (3) Say "at least $120 million", as the Post does.
Date on $120m Baykar-DIS contract for 6 TB2, 3 ground stations, 600 warheads, signed by Mirghani Idris Suleiman. washingtonpost.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
First Baykar munitions arrive by air at Port Sudan (Aviacon Zitotrans via Bamako). washingtonpost.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Baykar employee photographed with Burhan in Port Sudan; 9 Sep meeting records Sudanese offer of Abu Amama port and mining rights to Turkish firms. washingtonpost.com↗
CGrade C: Single source
Baykar employee messages video of 'Today's attack'; '2nd attack' on 15 Sep; last delivery flight arrives 15 Sep. washingtonpost.com↗
YIHA-III wreckage dated to this day on the Kazgeil axis, North Kordofan (images surfaced 13 June 2026). military.africa↗
CGrade C: Single source
Baykar releases video showing 16 Sivrisinek (YIHA-III) one-way attack UAVs at its Kesan facility; Janes reports on 27 April. janes.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Flight tracker reports Sky Vision A320 freighter SU-SKD flying Tekirdağ Çorlu to Port Sudan, 'seven cargo flights in 48 hours linked to Bayraktar drone deliveries to the SAF'. The link to Baykar is the tracker's inference; not corroborated. x.com↗
DGrade D: Unverified lead
8 more events below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
4 more events at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
1 more event at grade D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.
Geography
Tags come from the recorded jurisdiction and from place names in the records. Coordinates on the map are approximate.
Based in
Türkiye
Also named
Mali (1)
Places
Port Sudan, Atbara, Blue Nile, Darfur, Bamako
Position in the network
Derived by analysing the documented relationships. Nothing in this section is a finding.
Connected to the SAF through official or corroborated records.