Egypt

New in second pass: (1) Egypt itself reported to UN Comtrade exports to Sudan in 2023 of military weapons, parts and ammunition, plus explosives, detonators and chlorine in 2022-2025; (2) the NYT/Washington Post dossier (Sept 2026) says the head of the SAF chlorine-bomb project reported importing 20 chlorine cylinders from Egypt in late August 2024; (3) analytical sources say Egypt supplied Turkish drones and trained SAF pilots; (4) unverified reports of Egyptian officers embedded with the SAF and of casualties.

Why this grade

A for the trade statistics as declared; C for the chlorine-cylinder import (single dossier of undisclosed intelligence origin, reported by two newspapers); C for training/drone provision (think-tank summaries); D for Egyptian casualties in Sudan

Response

Egypt did not answer Reuters on East Oweinat (Feb 2026). No Egyptian response to the chlorine-import claim found. Capital FM notes the Egyptian route still needs independent verification of purchaser, origin and onward movement.

Sanctions

None. OFAC (26 June 2026) says TMAC imported explosives from unnamed Egyptian companies.

The dossier published by the New York Times and Washington Post has the head of the SAF chlorine project reporting, in late August 2024, 'the import of 20 chlorine cylinders from Egypt'. Egypt's monthly returns to UN Comtrade record one chlorine export to Sudan in August 2024: 5,815 kg, declared value USD 4,200. Egypt declared chlorine exports to Sudan in nine other months of 2023-2025 as well (for example 31,185 kg in February 2024), so the trade is routine; the August 2024 entry shows only that a consignment of the right kind crossed in the right month. It names no exporter or consignee and cannot be tied to the SAF. On explosives, which OFAC says Egyptian companies supplied to TMAC, the same returns show prepared explosives (HS 3602) worth USD 655,600 in January and March 2023, before the war, and one wartime entry: detonators and related items (HS 3603) worth USD 485,821 in June 2024. The C4ADS commercial dataset used by FRANCE 24 contains no Egyptian chlorine shipment, so Sudanese import records for this flow are missing or incomplete.

Response

No Egyptian response to the chlorine claim was found (two searches, English and Arabic); the New York Times text as reprinted carries none. Egypt is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

(1) 2 Dec 2025, Cairo: DIS's director-general and Egypt's Minister of State for Military Production discussed 'mechanisms to develop cooperation in a number of fields of military manufacturing' (see DIS). (2) Aug 2024: the General Intelligence Service's media office reported Burhan's meeting with the head of Egyptian General Intelligence, with Sudan's intelligence director present; Burhan 'valued Egypt's leading role in supporting and backing its brothers in Sudan'. (3) 1 Jul 2025: the DIS director-general was on Burhan's delegation to the meeting with President Sisi at El Alamein. (4) Jul 2025: DIS ran free return trains 'in cooperation with the Egyptian National Railways'.

Why this grade

Grade A is for the fact that the page announced this. The page was identified as official by its name and content; no verification badge was detected.

Response

Egyptian statements not looked up in this pass.

Chatham House: 'the SAF has sought to transfer gold to Egypt to prevent it from being sent directly to the UAE'; an estimated 60% of production from Northern, River Nile and Red Sea states leaves unofficially for Egypt (>100 kg/day; >60 t in 2023-24). Egypt exempted gold imports from customs and taxes in May 2023. STPT: such 'grey trade allows the SAF to circumvent US, EU, and UK targeted sanctions against its main corporations'. In 2025 Egypt became the second official destination.

Response

No response located in the sources reviewed.

Sanctions

None found in OFAC SDN / EU / UK lists checked 2026-10-03

Political backer of the SAF; reported supplier of TB2 drones (2023) and possibly a K-8 aircraft (2024); since mid-2025 operates Akinci drones from East Oweinat air base striking RSF targets inside Sudan; Egyptian officials privately acknowledge logistical and technical support; Egyptian companies named (but not identified) by OFAC as explosives suppliers to DIS subsidiary TMAC.

Response

Egypt's Foreign Ministry (Oct 2024) denied RSF claims that its air force took part in the war and called on the international community to verify the RSF leader's evidence. Egypt's Foreign Ministry and State Information Service did not answer Reuters questions about East Oweinat (Feb 2026). Egyptian foreign ministry and SAF did not respond to WSJ on the 2023 TB2 report. Retired Egyptian general Samir Farag told Reuters Egypt 'will intervene directly' to secure its borders.

Sanctions

None on Egyptian state or firms identified. OFAC (26 Jun 2026) refers to "Egyptian and Indian companies" supplying TMAC but designates only India-based SBL Energy; no Egyptian company name published in the release or the SDN list.

Approx. 200 personnel at Merowe air base at the outbreak of war (Egypt: joint exercises); from 2025, Egyptian-territory drone operations against the RSF.

Response

See Egypt.

Darfur24, relaying a New York Times investigation, reports a secret airbase in Egypt's Western Desert behind Bayraktar Akinci drone strikes in Sudan, with Turkish cargo aircraft seen there in mid-2025.

Response

'لم ترد وزارة الخارجية المصرية ولا الجيش السوداني على أسئلة الصحيفة'. Egypt's Foreign Ministry dismissed Hemedti's 2024 accusation as 'المزاعم' made amid Egyptian efforts to stop the war (Noon Post, https://www.noonpost.com/254570/).

Source

Darfur24 (independent Sudanese outlet); relaying The New York Times

Context for the gold route; none of these Egyptian statements mentions the Sudanese army. Egypt's military spokesman announced on 22 Jun 2026 the arrest of 223 people (87 Egyptians, 136 foreigners) in a campaign against 'criminal hubs and illegal gold-prospecting networks', with equipment, weapons and 4x4 vehicles seized; an Egyptian court sentenced 450 people to one year in prison for illegal prospecting in the southern Red Sea area (reported 2 Jul 2026). On 11 Aug 2026 the armed forces said they seized 24 weapons, 49,211 rounds and 14 RPG rounds in the Aswan desert from a 'cross-border organized crime network', destined for sale inland and for 'criminal groups involved in illegal gold prospecting'. Arabi21 (22 Jun 2026), citing Sudanese social-media video, reports that Egyptian aircraft struck prospecting sites in the Halayeb area and at Allaqi on 16-17 Jun 2026 and that hundreds of Sudanese miners were deported through Argeen; Egypt had not announced this. Atar: Egypt's recorded gold exports to the UAE exceeded its production in 2023-2025.

Response

Official Egyptian statements are the source for the arrests and seizures. No Egyptian comment on the reported air strikes was found.

Reports of a joint operations room in North Kordofan / El Obeid after December 2025, field visits by Egyptian officers, and (unverified) Egyptian fatalities at Kosti in March 2026.

Why this grade

C for advisory presence in Kordofan (ACLED citing reports); D for casualties and for an Egyptian unit surrounded in Blue Nile

Response

Egypt has not confirmed any personnel in Sudan since 2023.

Sanctions

None

An Egyptian navy vessel docked at Port Sudan on 8 June 2023 carrying '270 tons of humanitarian and medical aid' per Egyptian media and SUNA. Humanitarian on its face; recorded as an early instance of Egyptian military logistics into the SAF-held port.

Fact-check

None.

Source

independent OSINT monitor (Sudan War Monitor; has issued public retractions)

RSF statement (1 June 2025) claims captured Egyptian-made armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition in Kordofan, 'confessions' by captured officers, that Egypt supplied 8 K-8 aircraft which reached Port Sudan in Aug 2024, and US-made 250 kg bombs. An earlier statement (11 Oct 2024) accused Egypt of military support since April 2023.

Fact-check

Egypt has publicly denied taking part in the fighting (its Foreign Ministry rejected Hemedti's Oct 2024 accusations – widely reported; the denial itself was not re-opened in this pass). Beam Reports rated several viral 'Egyptian air force' images/videos misleading (see known-false records).

Source

RSF official channel (party to the conflict; pro-RSF, UAE-aligned narrative)