Central Bank of Sudan

Banks listed by CBOS as its correspondents (AED, EUR, GBP, SAR, TRY, USD). Provides the Port Sudan authorities' access to international payments. Correspondent banking with a central bank is ordinary, lawful commerce; listing implies no wrongdoing.

Response

No response located in the sources reviewed.

Sanctions

None found in OFAC SDN / EU / UK lists checked 2026-10-03

Reference list only. A licence from the Port Sudan central bank is ordinary regulated business and is not evidence of support for the SAF. It shows which foreign state-linked banks keep a licensed presence under the SAF-led authorities, and that the RSF-linked Gulf (Al Khaleej) Bank is still listed.

Why this grade

A (official list)

The central bank's correspondent page was read again on 3 October 2026. It lists the same nine institutions as before: Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (Abu Dhabi); Al Salam Bank-Bahrain; Bank of Khartoum, Abu Dhabi; El Nilein Bank, Abu Dhabi; Alubaf Arab International Bank (Bahrain); Aktif Yatirim Bankasi (Istanbul); Bank Al Etihad (Amman); Bank of Beirut; British Arab Commercial Bank (London). The page is still undated and pass 2 dated its creation to about July 2021. No bank on the list has confirmed or denied a current relationship in any source found.

Response

None of the nine banks has commented publicly, as far as found.

The central bank's Economic & Financial Statistics Review for January-March 2026 (Table 2, source: Ministry of Finance) records US$1,204.7m of loan and grant drawings in 2025. US$617.1m was commodity grants; US$585.7m came from international organisations, almost all as grants (UN agencies 471.5, World Bank 65.7, African Development Bank 30.0, IFAD 7.4 grant plus 7.4 loan, donor fund 3.1); US$2.0m came from the Arab Fund (half grant, half loan). Every bilateral line is zero: Saudi Fund, Qatar, Oman, UAE, Kuwait, Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, India. The first quarter of 2026 shows zero across the table (preliminary). Loan repayments were US$31.9m in 2025, to the World Bank group and the African Development Bank only.

Response

Not applicable (official statistics).

The same review gives gold exports of US$1,536.3m in 2025 and US$370.7m in January-March 2026. By destination (all goods): UAE US$1,664.8m in 2024, US$926.2m in 2025 and US$7.7m in Q1 2026; COMESA countries (which include Egypt) US$289.5m, US$759.4m and US$319.3m; Saudi Arabia US$437.4m, US$409.7m and US$136.6m; 'other Arab countries' US$62.1m, US$180.6m and US$121.7m. The review does not break gold out by destination.

Response

Not applicable (official statistics).

Official posts record: (1) Feb 2026 - the governor told the prime minister she had signed a memorandum with the Central Bank of Oman and that 'correspondent relations were created between the Central Bank of Oman and a number of Sudanese banks'; Omani institutions agreed to invest in energy, mining, transport and ports. (2) 17 Jun 2026, Baku - memorandum on banking cooperation with the Central Bank of Azerbaijan, a 'general framework to develop correspondent banking relations and open branches and windows' of commercial banks. (3) 28 Jan 2026, Doha - the finance minister and governor met the Qatar Central Bank governor and agreed to 'update the agreements concluded between the two central banks'. (4) 17 Apr 2026, Washington - the governor and the State Bank of Pakistan governor discussed correspondent relations between commercial banks 'directly or indirectly'.

Why this grade

Grade A is for the fact that the page announced this. The page was identified as official by its name and content; no verification badge was detected.

Response

No statement from the foreign central banks looked up.

Sanctions

CBOS not designated.

Context, not support. January 2026: new transfer rules (sanctions screening, unified customer reference, reporting to the Financial Intelligence Unit; daily transfer cap raised to SDG 3m). July 2026: unnamed commercial banks penalised and bankers suspended from export/import transactions after inspections found FX violations. August 2026: customer-data (KYC) update deadline linked to the SUDAPASS digital ID, later extended to 31 Dec 2026. September 2026: two currency traders sentenced to two years and SDG 15m fines by Haj Youssef Criminal Court; pound at SDG 7,300 per US$ on the parallel market. The central bank injected about AED 400m into the banking system from 23 June 2026.

Response

n/a

The undated page listing nine correspondent banks is Drupal node 22309/22310 on cbos.gov.sd. Neighbouring nodes are dated daily exchange-rate posts: node 22305 is 15 July 2021 and node 22311 is 16 July 2021. The page was therefore created on about 15-16 July 2021, before the October 2021 coup and the war. It has not been shown to reflect wartime relationships. One listed bank's group has since withdrawn from Sudan (Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank's local branch, liquidated June 2026).

Response

n/a

Issues gold export certificates against advance payment; publishes the Foreign Trade Statistical Digest. STPT (citing a CBOS contact) reports most gold revenue was directed to the war effort, 'primarily for the import of weapons, ammunition, and drones', with government funds at CBOS 'handled by military leaders in the Sovereignty Council, with economic matters under General Ibrahim Jaber'. Dec 2024 currency replacement confined to six SAF-held states.

Why this grade

Regraded from B: one report citing one central-bank contact.

Response

No response located in the sources reviewed.

Sanctions

None found in OFAC SDN / EU / UK lists checked 2026-10-03

STPT investigative report (Jan 2025), citing unnamed Bank of Sudan sources, says gold sales at the central bank are often made by Sovereignty Council decisions, that the SAF commander personally intervenes in gold sales for the benefit of (fuel) importers, and that importers enjoy major privileges from SAF.

Response

No right-of-reply from SAF/Bank of Sudan recorded; RSF refused to answer the researchers on its own finances.

Source

Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker (independent Sudanese policy/research group)

A pro-army columnist, reposted 12 Jan 2024, wrote that the central bank kept its cohesion and 'rose to support the war effort by quickly reorganising the export sector' and preserved its foreign correspondents.

Fact-check

None.

Source

pro-SAF (unofficial news-aggregator channel 'السودان', ~212K subscribers; reposts official and partisan items)