Complicit Dossier

Foreign state support · state · Russia

Russia

روسيا

  • Documented supplier or backer
  • Grade A: Official recordStrongest record: official record
  • 3 documented ties · 1 step from the SAF

Also recorded as: Russian Federation - Red Sea naval facility and gold-for-arms offer; Russia (arms-for-naval-base understanding; cash brokers); Russia (second-pass update); Russia – Burhan's letter of thanks to Putin for the Security Council veto; Russia – energy and mining memoranda (2024–2025)

Listed as a backer on the strength of its Security Council veto and reported offers. No delivery to the SAF and no named exporter is documented.

On 1 Dec 2024 Burhan handed Russia's ambassador a letter thanking Putin for his 'unlimited support for Sudan', citing Russia's recent Security Council veto as a 'noble position'.

Their response

  • Russian Deputy UN Ambassador Polyanskiy on the veto: Sudan's government should be 'solely' responsible for what happens in Sudan. Bogdanov (12 Jun 2024, per Jamestown): 'no firm agreements at this time' on the base. WaPo (Mar 2025): Russia has not commented on weapons-supply reports. Wagner has claimed it no longer operates in Sudan (MEE).
  • No official confirmation of an arms-for-base exchange in the pieces read.
  • Russian ambassador Andrey Chernovol (Nov 2025): 'Given the current military conflict, movement on this issue has for now been halted.'
  • Not applicable.

Records

9

Each record carries its own grade. A grade describes the source for that record, not the actor.

Grade A: Official record

Russia – Burhan's letter of thanks to Putin for the Security Council veto

On 1 Dec 2024 Burhan handed Russia's ambassador a letter thanking Putin for his 'unlimited support for Sudan', citing Russia's recent Security Council veto as a 'noble position'.

Fact-check
None.
Source
official SAF-side (Transitional Sovereignty Council media office channel; presents as official, signed 'إعلام مجلس السيادة الانتقالي', active since 2020; not cross-verified from a government website)
Grade A: Official record

Russia – energy and mining memoranda (2024–2025)

SUNA headlines: the Minerals Minister signed 'a number of agreements, protocols and MoUs' in mining at the St Petersburg forum (7 June 2024); the Energy and Oil Ministry signed an MoU with the 'Russian chamber of commerce' (23 Jan 2025).

Fact-check
None.
Source
official SAF-side (SUNA, state news agency of the Port Sudan/Khartoum government)
  1. 1SUNA · t.me · 7 Jun 2024
Grade A: Official record

Russian defence ministry mission at Sudan's Ministry of Defence, named by the Russian embassy (September 2026)

2026-09-20

The Russian embassy's verified page posted on 20 Sep 2026 that 'officers of the Representation of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation at the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of the Sudan', a major-general and a colonel whom it names, visited the embassy to vote in the State Duma elections.

Why this grade
Grade A is for the fact that the page announced this. The page was identified as official by its name and content; no verification badge was detected.
Response
This is the Russian embassy's own statement.
›Research notes

Official Russian channel recording its own institution. It establishes that Russia keeps a defence-ministry representation attached to Sudan's defence ministry in September 2026, headed at general-officer rank; it says nothing about what the mission does. The officers' names are in the post and are not recorded here. Original: 'Офицеры Представительства Министерства обороны Российской Федерации при Министерстве обороны Республики Судан'.

Grade A: Official record

Official contacts 2025-2026: joint ministerial commission, deputy prime minister, interior ministers

2025-09 to 2026-09

(1) 22-24 Sep 2025, Moscow: the eighth session of the Sudanese-Russian joint ministerial commission, chaired by Sudan's minerals minister and Russia's natural resources minister, ended with a signed 'protocol of economic and trade cooperation' and memoranda; the Russian minister said bilateral trade had risen 92% (SMRC page). (2) 20 Oct 2025, Moscow: the finance minister met Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak with the energy minister; Novak cited 'the interest of the Russian public and private sectors in taking part in reconstruction' (minister's page). (3) 29 Sep 2026, Moscow: Russia's interior minister met Sudan's interior minister on 'Russian-Sudanese cooperation in police work' (police press office; Sudan's Moscow embassy). (4) 14 Jul 2026: Sudan's ambassador met the executive director of the gold company 'Alliance (Kush)', calling it 'a pioneering and successful model of Russian investment' whose production had increased (embassy page).

Why this grade
Grade A is for the fact that the page announced this. The page was identified as official by its name and content; no verification badge was detected.
Response
Russian embassy page (verified) carried the Lavrov meeting of 25 Sep 2026 and no contrary statement.
›Research notes

Source alignment: official SAF-side channel. Grade applies to the fact that the announcement was made, not to its content. Items 2 and 4 come from pages without a verification badge (the minister's page has 363,000 followers; the embassy page 3,700); they are graded as official for the fact of the announcement on the strength of consistent first-person and embassy content, and should be read as C if that is not accepted. No military content in any of these posts.

Grade B: Corroborated

Russia

Shift toward SAF from Apr-Jun 2024; naval facility talks 2024-2025; frozen Dec 2025

Diplomatic shield (sole veto of UNSC ceasefire resolution, 18 Nov 2024); offered the SAF weapons in 2024 in connection with a Red Sea naval logistics facility; reported supplier of fuel, weapons and jet components; Russian-made civilian-pattern small arms reach SAF-linked dealers.

Response
Russian Deputy UN Ambassador Polyanskiy on the veto: Sudan's government should be 'solely' responsible for what happens in Sudan. Bogdanov (12 Jun 2024, per Jamestown): 'no firm agreements at this time' on the base. WaPo (Mar 2025): Russia has not commented on weapons-supply reports. Wagner has claimed it no longer operates in Sudan (MEE).
Sanctions
US Treasury (24 Oct 2024) cites "a port-for-weapons deal with Russia" and Russian "weapons and diplomatic support" as emboldening the SAF. Aviacon Zitotrans (Russian airline that flew Baykar cargo) designated by OFAC 26 Jan 2023 under Russia/Wagner authorities.
Grade B: Corroborated

Russia (second-pass update)

December 2025

Base-for-arms negotiation: HSBA, citing the Wall Street Journal, says that in December 2025 Sudan's military authorities reportedly offered a 25-year agreement for a Russian naval base, "although the project has yet to materialize".

Why this grade
B for the offer (WSJ via HSBA and others); D for fighter-jet donation; C for TulAmmo presence
Response
Russian ambassador Andrey Chernovol (Nov 2025): 'Given the current military conflict, movement on this issue has for now been halted.'
Sanctions
No Sudan-related sanctions on the Russian state; Tula Cartridge Works under US sanctions since 20 July 2023 (Russia programme).
›Research notes

No named Russian state exporter and no documented 2026 delivery found. Russia does not appear as a reporter of arms exports to Sudan in Comtrade.

Grade B: Corroborated

Russia - wheat and other imports are ordinary trade; no state credit recorded

2024 - Q1 2026

Russia's Agroexport centre says agricultural exports to Sudan rose 2.3-fold in 2025 to 1.7 million tonnes worth US$410m, of which wheat was over US$408m. Sudan's central bank records imports from Russia of US$241.8m in 2024, US$484.7m in 2025 and US$159.9m in Q1 2026. The Ministry of Finance table of loan and grant drawings shows zero from Russia in 2025 and Q1 2026. No source reviewed documents wheat or fuel supplied on state credit or in exchange for gold; the only barter claim remains the reported naval-base offer already in the record.

Response
Not applicable.
›Research notes

Context, not support to the military. Who pays for the wheat and through which bank is not documented.

Grade C: Single source

Russian Federation - Red Sea naval facility and gold-for-arms offer

2025-12 (offer); earlier 2024 contacts per STPT

Wall Street Journal (reported by Asharq Al-Awsat, 3 Dec 2025), citing US and Sudanese officials: Sudan's government offered Russia a 25-year naval base (up to 300 personnel, four warships including nuclear-powered) and gold-mining investments in exchange for weapons.

Response
No response located in the sources reviewed.
Sanctions
None found in OFAC SDN / EU / UK lists checked 2026-10-03
Grade C: Single source

Russia (arms-for-naval-base understanding; cash brokers)

Sudan War Monitor analysis (Jan 2025) states the Sudanese government concluded an arrangement with Russia for weapons in return for a Russian military base on the Red Sea. Ayin (Aug 2025) adds that Russian arms brokers refuse bank transfers and take payment for weapons in cash in Dubai – one reason gold is sold there.

Response
No official confirmation of an arms-for-base exchange in the pieces read.
Source
independent monitoring collective; this piece is analysis/commentary
  1. 1Sudan War Monitor (Arabic edition, guest analysis) · sudanwarmonitor.com · 7 Jan 2025

5 more records below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

2 more records at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

Checked against the document

2

Statements compared with the wording of the primary document.

  • “Since the beginning of the war, the SAF has prioritized weapons acquisition, including Iranian drones and a port-for-weapons deal with Russia, choosing to expand the conflict rather than end it through good-faith negotiations. The weapons and diplomatic support provided by Iran and Russia have emboldened the SAF and lessened their interest in deescalating the conflict.”

    US Treasury press release jy267224 Oct 2024verified verbatim

  • 3 Dec 2025could not open

Relationships

8

← means the other party acts on this one; → means this one acts on the other.

Ownership and control · 1

Arms and supply · 3

2 more relationships below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

1 more relationship at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.

Political ties · 4

3 more relationships below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

2 more relationships at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

Weapons, sites and other subjects

1

Recorded links to things, places, events and authorities rather than to organisations or people.

  • To UN Security Council draft resolution on Sudan

    sole veto of ceasefire / protection of civilians text · 18 Nov 2024

    Grade A: Official record

Dated events

15
  1. OFAC designates Russia's 224th Flight Unit State Airlines as linked to the Wagner Group and lists its fleet, including An-124 RA-82040, as blocked property. treasury.gov

    Grade A: Official record
  2. Russian deputy FM Bogdanov visits Port Sudan with military officers; Russia reportedly offers 'unrestricted qualitative military aid'. middleeasteye.net

    Grade B: Corroborated
  3. SAF deputy commander Yasser al-Atta says Russia proposed a logistics supply centre in exchange for weapons and ammunition. jamestown.org

    Grade C: Single source
  4. OFAC designates Belarusian cargo airline Rubystar (UE RubiStar) for transporting Russian military personnel and military helicopters to Africa. home.treasury.gov

    Grade A: Official record
  5. Il-76 ST-JAN (ex EX-76011) shot down over Malha, North Darfur after SAF airdrop to El Fasher; Russian and Sudanese crew killed. sudanwarmonitor.com

    Grade B: Corroborated
  6. OFAC designates DIS director Mirghani Idris Suleiman; cites Iranian drones and a port-for-weapons deal with Russia. home.treasury.gov

    Grade A: Official record
  7. Russia casts sole veto against UK/Sierra Leone UNSC draft calling for ceasefire and protection of civilians in Sudan. voanews.com

    Grade A: Official record
  8. Bloomberg: Iran supplied dozens of drones; Russia provided fuel and weapons components; both sought Red Sea bases. iranintl.com

    Grade C: Single source
  9. Sudan's FM Ali Youssef announces 'mutual understanding' with Russia on a naval base. sudantribune.com

    Grade C: Single source
  10. Sudanese-Russian joint ministerial commission ends in Moscow with a cooperation protocol. facebook.com

    Grade A: Official record
  11. Sudan reportedly offers Russia a 25-year naval base agreement in exchange for arms (WSJ via HSBA); not materialised. smallarmssurvey.org

    Grade B: Corroborated
  12. Sudan Tribune: Sudan has frozen the Russian naval base; no progress in 2025. sudantribune.com

    Grade C: Single source
  13. Russian embassy names officers of the Russian defence ministry's representation at Sudan's Ministry of Defence. facebook.com

    Grade A: Official record
  14. Defense News: Aviacon Zitotrans aircraft 'may be supplying opposing sides', including flights from Russia and Turkey into Port Sudan defensenews.com

    Grade C: Single source
  15. Flight tracker reports a Russian 224th Flight Unit An-124 (RA-82040) flying from Minsk towards 'Port Sudan or Massawa'; two Belarusian Il-76s follow within 24 hours (single source; destination uncertain). x.com

    Grade D: Unverified lead

9 more events below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

6 more events at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

1 more event at grade D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.

Geography

Tags come from the recorded jurisdiction and from place names in the records. Coordinates on the map are approximate.

Based in
Russia
Also named
United Arab Emirates (1)
Places
Dubai, Moscow

Position in the network

Derived by analysing the documented relationships. Nothing in this section is a finding.

Still connected to the SAF when only official records are counted.

›Possible links to investigate · 3
  • Qatar hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary; cited in the same source (via Sudan Ministry of Defence).

  • Abdel Fattah al-Burhan hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: named in the other actor's record.

  • Sudanese Mineral Resources Company (SMRC) hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: named in the other actor's record.