Popular Resistance / National Committee for Mobilization

Created by SAF. FFM A/HRC/57/23 para 25: 'The leadership of the Sudanese Armed Forces established a committee to coordinate the recruiting, arming and financing of new militias.' CRP.6 para 84: 'In May 2024, SAF General Command issued The Regulations of Mobilization and Popular Resistance. At the national level, the SAF leadership established a National Committee for Mobilization and Popular Resistance to coordinate the mobilization into the SAF and the recruiting, arming and financing of the popular resistance. Each state also has its own committees ... The composition ... often includes current or former senior military and security officers, local officials, tribal and business leaders and also political figures, including a number associated with the Sudanese Islamist Movement and the former government of President Al Bashir.' OHCHR A/HRC/58/29 para 22 dates the regulations to 25 May 2024 (Transitional Sovereignty Council). Documented money flows: (i) North Kordofan Higher Committee announced 'support from companies and businessmen in the state exceeding 15 billion pounds as a first instalment, plus in-kind donations' (10 Jun 2024). (ii) Dalgo locality, Northern State: Sudan Tribune documents show a Popular Resistance committee agreed to buy 8 Land Cruisers and 8 DShK guns for SDG 1.569 billion (about US$500,000); 'a down payment of 750 million Sudanese pounds, drawn from corporate social responsibility funds, was made'; 4 vehicles were off-spec; the deal was 'verbal ... no official contracts'. The Arabic version says the vehicles were bought from a private showroom in Al-Dabbah. (iii) Leaked Islamic Movement performance report (Apr 2023-Apr 2024), per Sudan Tribune: 'some weapons were purchased with movement funds while official sources provided others'; '2,275 PRF training camps overseen by a central committee with branches in every state'. (iv) SUNA, 4 Nov 2025: Um Rawaba locality, 'the Zakat Chamber and the Chamber of Commerce' gave cattle, and crop traders gave shelter materials and digging equipment, 'to support the war effort'; received by the SAF Um Rawaba sector commander. (v) Nov 2025 (reported 13 Nov): River Nile governor dissolved the state Popular Resistance committee (assets incl. vehicles to be handed over), then reversed within hours 'amid reports of pressure'; a member said 'arming of the resistance is done directly by the armed forces'.

Why this grade

A (structure and mandate: UN FFM/OHCHR); B (corporate/business and zakat contributions: official announcements via SUNA and state committee); C (Dalgo deal and leaked report: single outlet)

Response

Dalgo Popular Resistance head (retired Brig. Azmi Hassan) to Sudan Tribune: 'The vehicles will be returned.' No response from the national committee captured.

Sanctions

None located.

Created by SAF mobilisation calls (from 2023; expanded Dec 2023 - Jan 2024). ACSS: led by Gen. Yasir al-Atta, 73,000+, 'among the largest armed militias operating across SAF-held territories'. STPT (eastern Sudan): mustanfareen are 'organized under the PR and sponsorship of SAF and supervised by Islamists including Barra Ibn Malik group, Special Operations Battalions, the General Intelligence Service (GIS) and others'; in the east a Popular Resistance/mustanfareen formation is led by Nazir Terik within the Joint Forces of Eastern Sudan Movements. Reuters: 'more than 70,000 joined operations' after the army's call. EUAA (citing Netherlands COI, 2024): 'Some government officials face pressure to enlist ... under the threat of losing their jobs or social benefits'; minors recruited as mustanfareen incl. girls in River Nile and Port Sudan camps. ACLED (June 2023, as relayed by EUAA): SAF arms and pays Popular Defence Forces in Gedaref and Kassala. Lighthouse lists Popular Resistance Forces among SAF-allied forces in the Kanabi attacks dataset.

Response

SAF publicly affirmed 18 as minimum recruitment age (TIP 2025).

Sanctions

None located

Armed and deployed by SAF. Ayin (25 Feb 2024): mustanfareen are 'misusing their new positions to set up arbitrary checkpoints, forcing civilians to pay bribes, raiding homes, and arresting anyone who calls for peace'; a Gedaref source: 'The army does not want to lose them so they don't interfere - they [mustanfareen] also do not earn salaries so they may let them earn from other means.' ACJPS (via Dabanga, 13 May 2024): 'Mass recruitment drives in SAF-controlled areas have led to abuses by newly recruited civilian soldiers, who exploit their positions for arbitrary arrests, extortion, and harassment of civilians, often with impunity.' Sudan Media Forum (23 Oct 2024): in SAF-controlled Omdurman 'soldiers dressed in army uniforms looted' phones at gunpoint; stolen goods 'regularly sold in local markets'; 'The SAF refused to comment'; videos showed 'armed groups in military uniforms admitting to impersonating soldiers'.

Response

'The SAF refused to comment on these accusations' (Sudan Media Forum).

Sanctions

None.

SUNA, 3 Sept 2026: Gezira sent a support convoy to Blue Nile and 'renews the call to open training camps on drones and support weapons' for mobilised civilians.

Why this grade

State media alone.

Fact-check

None.

Source

official SAF-side (SUNA, state news agency of the Port Sudan/Khartoum government)

SMRC's page reported on 25 Aug 2025 a 'support and backing convoy from River Nile State dispatched by the Popular Resistance with the participation of the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company', received in El Obeid by the governor, the acting commander of the 5th Infantry Division and the heads of the mobilisation and Popular Resistance committees of both states (both retired major-generals). The armed forces' page reported on 7 Feb 2026 that the land forces commander received at the Armoured Corps a convoy of 15 large trucks from White Nile State 'with the support and financing of the state governor and the Popular Resistance leadership'; he said the state 'has since the outbreak of the war supplied the armed forces with money and men'.