Command, allied forces and mobilisation · state intelligence service · Sudan
SAF Military Intelligence (MI)
Part of the SAF or state-controlled
AGrade A: Official recordStrongest record: official record
3 documented ties · 2 steps from the SAF
Also recorded as: الاستخبارات العسكرية; SAF Military Intelligence
Part of SAF. (1) Broker of paid militia alliances - FFM CRP.6 para 90: 'The SAF, often working through its Military Intelligence service, has also pursued alliances with other armed groups and militia leaders on the basis of shared political and military objectives or in exchange for payment, weapons and officer positions within the SAF. These include, for example, the JEM splinter faction headed by Abdelkarim Bakhit "Dabajo", the Sudan Awakening Revolutionary Council (SARF) linked to former RSF ally Musa Hilal, and SLM splinter factions headed by Sadiq al-Fuka and Ibrahim Abdullah Al-Toum "Bahloul".' UN Panel S/2024/65 para 22: before the war 'Meetings were held between Hilal and SAF leaders, including General Hassan Bilal, deputy director of military intelligence' to recruit former Border Guards. (2) Detention and abuse - S/2026/357: MI responsible for 13 of the child detentions, 2 abductions and 3 denial-of-access incidents attributed to SAF in 2025. FFM A/HRC/60/22 para 52: 'In military intelligence facilities in Singa, Sennar, in May 2024, detainees were beaten with water pipes while tied.' CRP.6 para 256: torture and ill-treatment 'carried out by the SAF, including its Military Intelligence'. (3) Named by the Gezira observatory among bodies running detention sites in El Gezira (see 'Detention-for-payment' entry).
Their response
Not captured.
The Attorney General replied to HRW on 2 Apr 2026, rejecting the allegations of arbitrary arrest and custodial deaths except one case in which criminal proceedings are said to be under way; she said security cells are formed by governors under emergency laws and that detainees are held only in police custody or prisons.
Records
2
Each record carries its own grade. A grade describes the source for that record, not the actor.
AGrade A: Official record
SAF Military Intelligence (MI)
2023 to 2026
›This record describes attacks on civilians. Show
Part of SAF. (1) Broker of paid militia alliances - FFM CRP.6 para 90: 'The SAF, often working through its Military Intelligence service, has also pursued alliances with other armed groups and militia leaders on the basis of shared political and military objectives or in exchange for payment, weapons and officer positions within the SAF. These include, for example, the JEM splinter faction headed by Abdelkarim Bakhit "Dabajo", the Sudan Awakening Revolutionary Council (SARF) linked to former RSF ally Musa Hilal, and SLM splinter factions headed by Sadiq al-Fuka and Ibrahim Abdullah Al-Toum "Bahloul".' UN Panel S/2024/65 para 22: before the war 'Meetings were held between Hilal and SAF leaders, including General Hassan Bilal, deputy director of military intelligence' to recruit former Border Guards. (2) Detention and abuse - S/2026/357: MI responsible for 13 of the child detentions, 2 abductions and 3 denial-of-access incidents attributed to SAF in 2025. FFM A/HRC/60/22 para 52: 'In military intelligence facilities in Singa, Sennar, in May 2024, detainees were beaten with water pipes while tied.' CRP.6 para 256: torture and ill-treatment 'carried out by the SAF, including its Military Intelligence'. (3) Named by the Gezira observatory among bodies running detention sites in El Gezira (see 'Detention-for-payment' entry).
Response
Not captured.
Sanctions
None located for MI as an entity.
›Research notes
No UN source reviewed attributes ransom-taking, smuggling or border bribery to MI. Ransom/hostage-taking findings in A/HRC/60/22 (paras 49, 56) are against the RSF only.
'Security cells' (GIS, Military Intelligence, police, at times Al-Baraa Ibn Malik): arbitrary detention; payment-for-release documented only once
2024-2026
›This record describes attacks on civilians. Show
Human Rights Watch (7 Apr 2026; 28 interviews, Jun 2025-Feb 2026): state governors in army-controlled areas set up 'security cells' made up of police, the General Intelligence Service, Military Intelligence 'and in some cases, al-Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade'; detainees were held in houses used as ad hoc sites and in military facilities in Omdurman, River Nile, Northern, Gedaref, Red Sea, Gezira and Khartoum. Money appears in one case: a trader stopped at a checkpoint in western Omdurman in Dec 2025 said three SAF personnel interrogated him and he 'was released after they took my money - I had US$200 on me'. A relative of a man taken in Atbara in Jan 2025 said he was arrested 'at a checkpoint controlled by Military Intelligence'. HRW does not describe a ransom system. UN findings are consistent with that: A/HRC/61/24 (13 Jan 2026, para 69) says 'the Rapid Support Forces systematically used abduction as a revenue-generating mechanism, holding civilians for ransom', and makes no such finding against SAF-side bodies, while recording torture and a death in custody 'by Sudanese Armed Forces-allied security forces and militias' in Gezira (para 70) and journalists detained 'by the Joint Security Cell and Military Intelligence for denouncing corruption' (para 78). OHCHR's Khartoum detention report (to June 2024) records payments only in its RSF section.
Response
The Attorney General replied to HRW on 2 Apr 2026, rejecting the allegations of arbitrary arrest and custodial deaths except one case in which criminal proceedings are said to be under way; she said security cells are formed by governors under emergency laws and that detainees are held only in police custody or prisons.
›Research notes
Detention and ill-treatment: HRW plus UN (B to A). Payment for release by SAF-side bodies: one HRW testimony here, plus the Gezira observatory material already in the dossier. No UN body has made a detention-for-payment finding against Military Intelligence or the security cells.
2 more relationships below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
1 more relationship at grade C (single source) or D (unverified lead). Change “Evidence shown” to see it.
Dated events
2
GNU chief of staff Al Namroush receives SAF Military Intelligence director Mohamed Ali Sabir in Tripoli; training and intelligence exchange agreed. thenationalnews.com↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Human Rights Watch reports arbitrary detention and torture by army 'security cells' (GIS, Military Intelligence, police, at times Al-Baraa Ibn Malik); the Attorney General rejects the findings. hrw.org↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
2 more events below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
Geography
Tags come from the recorded jurisdiction and from place names in the records. Coordinates on the map are approximate.
Based in
Sudan
Places
Khartoum, Omdurman, Atbara, Gedaref, Wad Madani / Gezira, River Nile State
Position in the network
Derived by analysing the documented relationships. Nothing in this section is a finding.
Connected to the SAF through official or corroborated records.