Complicit Dossier

Procurement and supply networks · company · India

Chemtrade International Corporation

  • Commercial or professional counterparty
  • Grade B: CorroboratedStrongest record: corroborated
  • 1 documented tie · 2 steps from the SAF

Also recorded as: Chemtrade International Corporation (second-pass update)

C4ADS assessed the diversion of chlorine as "unbeknownst to Chemtrade". The company says the cylinders were for water treatment. Nothing shows the exporter knew of any military use.

Flagged for legal review before publication.

Exported compressed chlorine gas cylinders to Ports Engineering Company; one cylinder (serial GC-1983-1715, from a batch of 17 shipped from Nhava Sheva on 14 Jul 2024) was filmed after being used as a chemical weapon near al-Jaili refinery on 5 Sep 2024.

Their response

  • Chemtrade (marketing director Dhruvesh Bhonsale) to FRANCE 24: the consignee 'imports chlorine cylinders exclusively for water treatment purposes under the Tawila Water Supply System' and 'all past and current transactions were handled via Ports Engineering Company only'. UNICEF said it never worked with Ports Engineering and that Tawila uses chlorine powder, not gas.
  • Chemtrade to FRANCE 24: the importer assured it the chlorine would be used 'only to treat potable water' (Tawila Water Supply System). C4ADS: Chemtrade is 'a manufacturer and exporter of chlorine for water treatment and other legitimate purposes'; the chlorine 'may have been diverted from its intended use (unbeknownst to Chemtrade)'.
  • See arms-thread record (company told FRANCE 24 the chlorine was for water treatment and handled only via Ports Engineering Company).

Records

3

Each record carries its own grade. A grade describes the source for that record, not the actor.

Grade B: Corroborated

Chemtrade International Corporation

Apr 2023 - 2024

›This record describes attacks on civilians. Show

Exported compressed chlorine gas cylinders to Ports Engineering Company; one cylinder (serial GC-1983-1715, from a batch of 17 shipped from Nhava Sheva on 14 Jul 2024) was filmed after being used as a chemical weapon near al-Jaili refinery on 5 Sep 2024.

Response
Chemtrade's marketing director to FRANCE 24: the consignee 'imports chlorine cylinders exclusively for water treatment purposes under the Tawila Water Supply System' and 'all past and current transactions were handled via Ports Engineering Company only'. UNICEF said it never worked with Ports Engineering and that Tawila uses chlorine powder, not gas.
Sanctions
None found.
  1. 1FRANCE 24 Observers (via Yahoo News): How did chlorine imported to Sudan for water purification end up being used as a poison gas? · uk.news.yahoo.com · 29 Nov 2025
  2. 2France 24 Les Observateurs: Guerre au Soudan : enquete sur l'utilisation d'armes chimiques par l'armee soudanaise · france24.com · 29 Nov 2025read via summary
  3. 3US State Department: Imposing Measures on Sudan for its Use of Chemical Weapons · state.gov · 22 May 2025read via summary
  4. 4US Treasury: Treasury Sanctions Networks Fueling Sudan's Civil War and Worsening Humanitarian Crisis · home.treasury.gov · 26 Jun 2026

NamesPorts Engineering

Grade B: Corroborated

Chemtrade International Corporation (second-pass update)

2024

Exporter of the chlorine cylinders traced to the al-Jaili attack (first pass). Second pass adds the C4ADS statement that diversion was "unbeknownst to Chemtrade", India-reported national chlorine export volumes, and the lack of any documented Indian regulatory reaction.

Response
Chemtrade to FRANCE 24: the importer assured it the chlorine would be used 'only to treat potable water' (Tawila Water Supply System). C4ADS: Chemtrade is 'a manufacturer and exporter of chlorine for water treatment and other legitimate purposes'; the chlorine 'may have been diverted from its intended use (unbeknownst to Chemtrade)'.
Sanctions
None
›Research notes

C4ADS (15 Apr 2026) describes the chain as running 'from an Indian manufacturer through a UAE-linked intermediary to Ports Engineering Co. Ltd.'; the intermediary is not named in that sentence (Bond Technologies FZE is the UAE firm named for the Karmetal shipment). No statement by Indian authorities and no further Chemtrade statement after the June 2026 OFAC action was found. The FRANCE 24 text names neither the vessel nor the freight forwarder. Dating note: Arms Control Today dates the first FRANCE 24 investigation (chlorine use) to October 2025; the supply-chain piece with C4ADS is the 29 Nov 2025 article.

  1. 1C4ADS: C4ADS Supports France 24 Investigation into Alleged Chemical Weapons Use in Sudan · c4ads.org · 1 Dec 2025
  2. 2C4ADS: Sudan's Armed Conflict Enters Its Fourth Year · c4ads.org · 15 Apr 2026
  3. 3FRANCE 24 Observers (reprinted by Yahoo News UK): Did chlorine imported into Sudan for water treatment end up in chemical weapons? · uk.news.yahoo.com · 29 Nov 2025
  4. 4Arms Control Today (Kimball): Sudan Army Said to Use Chlorine as Weapon · armscontrol.org · Jan 2026
  5. 5UN Comtrade public preview API: reporter-declared exports to Sudan (partner 729), HS 93, 8710, 8802, 8806, 3602, 3603, 2801, years 2022-2025 · comtradeapi.un.org · 3 Oct 2026

NamesUAEPorts EngineeringBond Technologies FZEKarmetal

Grade B: Corroborated

Three chlorine shipments in 2024: trade records and India's own customs statistics agree

July - November 2024

›This record describes attacks on civilians. Show

The FRANCE 24 / C4ADS shipment table lists three chlorine consignments (HS 28011000) from Chemtrade International Corporation to Sudan, dated 11 July, 26 September and 8 November 2024, with the importer recorded as unknown; 'according to Chemtrade, the importer listed as "unknown" was in fact Ports Engineering Company'. India's monthly customs returns to UN Comtrade show chlorine exports to Sudan in exactly those three months and no others in 2024-2026: 15,300 kg (July 2024), 48,600 kg (September 2024) and 48,600 kg (November 2024), 112,500 kg in all. At 900 kg per cylinder that is 17, 54 and 54 cylinders, or 125, which matches both the 17 cylinders FRANCE 24 traced to the July shipment and its total of 'at least 125 cylinders'. Two of the three shipments, 108 of the 125 cylinders, left India after the attacks of 5 and 13 September 2024. FRANCE 24 could not establish what happened to the other 123 cylinders.

Response
Chemtrade (marketing director, to FRANCE 24): the consignee 'imports chlorine cylinders exclusively for water treatment purposes under the Tawila Water Supply System'; 'they verbally informed us that they are working under a contract with the Nile River Water Board'; 'all past and current transactions were handled via Ports Engineering Company only'. C4ADS: the chlorine 'may have been diverted from its intended use (unbeknownst to Chemtrade)'. UNICEF: no chlorine gas dosing is used at Tawila and the cylinder serial number matches nothing UNICEF supplied. No statement by any Indian authority was found.
›Research notes

Dual-use framing: chlorine is a standard water-treatment chemical and is not a scheduled chemical under the Chemical Weapons Convention; its use as a weapon is what is prohibited. Nothing in the record shows Chemtrade knew of any diversion: the first public report of chemical weapons use was the New York Times in January 2025 and the cylinder was not traced until November 2025, after all three shipments. The 900 kg-per-cylinder conversion is this desk's arithmetic (the standard 'tonner' size), not a figure from a source; Comtrade does not name exporters. Chemtrade is not on the OFAC SDN list.

  1. 1FRANCE 24 Observers / C4ADS table, 'Ports Engineering Company is one of the only regular importers of chlorine to Sudan' (dataset.csv) · datawrapper.dwcdn.net · 4 Dec 2025
  2. 2FRANCE 24 Observers (Yahoo syndication), 'How did chlorine imported to Sudan for water purification end up being used as a poison gas?' · uk.news.yahoo.com · 29 Nov 2025read via summary
  3. 3UN Comtrade, monthly reporter-declared exports to Sudan (India 699, Egypt 818; HS 280110, 3602, 3603), queried 3 Oct 2026; raw JSON in raw/pass3/ · comtradeapi.un.org · 3 Oct 2026
  4. 4C4ADS, 'C4ADS Supports France 24 Investigation into Alleged Chemical Weapons Use in Sudan' · c4ads.org · 1 Dec 2025not opened
  5. 5OFAC SDN list (cached copy in raw/sdn.xml, searched by name) · treasury.gov · 3 Oct 2026

NamesPorts Engineering

3 more records below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

Checked against the document

1

Statements compared with the wording of the primary document.

Relationships

3

← means the other party acts on this one; → means this one acts on the other.

Arms and supply · 3

3 more relationships below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

Dated events

9

  1. First of three Chemtrade chlorine consignments to Sudan in trade records (17 cylinders; loaded at Nhava Sheva 14 July per FRANCE 24) datawrapper.dwcdn.net

    Grade B: Corroborated

  2. 17 chlorine cylinders shipped by Chemtrade from Nhava Sheva (India) for Ports Engineering Company, Port Sudan. uk.news.yahoo.com

    Grade B: Corroborated

  3. 17 chlorine cylinders shipped by Chemtrade loaded at Nhava Sheva for Port Sudan; collected by Ports Engineering on 17 Aug 2024 (vessel not named). uk.news.yahoo.com

    Grade B: Corroborated

  4. Chlorine barrel dropped on Garri base near al-Jaili refinery; second attack 13 Sep. Barrel serial traced to Chemtrade shipment. uk.news.yahoo.com

    Grade B: Corroborated

  5. Second Chemtrade chlorine consignment to Sudan (48,600 kg in Indian customs data for September) datawrapper.dwcdn.net

    Grade B: Corroborated

  6. Third and last Chemtrade chlorine consignment to Sudan (48,600 kg in Indian customs data for November) datawrapper.dwcdn.net

    Grade B: Corroborated

  7. FRANCE 24 Observers publish chlorine supply-chain investigation naming Chemtrade and Ports Engineering. uk.news.yahoo.com

    Grade B: Corroborated

  8. FRANCE 24 and C4ADS trace the Garri cylinder to Chemtrade and Ports Engineering uk.news.yahoo.com

    Grade B: Corroborated

  9. C4ADS press release: Ports Engineering is majority-owned by Giad; Karmetal shipment detail; chlorine diversion "unbeknownst to Chemtrade". c4ads.org

    Grade B: Corroborated

9 more events below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.

Geography

Tags come from the recorded jurisdiction and from place names in the records. Coordinates on the map are approximate.

Based in
India
Also named
United Arab Emirates (2)
Places
Al-Jaili / Garri

Position in the network

Derived by analysing the documented relationships. Nothing in this section is a finding.

Connected to the SAF through official or corroborated records.

›Possible links to investigate · 2

  • Karmetal hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary; named in the other actor's record; cited in the same source (via Ports Engineering Company Ltd).

  • Bond Technologies FZE hypothesis

    No direct tie is documented. Basis: shared intermediary; named in the other actor's record; cited in the same source (via Ports Engineering Company Ltd).