Command, allied forces and mobilisation · state security services · Sudan
General Intelligence Service (GIS) and Central Reserve Forces
Part of the SAF or state-controlled
AGrade A: Official recordStrongest record: official record
3 documented ties · 2 steps from the SAF
Also recorded as: جهاز المخابرات العامة; Central Reserve Police; Abu Tira; الاحتياطي المركزي
State services aligned with SAF. FFM CRP.6 para 80: by 'a legal amendment from May 2024', GIS 'regained legal powers of interrogation, search, detention and asset seizure, along with immunities shielding its personnel from criminal or civil prosecution without approval of its director'. Para 81: Central Reserve Forces are 'formally under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior' but 'it is widely considered that they are effectively controlled by the GIS'; after heavy losses in 2023 the CRF 'has seen a less pronounced role in the ongoing armed conflict'. Para 82: state security committees (governor, GIS state director, police director, senior SAF and reportedly MI officers) 'have been integrated into the efforts to mobilize new forces, neutralize RSF supporters and suppress any opposition to SAF military rule'. Anti-trafficking/heritage role: GIS handed 570 recovered antiquities to the Culture Ministry (Dabanga, 14 Jan 2026); customs anti-smuggling operations in Red Sea State were 'in coordination with' GIS (customs statement, Mar 2026).
Their response
Not captured.
Records
3
Each record carries its own grade. A grade describes the source for that record, not the actor.
AGrade A: Official record
General Intelligence Service (GIS) and Central Reserve Forces
2023 to 2026
State services aligned with SAF. FFM CRP.6 para 80: by 'a legal amendment from May 2024', GIS 'regained legal powers of interrogation, search, detention and asset seizure, along with immunities shielding its personnel from criminal or civil prosecution without approval of its director'. Para 81: Central Reserve Forces are 'formally under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior' but 'it is widely considered that they are effectively controlled by the GIS'; after heavy losses in 2023 the CRF 'has seen a less pronounced role in the ongoing armed conflict'. Para 82: state security committees (governor, GIS state director, police director, senior SAF and reportedly MI officers) 'have been integrated into the efforts to mobilize new forces, neutralize RSF supporters and suppress any opposition to SAF military rule'. Anti-trafficking/heritage role: GIS handed 570 recovered antiquities to the Culture Ministry (Dabanga, 14 Jan 2026); customs anti-smuggling operations in Red Sea State were 'in coordination with' GIS (customs statement, Mar 2026).
Response
Not captured.
Sanctions
Central Reserve Police: US OFAC (first-pass sanctions.json; designation pre-dates the war).
›Research notes
CONFIRMED NEGATIVE within sources reviewed: no source read in this pass documents wartime looting, checkpoint taxation or detention-for-ransom by the Central Reserve Police. Search was limited (site searches on Dabanga, Darfur24, Sudan Akhbar, Al-Taghyeer); treat as 'not found', not as exoneration.
General Intelligence Service: security cooperation with Azerbaijan's State Security Service; director on the Ankara delegation
2025-09 to 2026-09
The service's media office reported that its director-general led Sudan's delegation to the Baku Security Forum on 21-23 Sep 2025 and again in September 2026, when he 'discussed with the leadership of the Azerbaijani State Security Service strengthening security and intelligence cooperation', the talks covering 'developments in the military and security situation in Sudan' (22 Sep 2026). DIS's page lists the director among the three officials accompanying Burhan to Ankara on 25 Dec 2025.
Why this grade
Grade A is for the fact that the page announced this. The page was identified as official by its name and content; no verification badge was detected.
›Research notes
Source alignment: official SAF-side channel. Grade applies to the fact that the announcement was made, not to its content. Page is not badge-verified on Facebook; treated as official because its output is the body's own press material (same texts are carried by the state news agency) and it is referenced by other official pages. Two pages carry the service's name (about 69,000 and 77,000 followers); both carry the same releases.
Central Reserve Forces: banking window and welfare support from the army-owned Omdurman National Bank (2026)
2026-04 to 2026-05
Omdurman National Bank's verified page reports opening a banking window at the Central Reserve Forces' headquarters at Kalakla (16 Apr 2026), with the bank ready 'to provide the financing needed for the projects of the forces and their personnel', and financing 1,100 sacrificial animals for the force's personnel (25 May 2026). The force's commander, a police major-general, attended both events.
Why this grade
Grade A is for the fact that the page announced this. The page was identified as official by its name and content; no verification badge was detected.
Sanctions
Central Reserve Forces: US (2022, as recorded in the dossier).
›Research notes
Grade A for the bank's own announcements. Shows a sanctioned force being served and supported by a bank the dossier records as army-owned.
Burhan arrives in Ankara accompanied by the DIS director-general and the intelligence director. facebook.com↗
AGrade A: Official record
Human Rights Watch reports arbitrary detention and torture by army 'security cells' (GIS, Military Intelligence, police, at times Al-Baraa Ibn Malik); the Attorney General rejects the findings. hrw.org↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
Omdurman National Bank opens a banking window at the Central Reserve Forces' headquarters at Kalakla. facebook.com↗
AGrade A: Official record
Omdurman National Bank finances and delivers 1,100 sacrificial animals to Central Reserve Forces personnel. facebook.com↗
AGrade A: Official record
Customs anti-smuggling, GIS and drug police announce two meth labs dismantled in Khartoum State; 150,000 captagon pills and drone-guidance fibre-optic spools seized; two foreign suspects held. sudantribune.net↗
BGrade B: Corroborated
2 more events below grade A (corroborated, single-source or unverified). Change “Evidence shown” to see them.
Geography
Tags come from the recorded jurisdiction and from place names in the records. Coordinates on the map are approximate.
Based in
Sudan
Also named
Azerbaijan (3), Türkiye (2)
Places
Omdurman, Red Sea State, Darfur, Ankara, Baku
Position in the network
Derived by analysing the documented relationships. Nothing in this section is a finding.
Still connected to the SAF when only official records are counted.